SURVIVING THE PEACE The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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Bosnia Update, October 10, 2022
Corruption; Electoral Campaigning; the October 2 Elections; A Decree by HR Schmidt

The big news since my last blog is two-fold: Bosnia-Herzegovina's national elections took place on Sunday, October 2, and that evening, after the polls were closed but before the election's results were announced, High Representative Christian Schmidt imposed a set of laws that adjusted electoral procedures in the Federation. They also streamlined the process of post-election governmental formation, with a view to preventing political manipulation and stalling.

I'll start with some updates on corruption which, in my opinion illustrate why most people run for office in Bosnia, and then something about how one of them runs for office.

Corruption

It may sound a little naïve, but there are probably a few politicians who want power because they are Bosnian patriots and they want to make their country a better place. There are plenty of patriots in Bosnia, but most of them are too honest to want to run for office. Most politicians just want to enrich themselves in various ways. This also describes judges and prosecutors. The opportunities for graft are plentiful, particularly in that realm where mafia operations and political power overlap.

In late September the US Treasury Department targeted yet another Bosnian official, state-level prosecutor Diana Kajmaković, with sanctions. Kajmaković had been a member of the prosecutorial office's Organized Crime and Corruption Division, but when information surfaced that pointed to her ties with regional narco-traffickers, she was moved to the Special Division for War Crimes.

This information was revealed in the course of an ongoing investigation of material available from deciphered Sky transcripts. The Sky application, shut down in 2021, was an encryption program popular among members of organized crime groups around Europe and North America. The FBI, US Department of Justice, and police departments in several European countries undertook to crack the Sky codes, and investigators have been studying transcripts of criminals' correspondence ever since. Some 2,500 figures within Bosnia-Herzegovina were known to use Sky. [1]

The prosecutorial division in which Kajmaković was employed analyzed Sky messages. She was removed from the team in May of this year when her name came up in some messages where people involved in illegal operations were mentioning her as a cooperative element in the prosecutorial office. She was not fired—just moved to another division.

The US Treasure Department describes her as "a flagrant example of a corrupt state prosecutor of BiH, connected to criminal organizations.” Its report stated that "in support of drug dealers and other criminals, Kajmaković helped conceal evidence, prevent criminal prosecution, and in other ways assisted illegal activities in exchange for personal gain.” The report further described her as attempting to block investigation into her criminal affiliations, and as "complicit in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes." Among such actions was her failure to use a method of assigning criminal cases to prosecutors in a way that would prevent conflicts of interest.

Investigative journalist Avdo Avdić points out that the sanctioning of Kajmaković came as no surprise to people who pay attention to the behavior of prosecutors, as her above-mentioned illicit practices were on display for quite some years [2]. For that matter, few if any chief prosecutors in the state-level office have ever finished their terms in office; remember Gordana Tadić, removed for corruption last year, and before her Goran Salihović, removed for corruption in 2016 (see my previous blogs about Tadić here and here)—and for that matter, Milan Tegeltija, erstwhile head of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC), who resigned under suspicion of corruption in 2020 (see my January 2021 blog here).

Although Kajmaković was removed from her earlier division, and even though she was sanctioned by the US, she cannot be removed as prosecutor except by a decision from the disciplinary commission of the HJPC. That office has stated that it does not have information against Kajmaković at this point, and there is no other legal basis for her temporary suspension. Transparency International of Bosnia, the corruption watchdog organization, notes that other officials who have been sanctioned are continuing to do their jobs without any problem, and that the judiciary is "not in a condition to fight corruption within its ranks." [3]

Authors of this commentary go on to assert that Kajmaković, Tegeltija, Tadić, and another 25 judges, prosecutors, politicians, lawyers, and their representatives are the tip of the iceberg of corruption in the judiciary.

In another imposition of sanctions, the US Treasury Department placed Prime Minister of the Bosnian Federation Fadil Novalić on its blacklist, as well as Republika Srpska businessman Slobodan Stanković, on October 3. The sanctions against these figures, again, are no surprise. Novalić has been on trial, sporadically, for corruption in the ventilator scandal which broke in 2020. In that episode, PM Novalić was involved in the dodgy purchase of overpriced and useless Chinese ventilators through a Srebrenica-based raspberry cultivator who had no license to import (see my earlier blogs on this subject here and here).

In a move reminiscent of the US Prohibition Bureau's tax evasion case against Al Capone, the US Treasury Department accused Novalić of "undermining democratic institutions" by misusing pensioners' personal data, that is, sending pensioners campaign letters in the 2018 electoral campaign. It is clear to Bosnian observers that this thin excuse for sanctions was employed because there has, so far, been no conviction against Novalić for his ongoing corruption case.

The Treasury Department admitted that the sanctions were imposed because of "a larger, publicly reported pattern of using his position of political influence for personal or party gain, undermining democratic processes or institutions" in Bosnia. [4]

Slobodan Stanković has been a high-profile crony of Bosnian Serb strongman Milorad Dodik since the end of the war. He is owner of the construction company Integral Inženjering, in Dodik's home town of Laktaši. Stanković's company regularly receives lucrative construction contracts from the RS government without tender; he has been targeted because of his close ties with Dodik. (Dodik himself has been under US sanction since 2017. The sanctions against him were strengthened at the beginning of this year.)

The State Department characterizes Stanković as "having materially assisted, sponsored, provide material support for" Dodik. [5] The main thrust of the US State Department and the Treasury Department's sanctions in the RS has been to attempt to foil Dodik's ongoing secessionist and generally destabilizing program. But Dodik is a professional, and the US has not shown any real effectiveness in dealing with him.

I refer you to a discussion by Kurt Bassuener of the Democratization Policy Council, where he says that "it is mistaken to speak of 'corruption' in Bosnian politics as if it is a matter of an opportunistic infection or an aberration. The abuse of the public trust for material and political benefit is really the point of politics...the strengthening of sanctions announced by the US is an obvious method for transmitting a message, but not an offer of support for a real systemic change." Bassuener adds, "As long as individuals from Bosnia and the Balkans are not hit where they most likely have property or where they travel—especially Austria and Germany—the real influence of sanctions is limited (my translation). [6]

Bosnia and Russia

Among the vast majority of candidates, who are not patriots but profiteers, there's a limited and time-worn repertoire of activities that have proven effective in winning elections. All of them have to do with stoking mistrust among one population against another. Let's concentrate on the behavior of the master, Milorad Dodik.

Here, this discussion overlaps somewhat with the burning issue of the Russian assault on Ukraine. One of Dodik's strong cards is the relationship he has developed with Putin. Dodik has been traveling to Russia and meeting with Putin more than once a year for several years. The relationship that the two have developed is advantageous for both of them: Dodik basks in the great strongman's aura, gleaning a measure of power and fierceness from the encounter. And Putin finds in Dodik one of his most trustworthy levers for destabilizing Bosnia-Herzegovina and keeping it out of any Euro-Atlantic alliance. The alliance between the two figures is a natural one.

Furthermore, having blocked Bosnia's participation in Western sanctions against Russia, Dodik has ensured favorable economic relations with that country. This advantage includes delivery of Russian gas that most of the rest of Europe is having an increasingly harder time acquiring, and the Republika Srpska also receives direct investment from Russia in various forms.

All of this dovetails with Russia's relationship with the closest RS ally, Serbia. Alongside significant economic and military cooperation between Serbia and Russia, Russia has also prevented the UN Security Council from passing a resolution condemning the genocide at Srebrenica. Russia also, together with China, refuses to recognize Kosovo as an independent state.

Dodik uses the fact that he has a very powerful patron to the east who can, at least in theory, help the RS, as a trump card that no other politician can wield. From our distance and the mainstream perspective of Americans, it all sounds distasteful, at the very least. But from the perspective of the average RS voter, there is evidence that Russia has, over the last couple of decades, turned into a beacon of some sort. As the International Republican Institute learned via an opinion poll this year, "89% of Bosnian Serbs have a positive view of Russia's role in Bosnia." [7]

Dodik's stance on Russia's war against Ukraine is fascinating because, among other things, it diverges from that of Serbia in one aspect. This refers to the recent legal atrocity called "referendums" in four Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia. Serbia opposed these "referendums," while Dodik supported them. The reasoning is built around the pretense that there is any validity whatsoever to arranging any kind of vote, in the middle of a war, in occupied territories. For Serbia, a vote for independence in a breakaway territory is too similar to what has happened in Kosovo, and therefore unsupportable. On the other hand, such a move is exactly what Dodik aspires to do with the RS: hold a referendum and secede. So he supports an analogous move in the Ukrainian situation. [8]

During a mid-September visit to Putin, Dodik supported Russia's escalation against Ukraine, saying, "For many years the West did not react to the extermination of the Russian population in Ukraine, there were daily murders and bombings in Donbas...All this was clear, and Russia was forced to retaliate.” [9]

Under present conditions it is very unlikely that the Republika Srpska will be able to secede from Bosnia, but this is something that Dodik continues to promote, especially when he is running for office. In a campaign rally in late September, he said, “Bosnia-Herzegovina is not the place for us. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a place that constantly suppresses us to take off in our development...And I think that these conditions (for separation) are being created, Europe is in more and more trouble. America is losing its strength. A new world is being created...In that world it is important that the Republika Srpska has Milorad Dodik who can call Putin and see him tomorrow.” [10]

Around this time, some public figures from the RS traveled to occupied parts of Ukraine to observe the sham referendum. One was Slobodan Šoja, a historian and former Bosnian ambassador to France and Egypt, and the other was Oleg Soldat, a professor of philosophy in Banja Luka. Their presence as observers raised a furor in Bosnia, prompting the foreign minister to state that no one was sent to Ukraine in an official capacity. But the presence of Serbs from the RS can be interpreted as further support for Russia's war.

On September 29 Dodik held a campaign rally in Laktaši that was attended by some 5,000 people. During his speech he proclaimed, "Živjela Republika Srpska, živjela Srbija, živjela Rusija, živio srpski narod! – Long live Republika Srpska, long live Serbia, long live Russia, long live the Serb people!" This was greeted by large applause. [11]

The Croat and Bosniak nationalist candidates also promote ethno-chauvinism in their campaigns. The Serb expressions are the most extreme. All in all, Dodik's efforts to play the Russia card in order to bolster his support in the elections have become more and more flagrantly accommodating to Russian brutality. But they work.

Elections

The recent election included seats for the three-part state-level presidency; parliaments at the state level, in both entities, and in the ten cantons of the Federation; and the presidency of the Republika Srpska, among other positions.

The poll was essentially a contest between those who favored the "civic option," that is, treating individuals as citizens rather than as members of an ethnic flock, and those who wished to keep to the old system, prescribed by the Dayton constitution, that divided the population according to the religion of their grandparents rather than according to their common interests as workers, students, pensioners, women, etc.

Support for the civic option was present, if not prevalent, mainly among Bosniak voters. The Croat vote is primarily homogenized around Dragan Čović's Croat nationalist HDZ, with Croat dissenters unorganized and peripheral. Among the Serb voters and their representatives, there is a strong opposition force in the Republika Srpska. Leaders of the PDP, SDS, and a couple of other parties cooperated and mounted their movement against Dodik and his SNSD party as an anti-corruption campaign, which is entirely justifiable (though it is tempting to think that the resentment of Dodik and his abuses is more based on jealousy than righteous objection to corruption).

However, the Serb opposition parties are, for the most part, equally as nationalist, separatist, racist, and xenophobic as the SNSD. For example, the PDP/joint opposition candidate for president of the Republika Srpska, Jelena Trivić, swears fealty to the memory of Draža Mihailović, World War II Chetnik leader.

The October 2 elections showed mixed results and involved a certain amount of chaos, but left an opening for some analysts to declare victory for the civic option. The main basis for this was the victory of non-nationalist Željko Komšić, for a fourth time, for the seat of Croat member of the presidency, along with the victory of Social Democrat Denis Bećirovic for Bosniak member, edging out SDA candidate Bakir Izetbegović with a convincing margin of 100,000 votes (at more than 296,000 votes for Bećirović and nearly 194,000 for Izetbegović).

Victory was expected for Komšić, who has been a member of the presidency for three out of the past four terms. This, of course, is considered an outrage by Croat leaders because he is not a member of the HDZ and wages an ongoing fight against that party's separatism. He receives votes from Croats who disagree with the HDZ's divisive stance, but they are in the minority. It is the Bosniak vote that puts him in office.

HDZ leader Dragan Čović has called the Bosniak-driven election of a non-HDZ politician an "anti-constitutional theft of Croat positions" and a "usurpation of the rights of the Croats." It is an intuitively attractive position to assert that the Croats should control the selection of their own representative—if you believe in the separation of citizens by ethnicity. But the system that allows people in the Federation to vote for whichever candidate they favor (between Croats and Bosniaks, but not including other ethnicities) is one of the more democratic elements of the constitution, and one that the Croat nationalists would be happy to remove.

In a campaign rally, Čović declared, "Bosnia cannot be a civic state; we must return sovereignty to the Croat people. History does not permit this [change]. We can't be a state of one people. Let us be sensitive about this." Of course, when Čović mentions the sovereignty of the Croat people, he is referring to the hegemony of his own separatist party. [12]

As to the overwhelming defeat of Bakir Izetbegović, son of Alija and head of the Bosniak nationalist SDA, Denis Bećirović's victory has primarily been interpreted as a rejection of Izetbegović. While the SDA won a solid majority of parliamentary seats among the Bosniaks, its leader's defeat has been interpreted as a rejection of him personally, as someone who has become a particularly unpopular personality among the Bosniak voters. As one commentator wrote, the reason for Izetbegović's unpopularity is that he has become a symbol of the corruption and clientelism in the SDA. [13] Izetbegović's nepotism, favoring his wife Sebija (director of the Sarajevo University Hospital, but whose medical credentials have been under question), has not helped. She has been likened to Lady MacBeth or Elena Ceauşescu.

On the Serb side, Dodik gave up his position in the state-level presidency and ran for a third term as president of the Republika Srpska. His party colleague Željka Cvijanović, until now president of the RS, ran for Serb member of the presidency, and it appears that she has won, against SDS member Mirko Šarović.

The fact that two of the three members of the presidency are solidly opposed to separatism and the breakup of the country is, of course, significant. This may help to prevent some escalation of crises in the country, and it is interpreted as a vote for the civic option and for democratic change. We will see whether Bećirović and Komšić have enough real power to lead the country in a positive direction, but it is more likely that they will merely be able to stand in the way of some, but not all, of the ongoing production of crises from the Serb and Croat separatists. This is probably the unoptimistic best case scenario, because overall, the entrenched Croat, Serb, and Bosniak nationalist parties (respectively the HDZ, SNSD, and SDA), maintained power at nearly all levels of government other than the presidency.

Commentator Gordan Duhaček of Index.hr offered a particularly trenchant view of the electoral results in the presidential race: "Bećirović is a faceless apparatchik...it is a mistake to interpret his entry into the Bosnian Presidency as a victory for the civic option; it is more a matter that the majority of Bosniaks had enough of Izetbegović. ...Bosniaks who voted for Komšić were not interested in arbitrating between Izetbegović and Bećirović. Komšić is in fact a spent politician who survives by causing conflicts...and it is not to be expected that he will change now. ...Cvijanović is a Serb nationalist who has, as Dodik's colleague, worked for the organized plunder of the people in the RS, and of course supports the denial of genocide in Srebrenica. [14]

*

Over a week after the elections, the contest between Dodik and the opposition in the Republika Srpska is an ongoing story. On the Sunday night of the elections, both Dodik and Trivić declared victory. By the morning, the vote count favored Dodik with about 242,000 votes, and Trivić 212,000. A week later, the 30,000-vote margin remained, with a reported count of 291,000 and 261,000 respectively. But the Central Election Commission (CEC) has, as of October 10, called for a recount of ballots in the RS.

The story of electoral manipulation and outright blocking of opposition votes is of textbook quality. Outstanding among the behavior of the polling station committees is the fact that over 32,000 ballots were declared invalid. There is no explanation yet for this unusually high figure. There has also been wide reporting of unbelievable falsified ballot counts in at least a dozen RS municipalities.

For example in Krajišnik, the village where Jelena Trivić was born, near Bosanska Gradiška, Dodik received 141 votes; an obscure candidate received 137 votes, and Trivić received zero votes. Similarly unbelievable vote counts were recorded in many other places. In Krajišnik a local voter commented, "They called observers outside [from the polling station] and told them that Dodik must win at all costs...they are stealing, brother, stealing." The head of the polling station admitted, "I put the count in the line above [Trivić's], and I gave Jelena 000." [15]

The Bosniak returnee village of Klisa near Zvornik is home to about 70 registered voters. There, Dodik received 103 out of a recorded 197 votes. [16]

There was also widespread reporting of votes being purchased, at 100 euros per vote, and of local election committee members selling positions on the polling station committees; such positions make it easier for an operator to commit fraud in the vote counts. There was also pressure exerted on voters as they approached the polling stations, and there were reports of people voting in other people's names.

Immediately after the elections, Jelena Trivić and the coalition of Serb opposition parties demanded a recount and called for protest rallies. Trivić and her supporters noted that thugs had driven observers from the opposition parties out of polling stations; that polling station committee members were seen opening ballot sacks in the middle of the night; that voter count records were being changed after the count; and that the number of ballots in ballot boxes often did not correspond to the recorded number of voters who had participated. Opposition figures stated that there were at least 10,000 votes given to unknown candidates, and that it was probable that, including the mysteriously invalidated ballots, as many as 65,000 votes were stolen.

The opposition organized a protest rally in Banja Luka, capital of the Republika Srpska, a few days after the elections. It was reported that some 30,000 people attended. That would not include people whose buses were blocked by the police on the outskirts of the city. A subsequent large demonstration was held on October 10, in the wake of the CEC's announcement calling for a vote recount.

Schmidt's Decrees

Immediately after the polling stations closed on October 2, High Representative Christian Schmidt, using the OHR's Bonn Powers, decreed several new laws affecting the composition of the Federation's upper parliamentary body, the House of Peoples; how that body can make certain decisions; and the timing of the formation of that body after the elections.

As I have discussed before (here, here, and here), negotiations have been underway between Croat and Bosniak leaders in the Federation over the course of the last couple of years, without result. Croat leaders have insisted on measures that would enshrine the HDZ as the unchallengeable power among the Croats and, possibly, that would create a de facto "third entity" under their control. Bosniak negotiators have not been willing to accept these changes. In the summer, at a point when it appeared that Schmidt was about to decree in favor of the Croat position, some thousands of demonstrators protested in front of the OHR office in Sarajevo, and Schmidt backed off—for the time being.

It is also very pertinent that there have been several findings by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) faulting the Bosnian constitution for discrimination because of its bias towards ethnic groupings to the detriment of the rights of citizens as individuals. For example, the ECHR found in 2009 that it was inadmissible under EU rules that no Jew or Rom could legally run for member of the state presidency nor of the House of Peoples. Several subsequent rulings found similarly against laws that prevent a Serb from running for state-level presidency from the Federation, and that prevent anyone who declares as a Bosnian (rather than as a Serb, Croat, or Bosniak) also from running for the presidency or the House of Peoples.

Schmidt did not undertake to implement any of the ECHR findings; rather, he took measures to ensure a timely composition of the post-election governing bodies in the Federation. This has been a flagrant problem, as the HDZ blocked the formation of a new parliament in the Federation ever since the 2018 elections as a way to push for the electoral reform that they desired. So the parliament and other Federation officials who have served until now were elected in 2014, not in the subsequent elections.

Schmidt also undertook to re-engineer the functioning of the House of Peoples via an adjustment of the number of delegates from each ethnicity. That number has been 58—17 Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks, and 7 "Others." The 17 were selected from each of the Federation's ten cantons.

Now, there will be 80 delegates, including 23 from each of the three constituent ethnicities, and 11 "Others." The delegates will still be selected from each canton, but what is critical here is that there will be a proportionate selection that reflects the population of each canton. This ensures that the Croat caucus will be dominated by delegates from the western cantons that are the HDZ stronghold. This is a dealbreaker for the proponents of the civic option—but there is no deal involved. It is a decree, imposed by the High Representative.

It is the House of Peoples that nominates a candidate for the Federation president, and here, there is a threshold to be passed. That is, from each caucus, previously, about one third of members had to approve a nomination. Now, that threshold has been raised to nearly one half, that is, 11 out of the new 23 delegates. This in turn compounds the power accruing to HDZ delegates, through their domination of the Croat caucus.

Critics see all this as a blatant appeasement of the wishes of the HDZ in that the measures described here essentially satisfy the demands that party has been posing for several years. Schmidt's laws are interpreted as "delivering a permanent monopoly to the HDZ," which, as expressed by analyst Jasmin Mujanović, will allow it to "hold up virtually all legislation and government formation—as they have done for much of the preceding four years—without any evident route to circumventing their dominance." [17]

The international response to Schmidt's decrees was also negative, on the whole. Schmidt's measures were taken without support from the Peace Implementation Council that is supposed to back up the OHR. The PIC issued the most lukewarm statement possible in acknowledgment of the reform. Officials in Germany (Schmidt's home country) in particular were surprised and upset about the move. The timing of the decrees, at night after the elections, and the lack of input from Bosnian institutions, was seen as undermining Bosnian democracy. Pro-Bosnia commentators predict further crises resulting from the decrees. [18]

If HR Schmidt were inclined to do something truly helpful, that would bolster democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, he would find a way to compel domestic officials to implement the long-ignored findings of the European Court of Human Rights.

NOTES:
1. "Sky izdati ne zna," (Sky doesn't betray), by Vildana Selimbegović, Oslobodjenje, October 3, 2022
2. "Crne liste II: Skymaković " (Blacklist II...) by Avdo Avdić, Oslobodjenje, September 28, 2022
3. " Tužiteljice Tadić i Kajmaković nalaze se na američkoj crnoj listi," (Prosecutor Tadić on the American blacklist) by Dženisa Zukančić i Kenan Ćosić, Oslobodjenje, September 28, 2022.
4. "US blacklists FBiH entity Prime Minister Fadil Novalić, businessman Stanković," Bosnia Daily, October 4, 2022.
5. "U.S. sanctions Bosnian prime minister, businessman day after presidential elections," by Adam Schrader. https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2022/10/03/us-sanctions-prime-minister-of-bosnia-herzegovina-fadil-novalic/6811664822687/
6. "Amerika mora sjekirom zamahnuti prema glavama zmija u BiH!" (America must swing the axe towards the heads of the snake in Bosnia-Herzegovina!), Fokus.ba, October 4, 2022 https://www.fokus.ba/vijesti/bih/amerika-mora-sjekirom-zamahnuti-prema-glavama-zmija-u-bih/2411379
7. "The past and the furious: How Russia’s revisionism threatens Bosnia," Policy Brief by Majda Ruge, European Council on Foreign Relations, September 13, 2022.  [https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-past-and-the-furious-how-russias-revisionism-threatens-bosnia/#conclusion
8. See the clarifying article written by professor Timothy Snyder about the "referendums," where he calls them "obscene" and a "media exercise in humiliation," here.
9.  " Putin meets Bosnian Serb separatist leader, praises Serbia," by Dušan Stojanović, The Associated Press  September 20, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-serbia-milorad-dodik-european-union-795a26a1d3b9eaeecf780e9e905cab89
10. "Bosnian Serb separatist leader blasts West, praises Russia," by Eldar Emrić, The Associated Press  September 28, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-elections-presidential-moscow-6eb1a7e1526d7d58082cda15b496b85d. 
11. "Sramota u posljednjim satima predizborne kampanje!" (Shame in the last hours of the pre-election campaign), Oslobodjenje, September 29, 2022
12. "Čović i Krišto u Tomislavgradu: BiH ne može biti građanska država, moramo vratiti suverenost hrvatskog naroda"  (Bosnia cannot be a civic state, we must return sovereignty to the Croat people), Oslobodjenje, September 9, 2022
13. Prva analiza izbora u BiH iz susjedstva: "Debakl Bakira Izetbegovića je odlična vijest, ali pobijedio ga je…"(First analysis from the neighborhood: 'The debacle of Bakir Izetbegović is excellent news, but he was defeated by...) Gordan Duhaček, Index.ba, October 3, 2022
14. ibid.
15. "Predsjednik biračkog odbora priznao da je Jeleni Trivić upisao tri nule umjesto 137 glasova" (President of polling station committee admitted that he enscribed three zeros for Jelena Trivić instead of 137 votes), Oslobodjenje, October 4, 2022.
16. "Protest Bošnjaka u Zvorniku zbog krađe glasova" (Bosniak protest in Zvornik because of vote theft) Oslobodjenje, October 7, 2022
17. " An illiberal putsch attempt in Bosnia," by Jasmin Mujanović, Al Jazeera, October 4, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/opinions/2022/10/4/an-illiberal-putsch-in-bosnia
18. "US Reinvests in Ethnic Oligarchy in Bosnia, Abandoning Support for Integration  by Bodo Weber and Kurt Bassuener, " Just Security, October 5, 2022 https://www.justsecurity.org/83373/us-reinvests-in-ethnic-oligarchy-in-bosnia-abandoning-support-for-integration/

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