SURVIVING THE PEACE The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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June 19, 2022
Bosnia update: "Nothing happens in Bosnia"; Funding the elections; Bosnia and Croatia; Happenings in Prijedor; Fascism on May 9th.

During the last month or so, Bosnia-Herzegovina has seen a continuation of a variety of simmering problems, with one or two solutions, but no real progress.

A friend said to me the other day, "Nothing happens in Bosnia." This sounds odd given that, when observing the country day to day at the granular level, it seems that things are always about to explode. Thinking back to last fall, there were ongoing, dire predictions of war. As I wrote then, you can never rule out war. But war did not break out this spring, when it could have, and it doesn't look likely at this point.

There again, during the now waning season there have been predictions of a boycott of the upcoming elections, with many people convinced they would not take place. That outcome has now been circumvented.

And the ongoing move toward secession of the Serb-controlled entity has stalled, for the moment, notwithstanding statements that the secession is already underway.

All of this, and other similar developments, lead me to agree with my friend that, at the very least, there's a lot more drama in Bosnia than actual history taking place. You could confirm this by looking at any Bosnian newspaper, where 80% to 90% of the articles are about what one politician said about another politician. That's not news; it's isto sranje, drugo pakovanje (different day, same b.s.).

This is not to say that nothing is really happening in Bosnia, but the trends are much slower and you could probably skip reading the news most of the time without missing much actual news. Rather than news, there are trends, and the most important trend this year has to do with Bosnia's international relations: with the EU and NATO on one hand, and with Russia and China and the other.

Changes in the international realm have clearly been prompted by Russia's vicious assault on Ukraine, which has forced the EU to focus on its perimeter in ways that it has been unable to do for at least a decade and a half. There is relative cohesion and harmony of politics within the Western bloc (EU + US) at this time, which is not to say that there is absolute harmony, nor that it will last very long.

There's nothing like having a common enemy to concentrate the mind. The West has been forced, let's say, back into a Cold War mode wherein there's a clear threat on the eastern frontier, and it has, for now, taken the side of Ukraine. We'll see how long that uniform response lasts. EU member Hungary has, notably, been on the fence, preventing EU sanctions against Russia. Slovenia held a similar position until May of this year, when its right-wing nationalist prime minister was ousted.

Nervousness about Russian aggression has caused Western powers to increase their focus on the Western Balkans, especially on Bosnia, where political leanings are divided between East and West. Bosniak politicians uniformly support EU accession and oppose Russia's war on Ukraine. Croat and Serb nationalist politicians all rhetorically support going to the EU but are, at best, publicly ambivalent on Russia.

The leaders of both ethnic groups have at least criticized Russia's invasion and declared in favor of respect for Ukraine's sovereignty. But at the same time, Croat and Serb leaders Čović and Dodik, respectively, have maintained ties with Putin. Dodik is visiting Putin and his foreign secretary Lavrov as I write this, and has recently announced a favorable deal with Russia for supply of gas to the RS. Čović's and especially Dodik's leanings have prevented Bosnia-Herzegovina from participating in Western sanctions against Russia.

The situation is similar with neighboring Serbia. Both Dodik and Serbian president Vučić are under international pressure to come down off the fence and stop supporting Russia, but there has been no significant movement in that direction from either leader.

On the other hand, the RS's drive for secession has been officially delayed. In early June the RS National Assemby, controlled by Dodik's SNSD party, adopted a resolution postponing implementation of its plan to "transfer competencies" from the state level to the entity. This plan was outlined back in December 2021, and given a six-month period to implement. With that period now ending, the RS leadership has stated that it will postpone implementation of plans such as creating an entity army, tax agency, and judiciary, in order to "avoid additional complication of the international political position of the RS in complicated geopolitical circumstances."

This is an acknowledgment, according to commentator Avdo Avdić, of the fact that "the Western world no longer looks the same way at pro-Russian politicians anywhere in the world." (1) Avdić adds that, besides this, Angela Merkel, the former Chancellor who (according to Avdić) was clearly sympathetic to Russia, is no longer in a position to decide things in Germany. Avdić concludes that Russia's "special operation" in Ukraine has been answered by a Western "special operation in Bosnia," where pro-Russian operators such as Dodik and Čović have been exposed. Dodik, notes Avdić, is under a variety of sanctions, and Čović and some of his cronies are also under international pressure for their separatism and obstruction.

Avdić considers that the fight for democracy in Bosnia-Herzegovina is being fought in Ukraine, and he writes optimistically about the outcome, listing ways that Western attitudes and practices toward Bosnia have changed in the last few months. We will see if these changes are sustainable.

BiH-Croatia

Having mentioned Serbia's place in the current international ruckus, I'd like briefly also to mention Croatia. That country's president, Zoran Milanović, has outdone himself by letting loose a slew of flagrantly racist, nationalist, and belligerent statements toward Bosnia over the last few months.

The common theme in Milanović's utterances has been support for Dragan Čović's separatist project. He has declared that Bosnian Croats "will have a third entity," and has described the Bosniak politicians as blocking electoral reform. That refers to pro-Bosnian resistance to Čović's long-running attempt to establish an apartheid system of voting. As I've described before, this is designed to favor the votes of those Croats who will ensure an HDZ monopoly on power, to the detriment of potential democratic processes. After more than a half year of futile negotiations, time ran out—for now—on that attempt, as Bosniak negotiators refused to capitulate to the Croat separatists' demands.

It seems that just about anything that would work in favor of Čović's goals is acceptable to Milanović. That includes Russian destabilization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian support of Dodik's separatism, and Dodik's obvious long-running alliance with Čović. All of these trends work against democratic processes in Bosnia, and that part of Croatia's political management that has not given up its wartime interventionist goals thus supports Čović's autocratic manipulation above all else.

In this vein, Milanović recently called on the "West" to force Bakir Izetbegović, leader of the largest Bosniak party, to accept Čović's version of electoral reform or, alternatively, for High Representative Schmidt to decree that kind of reform as law. This, while simultaneously calling Schmidt an illegal, illegitimate High Representative, echoing what Dodik and Russian officials have said.

In this vein, Milanović stated, "In this situation, the Serbs are our allies; how is that not clear to anyone?" And when a journalist commented that the Republika Srpska was borne of genocide, Milanović responded, "Hello, America was founded through genocide; the majority of states came about through crimes." (2)

One more statement from Milanović drives home the fact that he, along with much of the rest of the governing class of Croatia, support the Bosnian Croat separatists to the detriment of all else in Bosnia including peace and stability. When Sweden and Finland recently voiced interest in joining NATO Milanović, speaking for Croatia as a NATO member, declared that Croatia would not support the two countries' membership as long as Čović's version of electoral reform were not instituted in Bosnia. He made no excuse for attaching these two unrelated issues.

Elections

For now, as I have mentioned, the drive for the Croat nationalists' version of electoral reform is definitively stalled, at least until the October elections. But for much of the spring, it appeared that Bosnian Croat politicians were going to be able to prevent those elections from taking place. On May 5, Bosnia's Central Election Commission (CEC) announced the elections for October 2. Electoral law requires that the CEC receive funding to administer the elections by two weeks after such announcement, i.e., May 19.

There are two ways for funding to be allocated, and both were blocked by Croat officials. One is for the money to be allotted through a vote by the Council of Ministers, and the other is through legislation by Parliament. For the time being, funds were blocked because the 2022 state budget had not been passed—nearly five months into the year. The CEC estimated that it would need 12.52 million KM (about 6.5 million euros) to run the elections. Soon after the CEC's scheduling of the elections, the Council of Ministers discussed funding them, but this was blocked by the Minister of Finance, Vjekoslav Bevanda, a crony of Čović and an HDZ stalwart.

The funding was not made available by the deadline of May 19, and the CEC was compelled to interrupt the printing of voter rolls, mailing envelopes, polling station signs, and various forms. Members of the CEC were working overtime to examine lists of signatures supporting the candidacy of various politicians. With over 90 political parties, and 17 additional independent candidates, this is no small task.

As member of the state-level presidency Željko Komšić pointed out, the HDZ has stated regularly that they are in favor of the elections, but their officials were meanwhile doing everything they could to block them. Minister Bevanda should have expedited the submission of the 2022 state budget, but instead, late in May, he submitted a framework budget estimate for the years 2022 to 2024. This then had to be adopted before the 2022 budget, which could then take another couple of months to pass.

The CEC, at this time, saying "we need the funds yesterday," called attention to the fact that there were unallocated funds available from leftover reserves from past years, and that these should be used to finance the elections. Bevanda responded saying that such an allocation would be against the law, while the OHR put out a statement to the contrary. Various commentators now said that only the OHR could save the situation, by decreeing funding. Meanwhile, in late May Bevanda again thwarted a vote by the Council of Ministers to fund the elections.

A week into June, Bevanda suggested that the CEC take a loan for 9.7 million KM from the RAK, Bosnia's agency for regulation of the media. This rather senseless plan, over three million KM short of what was needed, would have left the CEC unable to fulfill its duties. The CEC needed to purchase 120 tons of paper, and print millions of ballots. A day after Bevanda's suggestion, High Representative Schmidt, using his Bonn powers, decreed that the state shall allocate the full 12.52 million KM for the elections. This superseded Bevanda's suggestion and all his blocking maneuvers, settling the problem once and for all.

Schmidt's decree also established a mechanism to prevent such financial blockage in the future. This was the second time Schmidt used the Bonn powers (having earlier nullified a move by the RS to transfer state-owned property to the entity). This, after most international officials had repeatedly declared that the elections must take place. Schmidt commented that he could simply not believe that the holding of the elections was under any question whatsoever.

This time, there was less shock and surprise at Schmidt's move, but Croat and Serb separatists reacted with the usual posturing. Dodik stated that "Bosnia-Herzegovina does not exist as a sovereign state; it is a failure...Schmidt was not formally appointed [as High Representative], he doesn't have Bonn powers and he cannot intervene in Bosnia."

In spite of Dodik's declaration, the elections are now cleared to take place—but look for post-October obstruction from the Croat separatists.

Prijedor

May 31 was "White Armband Day," the anniversary of the time at the beginning of the war, in 1992, when the newly dominant Serb separatist leaders of Prijedor municipality announced, on the radio, that all "non-Serbs" must post white sheets in their windows and wear white armbands when leaving their homes—as a "demonstration of loyalty" to the new regime. The radio announcement went like this: "Citizens of Serb nationality, join your army and police in pursuit of extremists. Other citizens, of Muslim [sic] and Croat nationality, must hang white flags on their houses and apartments, and wear white bands on their arms. Otherwise, they will suffer serious consequences."

This demand by the separatist authorities reflected carnage that was already underway. Croats, Bosniaks, and "Others" who constituted over half of the municipality's population were nearly entirely driven out in the next couple of months, thousands of them suffering internment in local concentration camps, and over 3,000 killed or disappeared.

Activists in Prijedor and around the world have commemorated the White Armbands announcement for over ten years, with annual attempts to stage a march or rally in Prijedor town. This has met with varying degrees of repression over the years. This year, local authorities—members of Dodik's SNSD party—tried a new approach: scheduling a variety of events on the same day, thus arranging a prefabricated scheduling "conflict." One event was set to mark "World Tobacco Day," starting first thing in the morning. Then in mid-morning a youth group organized a public celebration of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, whose autocratic ways are in harmony with those of Milorad Dodik. A concurrent theme was the celebration of Serbian president Vučić's five years in office.

Apparently this latter event was very sparsely attended, but that did not stop local authorities from curtailing the next scheduled event, the one meant to commemorate the white armband radio announcement and all the evils associated with the onset of Serb extremist rule. The Prijedor police allowed the gathering to take place, but prohibited a planned march, saying that it could create a "security risk." In spite of this, several hundred supporters wearing white armbands gathered for an hour of peaceful demonstration.

In contrast to this event, on the day before, Serb authorities had allowed a march through the city commemorating the 80th anniversary of Prijedor's liberation from Nazi forces, and simultaneously commemorating the "Day of defense" of Prijedor in 1992.

In recent years the focus of Prijedor returnee activism has largely been the call for the creation of a memorial to the 102 children who were killed in the municipality during the 1990s war. Activists have been advocating for this memorial for over a decade. With the departure of long-time mayor Marko Pavić, a wartime nationalist figure and a staunch obstructionist, the next mayor and the city council allowed an opening to discussion of the project. However, two mayors later, the memorial has been obstructed yet again, and is further from realization than before.

There have been countering proposals that make it seem that there could be an equitable approach to the memorialization of the children who were killed, but this is illusory. Both proposals afloat would serve, in fact, to erase the memory of those children. One proposal is to construct a monument that would list the names of all of the children killed not only in the 1990s war (all Bosniaks), but also all of those killed in World War II, and perhaps even in the previous World War. Such a monument would bury the names of those killed in the 1990s among hundreds of other names—if the research required were ever completed enough to allow the project to get off the ground. The other proposal calls for a monument to the children, with no names. This would be another manner of enforced forgetting of history.

May 9th, Victory Day

Historically May 9th has been the day that Eastern European countries, especially those of the Soviet bloc, have celebrated the end of World War II, the great anti-fascist victory. As I've written before, in recent years both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Russia, "anti-fascism" has been co-opted by arguably fascist leaders and movements. Thus in Serbia the memory of the WWII Chetnik leader Draža Mihailović has been elevated to the same level as that of the Partisans. Mladić and Karadžić have been glorified as fighters for the freedom of the Serb people.

Such cooptation has carried on and been even more amplified this year, in the time of Russia's onslaught against "Nazism" in Ukraine. So the ostentatious commemoration of May 9th in pro-Russian circles has taken on an even more sinister connotation.

In Banja Luka, capital of the Serb-controlled entity, a march was held re-enacting the "March of the Immortal Regiment," a relatively new post-Soviet, Russian commemoration of Soviet participants in the war. The event in Banja Luka was notable for its VIP attendees: Dodik; the RS president and prime minister; Russian Ambassador to Bosnia Igor Kalabuhov; and the Russian biker club (said to be "Putin's favorite"), Noćni vukovi (the Night Wolves). Kalabuhov praised the "day of solidarity between the Russian and Serb peoples and all anti-fascists of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

Remembering the losses and gains of WWII, Kalabuhov also stated, "We arrived there where we had to arrive: in Berlin...Today's date is a day of great sadness because of the loss of 27 million Soviet lives, but it is also a day of warning, as it is visible that neo-Nazism has raised its head. We will realize all of our goals and arrive there where we must come," drawing a clear parallel between Berlin then, and Kyiv now.

Some days after the commemoration, Dodik expressed related, recognizably fascist thoughts in a letter to his autocratic friend Viktor Orban, prime minister of Hungary. He wrote, "I agree with you that a Europe in which immigration is allowed leads to the destruction of its biological future founded on Christian values and principles. Hungary has recognized that the true way to biological renewal of the nation is the increase in its own birth rate, and not the importation of people from other areas, from other cultures, civilizations, and non-Christian faiths. The Republika Srpska recognizes these values as its own and within the boundaries of its own possibilities."

Fascism is not dead in Europe.

Meanwhile, the anti-fascist holiday was commemorated in Sarajevo as well—more in the traditional spirt of the day. There, local officials laid flowers at the Viječna vatra—the Eternal Flame commemorating the anti-Nazi victory in Yugoslavia. The prime minister of Sarajevo Canton spoke: "It is unbelievable that we have again come to a situation where we must say 'Death to Fascism!'  We must struggle against fascism in Sarajevo. Historically, Sarajevo has stood on the right side, but fascism does not sleep, and the struggle does not end. Now is the time to renew our anti-fascist foundations, because if we do not nurture them, all will be destroyed."

1. Avdo Avdić, "Slava Ukrajini! - Rusi su došli 'tek' do Sjeverodonjecka..." (Glory to Ukraine! – The Russians have "only" gotten to Severodonetsk), Oslobodjenje, June 9, 2022
2. "Milanović javno "otkrio karte" / Hrvati će ići u treći entitet, Srbi su nam saveznici - Pa šta ako je RS nastao na zločinu?" (Milanović publicly showed his cards; Croats will get a third entity, Serbs are our allies, so what if the RS came about through crimes?). Oslobodjenje, May 5, 2022.

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