SURVIVING THE PEACE The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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February 13, 2021
Updates on many topics: Corona, migrants, the icon scandal, OHR stirs, and more.

Corona

Nearly 5,000 people have died of Covid-19 in Bosnia. As of this weekend the per capita death rate for Bosnia-Herzegovina, at some 1,493 per million, is just higher than that of the United States. However, the daily infection rate has decreased, and is presently around half of what it was during a surge in mid-autumn.

Bosnia has been slow in receiving its first vaccinations. Just this week the Republika Srpska received 2,000 Sputnik-V vaccines from Russia. The Federation, its government typically slow to organize just about anything, is waiting for the international Covax distribution mechanism to activate. That is expected to deliver by sometime this month.

One medical expert said, "Bosnia-Herzegovina could make its own Corona vaccine, we have the experts and the factories. All we need is a state!"

There has been sparse news pertaining to last year's scandal wherein the Federation government, headed by entity Prime Minister Fadil Novalić, allocated 10.5 million KM for the purchase of 100 Chinese ventilators. For details that I wrote earlier on this affair, see here. Part of what was crooked about that arrangement was that the funds were directed through the Srebrenica-based raspberry-producing company, Srebrena Malina, which had no previous experience in importing medical technology. This alone pointed to a shady crony deal, compounded by the fact that the money paid for the machines outstripped any demonstrable market price.

The state prosecutor's office filed charges against Novalić, Srebrena Malina director Fikret Hodžić, and two other figures in December. The charges were confirmed by the court this week, and the trial for corruption, graft, and forgery of financial reports will begin February 24.

Migrants

The plight of the migrants keeps going from bad to worse. At last report the Lipa camp, in an isolated location away from Bihać, had been burned and evacuated, but hundreds of stranded migrants were being prevented from finding shelter at the former Bira camp in the city. The international community and the Bosnian government promised to rebuild Lipa—by April, meanwhile leaving some 900-odd migrants to sleep in the woods, in abandoned buildings, and in the snow.

One commentator reports that some 21,000 migrants entered Bosnia in 2018; 18,000 in 2019; and 11,000 last year. Another analyst says that 90,000 migrants have passed through Bihać on their way to the EU. All anyone can do is guess about how many remain in the country, but some 11,000 are registered as currently residing in Uno-Sanski Canton (the location of Bihać in the northwestern part of the country, the Krajina) and in Sarajevo Canton.

Tents have been erected at Lipa, and some good-hearted souls from surrounding cities have been delivering food and bedding. Migrants with no other choice have been washing themselves in streams.

Meanwhile tensions have risen both among migrants and between them and local residents. Flare-ups have increased in the Bihać area, with several recent fights between young locals and migrants. And in the third week of January there was a terrible brawl between Afghan and Pakistani migrants in the camp at Blažuj near Sarajevo. The fight is said to have been sparked by religious arguments or insults between Shiites and Sunnis. Some 2,000 people participated, and numerous police were injured. Twenty police vehicles were damaged. Around 3,500 migrants had been staying at Blažuj; that number is now being reduced and the police presence has been reinforced.

The Republika Srpska and areas in the Federation under Croat control are still refusing to host any migrants.

The Icon Scandal

You'll remember that in December, Serb member of the state-level presidency Milorad Dodik created a scandal by presenting Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov with a 300-year-old gilded icon as a gift. The scandal was that there was a strong possibility that it was not Dodik's to give away. There were varying stories about the provenance of the icon.

The most common hypothesis is that the icon was of Ukrainian origin, and that it was originally from Lugansk in the eastern part of Ukraine, where pro-Russian fighters have established a separatist enclave. Additional hypotheses hold that the icon was stolen either by occupying pro-Russian forces or, possibly, by Serb mercenaries who have regularly traveled to the enclave to help on the pro-Russian side. No theory has been unanimously accepted, but the media have regularly reported that a seal on the back of the treasure attests to the Ukrainian origin.

Soon after the scandal broke, Russian authorities returned the icon to Bosnia via Bosnia's ambassador to Russia—who thereupon returned it not to Bosnian authorities, but to Dodik. Since late December it has sat in Dodik's safe. Around that same time, Dodik took ill with Covid-19 and was hospitalized. In early January, when he was released, he gave a statement saying that there was no problem concerning the icon, and that his staff had checked with Interpol to see if there were any reports of it being stolen, before presenting the icon to Lavrov. He further asserted that the scandal was "a lie thought up in the Federation," and that no one from the Ukraine had requested its return.

Here, a commentator noted that Dodik "has again been caught diverging from the truth." That is, Ukraine had in fact requested information about the icon ten days before Dodik's January 5th statement. Ukraine's Minister for Foreign Affairs Dmitry Kuleba weighed in as well, saying that Dodik was lying and that Ukraine had indeed asked for inspection of the icon as early as December 17. 

Having stated that the icon was given to him by a prominent family in Banja Luka, Dodik later said that he didn't know the donor very well and did not know his name. In response to Kuleba's statement, Dodik said that if Ukraine could show that they had been looking for the icon before Dodik's meeting with Lavrov, he would publicly give it back. Meanwhile, Bosnian foreign minister Bisera Turković met with the Ukrainian Ambassador, who requested that Ukrainian experts be allowed to inspect the icon and confirm its origin.

In mid-January the Bosnian Prosecutor's Office opened an investigation regarding the icon, and announced that it would question all three members of the state-level presidency, including Dodik. For now, that is where the case stands. Time will tell if the scandal will affect Dodik's standing. While he has taken some political hits lately, he has shown to be able to weather all such problems to date. But his downfall—not just because of the present scandal—is more conceivable than before.

The OHR Mobilizes...maybe?

In last month's entry I mentioned two things about the Office of the High Representative and its leader, Valentin Inzko. First, that Inzko may be replaced soon (after being in office since 2009), and second, that he has called for entry of a "third phase" of relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the international community, where the IC returns to a more robust interventionary approach.

Both of these things show signs of happening, but it is early to tell if there will be real changes. Germany has officially nominated politician Christian Schmidt to be the next High Representative. The Dayton-established Peace Implementation Council's steering board will decide whether to accept the nomination or not. But meanwhile, there is active speculation as to the reasons Schmidt was nominated.

Analyst Emir Suljagić notes that Schmidt has ties to Croat nationalist parties in Croatia and Bosnia, and that he takes positions that are favorable to Russian autocrat Putin. Other commentators state that Germany nominated Schmidt—on the same day that President Biden was inaugurated—to pre-empt a revitalized activism on the part of the US in Bosnia. This stance on the part of Germany is explained by the assertion that Germany is in a cooperative mode with Russia, because it depends on Russia's gas supply. Although  Germany touts Schmidt's nomination as promising a revitalization of the OHR, the installation of a High Representative who would be favorable to Russia would not portend progress for Bosnia. Russia has distinguished its Bosnia policy by supporting separatist tendencies and increasingly working to thwart Western-backed reform efforts.

In contrast to these comments, former High Representative Christian Schwartz-Schilling has asserted that Schmidt "will certainly use the Bonn powers" (discussed in last month's entry) and that he must bring Bosnia to normalization. Schwartz-Schilling called for the next High Representative's use of the Bonn powers to prohibit genocide denial and to remove political leaders from office if they have violated the Dayton agreement. But it should be remembered that Schwartz-Schilling was also Germany's nomination (in 2006) and that it was he who introduced the OHR practice of sleeping on the job, so well perfected by Inzko.

For a thoughtful article on Schmidt's nomination, see "Why is Germany rushing a new Bosnia high representative?" by Kurt Bassuener and Toby Vogel of the Democratization Policy Council.

A couple weeks after Schmidt's nomination, Inzko posted a letter to the Republika Srpska's National Assembly (NSRS) demanding that it annul special honors awarded to war criminals. On October 24, 2016, in observance of the 25th anniversary of the first session of the NSRS, the body awarded special charters of recognition to Radovan Karadžić, Biljana Plavšić, and Momčilo Krajišnik in honor of their roles in the establishment of the Republika Srpska. Each one of these figures has been convicted of crimes against humanity and, in Karadđič's case, genocide. In effect, the RS Parliament did nothing less than reward them for their crimes.

Inzko gave the NSRS three months—to the end of April—to annul the awards, saying that the actions of the three who were awarded had shocked the world and caused unimaginable human suffering. He noted that "the glorification of war criminals...directly hurts and provokes those who suffered the consequences of the war." He also stated that his demand gives the RS the opportunity to remove a burden from itself, to show maturity, and to move toward reconciliation.

Inzko did not say what measures he would take if the NSRS ignored his demand. But RS officials termed the letter "scandalous and inappropriate," and said that Inzko had no right to get involved in the work of the NSRS—"the highest democratic institution of the RS." Dodik stated that Inzko "has shown his hatred toward the Serb people," who he blames collectively for war crimes. Some officials asked for the letter to be re-sent in the "Serbian language" and in Cyrillic.

The RS opposition also lashed out at Inzko's demand. President of the SDS Mirko Šarović announced that the NSRS would not take the letter seriously—but also took the opportunity to lash out at Dodik, saying that the demand was the direct result of the "Ghaddafi-esque" policies of Dodik's party. He also warned that Inzko would impose a law on genocide denial, as Inzko himself suggested last fall.

On the other hand, Inzko received approval for his move from pro-Bosnian forces in the Federation, including organizations that represent women survivors of Srebrenica. But one prominent commentator, professor Esad Duraković, expressed skepticism. He said that Inzko's term had been characterized by years of "inefficiency, uselessness, and bureaucratization," and that he had "slept through his mandate...his last moves are cheap political tricks to make it look like he's done something." Duraković asked why Inzko had not already imposed a law prohibiting genocide denial. He stated, "Those people [Karadžić et al] were awarded because they were the creators of that entity, which was built on mass graves...It's normal that they get recognition."

Srebrenica Elections

As I discussed in my December entry, and a couple entries before that, the November municipal elections in Srebrenica outdid themselves in fraudulence, convincingly outstripping that practiced in the rest of the country. Crooked operators on behalf of Dodik's SNSD party, fielding incumbent candidate Mladen Grujičić, arranged for ballots to be mailed from Serbia in the name of people who were living in western Europe and elsewhere, unbeknownst to them. And the blank ballots that were to be mailed out to expatriates, which should have been mailed 45 days ahead of the election, instead were not sent until 15 days before, thus canceling any potential diaspora (mostly Muslim) vote.

The Central Election Committee (CIK) investigated the election. Mayor Grujičić stated, naturally, that there was "no reason to count the votes again." But observers had witnessed a series of violations of rules of the electoral process, "irrefutable evidence that the electoral results were realized in an illegal and invalid manner."

The CIK did not release its findings until late January. Then, all but one member of the multi-ethnic body voted to annul the results of the election in 26 out of 28 of Srebrenica's polling stations, and to schedule a new vote. The announcement of the CIK stated that there were a significant number of people who had voted with documents that had not been issued by official Bosnian institutions. In response, Mayor Grujičić declared that the CIK decision was a "setup," and that the members of the CIK were corrupt. And Dodik termed the members of the CIK "thieves," that the decision implied that "Serbs don't respect the law." He threatened that the RS would boycott the national elections in 2022.

In further evidence against the validity of the elections, the CIK noted that its handwriting expert compared voters' signatures on the poll station documents with those on the electoral database, and established that between ten and twenty percent of the signatures on the Srebrenica voting lists were forged. The CIK declared that the irregularities were sufficient to affect the outcome of the vote, also noting that local officials had transferred ballots from one office to another; that they had added names to the voter rolls; that they had put ballots in unsealed ballot boxes; and that members of the polling station committees had allowed people to vote without i.d. or with expired i.d.

There was evidence of people in remote polling stations (voting for Srebrenica in absentia) voting twice with different i.d.s, and in the station at Gradačac a party observer offered money to another observer to keep away from the station or disregard fraudulent behavior.  Also in Gradačac, it was apparent that there were many ballots already present in the ballot box when the polling station opened.

Finally, the CIK took testimony from over 90 members of the local polling station committees in Srebrenica, and found that over and over again, they used the exact same language in two sentences: "Not one person acquired voting rights with invalid identification documents of the State of Bosnia-Herzegovina," and "An attempt to vote by one person with expired identity card was prevented."

(Caveat: In many fictional films you see the disclaimer, "Any resemblance to actual persons is coincidental." I should say here that any resemblance between Dodik and the former president of the United States is not coincidental—because there is a finite and specific repertoire of behavior shared by autocrats.)

Dodik, in further response to the CIK decision, lashed out at one of its members, a Serb woman who had demonstrated her impartiality and devotion to legalism. Her name is Vanja Bjelica-Prutina. Dodik fixed on the fact that Ms. Bjelica-Prutina had been married to a Muslim and then divorced, but had kept her married name. Dodik found fault with this, saying "This is a little strange, keeping your ex-husband's last name? I have not heard of such a case. We need to be more careful to pick Serbs who can be responsible in some way." When Dodik was asked how the name was relevant to the Srebrenica elections and the CIK decision, he answered, "It is relevant because of the political dimension. It is not chauvinism."

The CIK reported Dodik to the state Prosecutor for his attacks on Bjelica-Prutina, saying that they were criminal acts propagating hatred. In return, Dodik threatened to file criminal charges against each of the members of the CIK.

The CIK also filed criminal charges against members of the local polling stations—not only in Srebrenica, but also in Doboj and Mostar, two other municipalities where the electoral results were seriously compromised (the Doboj election will also be re-run). People who were members of the polling station committees in Srebrenica will not be allowed to participate in the re-run.

Mayor Grujičić weighed in again calling the CIK decision "scandalous" and one that showed that Bosnia "does not resemble a state." He called for the RS to secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina because "there is no life with those who belittle, condemn, and ignore everything that is Serbian, wishing to place absolute power in the hands of the Bosniaks. "

There were court appeals to CIK decisions; all were rejected by the Bosnian Court. However, at least one had apparent validity: the CIK, in calling for a quick new vote, did not address the problem of mail-in ballots from abroad. This effectively prevents at least 800 Srebrenicans from voting in the election, now scheduled for February 21.


Judiciary—very briefly

Just this week, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (VSTV) elected a new president. Halil Lagumdžija was elected in a second-round vote of 8 to 7. Lagumdžija has worked as a judge for the last 25 years, first in various courts in Goražde, and for the last ten years as a member of the state-level Court of Bosnia. It is to be hoped that Lagumdžija will turn the direction of the body around, after the dismal term of disgraced former president Milan Tegeltija. During Tegeltija's six years in office, the VSTV failed miserably in its mission to ensure the honesty, fairness, and effectiveness of the Bosnian judiciary. Lagumdžija has acknowledged the need to repair the reputation of the judiciary.

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