SURVIVING THE PEACE
The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina
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April 30, 2022
Bosnia update: Sanctions, creeping secession, Ukraine war, electoral
machinations
In the spring of 2022 Bosnia-Herzegovina, with its permanently corrupt
leadership, its beleaguered citizens, and its contending international officials
of all sorts, bumps along toward an uncertain future. The secessionists keep on
with their divisive work. Ordinary people are re-traumatized by the Ukraine war.
The exodus continues. Meanwhile, authoritarian leaders in the vicinity of
Bosnia, eager to keep Bosnia destabilized, have new wind in their sails, but
some Western leaders attempt to restrain these trends.
The strongest move towards fascism in Europe today is, of course, the Russian
attempt to obliterate Ukraine. Given this, the Ukrainian resistance is on the
front line in pushing back against Russia, and this resistance is therefore
critical to the survival of whatever passes for democracy and freedom in the
rest of Europe.
This is pertinent to Bosnia-Herzegovina's near future. It's not that Russia,
after destroying Ukraine, will come after BiH directly. But an eventual Russian
victory in Ukraine, be it whole or in part, would bolster Russia's continued,
years-long meddling and destabilization of Bosnia, especially via Serbia. Russia
and China continue to provide Serbia with sophisticated, aggressive military
equipment, and Serbia continues to support President Milorad Dodik's drive for
secession.
In the first weekend of April national elections were held in Serbia and in
neighboring Hungary. Serbian president Aleksandar
Vučić won strongly, as did Hungarian president Orban.
Both flirt with the EU (Hungary is a member) and collaborate with Russia,
playing both sides of the imperial divide. As with much else in the region,
which way the two regimes pursue their fortunes will be strongly affected by
what happens in Ukraine.
There have been a variety of efforts on the part of Western governments to push
back against Dodik's and
Croat leader Dragan Čović's destabilizing efforts. To recap
these efforts, which I've covered in
previous blog entries:
the RS has proposed, and in some cases passed, laws transferring state powers to
the entity. These include creation of a medical/pharmaceutical agency; an
entity-based indirect tax authority; an entity-based High Judicial and
Prosecutorial Council; entity possession of agricultural, forest, and other
state property; and the eventual withdrawal from the Bosnian armed forces and
establishment of an RS army. Creation of the entity-based army has not been
initiated.
State Property
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia last year declared that the RS may not
legally take possession of agricultural and forest lands. Now, an RS law has
gone into force that transfers ownership of state-owned property to the entity.
This includes land and real estate—especially military property—that devolved to
Bosnia's control under a 2001 resolution of succession pertaining to Yugoslav
possessions, and those of the former Republic of Bosnia as well. The
Constitutional Court later affirmed the sole right of the state to control these
possessions.
In response to the recent RS law transferring state properties, in early April
High Representative Christian Schmidt used his Bonn powers for the first time
since his mandate began last August, and suspended the law. He called for the
Constitutional Court to evaluate the law, and one public official filed a formal
request for this to take place.
On the RS side, there has been great protest. In keeping with the official
attitude that Schmidt is not legitimately a High Representative (because he was
appointed by the Peace Implementation Council, but not approved by the UN
Security Council), the RS asserts that the new property law is still in force.
But there is no indication that it will be implemented soon.
As I've mentioned before, secessionist moves creep along, but without really
flagrant expression because there is a degree of hesitation in response to the
Ukraine war. This is particularly true on the part of
Vučić, who is a savvy enough leader to know when to stay on the fence. In that
light, he has given Schmidt a certain amount of legitimacy recently by meeting
with him and calling him the High Representative. This to some extent reduces
Dodik's momentum. And in a recent meeting with Dodik, Vučić admonished him not
to follow through with his initiative to form an RS army, at least not in the
near future.
Vučić's opinions carry weight with Dodik, and so Dodik commented that the entity
army was on hold, a project for later on. But in response to Schmidt's action,
Dodik said, "It's time for the tourist Schmidt to buy a one-way ticket back to
Germany. His vacation is over."
The RS organized a rally for "freedom" in Banja Luka on April 20, ostensibly a
protest against Schmidt's move by RS veterans of the 1990s war. It was clear
that the initiative—and logistical resources—for this rally came from Dodik's
SNSD party, and many veterans were at a loss to understand how the rally
concerned them and their existential needs. At the moderatly attended rally, a
controversy was generated when a band, in the presence of Dodik, sang a ditty
that threatened to slaughter HR Schmidt.
A further chilling interaction took place when a professor from the East
Sarajevo (RS) Law Faculty attempted to show that genocide had nothing to do with
the creation of the RS. But when he called out, rhetorically, "Are we a
genocidal people?", the audience enthusiastically responded, "Yes!", and when he
asked, "Is the RS a genocidal creation (genocidna tvorevina)?" the audience
again responded similarly (1).
All this behavior fits with the style of President Dodik, who created another
stir not long ago when he insulted all independent journalists of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was in a limousine, arriving for a court deposition, and
he gave journalists the finger, through the car window. The Bosnian association
of journalists protested, and Dodik backtracked, saying, "This was not directed
at all journalists, only those from BN TV, who fabricate lies about me."
Russia also intervened in response to Schmidt's cancellation of the RS property
law. The Russian Embassy in Sarajevo repeated its opinion that HR Schmidt "could
not be considered the High Representative" and, as such, he had no powers in the
rubric of the Dayton agreement; thus, all of his decisions were illegitimate.
Russian officials asked the Peace Implementation Council (PIC—enforcer of
Dayton) to annul Schmidt's decision. A week later, Russia announced that it was
suspending its monetary contributions to the funding of the Office of the High
Representative.
Corrupt Leaders and the Prosecutors who Protect Them
The occasion for Dodik's deposition is relevant background here. Dodik was
called for questioning about his 2007 purchase of a mansion in Belgrade's elite
Dedinje neighborhood. What is fishy about this purchase is that he paid 750,000
euros for the villa in 2007, but was given credit for the purchase from Pavlović
Banka only the next year. So the question is why that money was transferred a
year later than the purchase, and with what money did he actually pay for the
house?
Another question
is why this case is coming up for review 15 years after the fact, but we know
the answer to that one. That is, Dodik's man Milan Tegeltija was president of
the state-level High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) until last year,
when he was removed for blatant corruption (see my previous entries
here
and
here
about this). Tegeltija was never going to promote this case against his boss.
Nor was Gordana Tadić,
until recently Bosnia's chief prosecutor. Tadić was removed in October of 2021
for a variety of forms of corruption.
With these removals, and the arrival of a new, more honest head of the HJPC, the
way was cleared for progress in the mysterious case of Dodik's credit. Dodik has
been described as being visibly nervous about his questioning, but it remains to
be seen whether any real headway will be made in the case. And Dodik's moves
toward secession are, at the very least, a form of distraction from his
expansive criminality, and at most, a long-term strategy for avoidance of
prosecution.
Certain parallels could be drawn here, as always, between Dodik's behavior and
that of the 45th president of the United States.
And as for Tadić, she was removed last year for, among other things, failure to
delegate cases of corruption to judges in an impartial manner, along with
leaving many cases under wraps for indefinite periods. These included the case
of Dodik's property in Belgrade. Then on April 11 of this year, the US Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) implemented sanctions against two Bosnian
officials: Gordana Tadić and Asim Sarajlić. Sarajlić, a stalwart of the leading
Bosniak SDA party, was recently implicated in an influence-peddling scheme. And
the OFAC tagged Tadić not only for her failure to distribute court cases
impartially, but also for "using her position as Chief Prosecutor to promote her
own personal and familial interests" (2). OFAC also accused Tadić of having
received payments via a fictitious contract.
In response to the sanctions Ms. Tadić asked, "What corruption? All my life I
have worked honestly." And the odd thing in all this is that, although Tadić was
removed as Chief Prosecutor, she is still a state prosecutor. Given this, the
High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council took interest when Tadić was sanctioned
by OFAC. The HJPC wrote a letter to OFAC after the sanctions were imposed,
asking for evidence. The reasoning is that if there is proof of Tadić's
criminality, the HJPC would like to know about it and to take measures to remove
her from office.
Sanctions
In other sanctions news, the United Kingdom joined the short but growing list of
European states that have imposed sanctions on President Dodik. On the same day
that OFAC sanctioned Tadić,
the UK placed sanctions on Dodik and the RS President,
Željka Cvijanović. The sanctions were termed a response to Dodik's and
Cvijanović's "attempts to undermine the legitimacy and functionality of the
State of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (3). The announcement of the sanctions noted
actions of the two officials to transfer state-level competencies to the RS
entity. It also commented on Cvijanović's glorification of convicted war
criminals, along with her denial of genocide. The sanctions include freezing of
assets and a travel ban.
Meanwhile, in mid-April Germany announced the interruption of some
infrastructure projects that it was supporting in the RS. These include a wind
farm near Nevesinje, the restoration of a hydroelectric dam in Trebinje, and two
other projects. Germany is withholding 105 million euros until the RS reverses
its moves to transfer state powers to the entity and ends the boycott of state
institutions.
On the other hand, Russian investments in the RS have increased since the
February escalation of the war in Ukraine. With the price of coal going up
throughout Europe due to the war, Russia revived dealings with a dormant coal
mine near Bosanski Novi. The renewed investment reflects the cordial
relationship between the leaders of the Republika Srpska and Russia. Officials
from the RS have vetoed Bosnia's participation in European sanctions against
Russia. In a parliamentary vote taken in late March, not only Dodik's SNSD, but
members of
Dragan Čović's Croat nationalist HDZ voted against sanctions. Two HDZ delegates
abstained from the vote, while Čović and one other HDZ member voted against it,
which caused a stir.
When asked why he voted against the sanctions, Čović responded that he has been
"clearly opposed to Russian aggression," but that the proposal to back sanctions
was not on the approved agenda for the parliamentary session. However, in the
last week of April SNSD and HDZ again sidelined a resolution presented by
Bosniak representatives to condemn the Russian aggression.
On the other hand, Croat members of the Council of Ministers voted in favor of a
proposal to support the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's (EBRD)
blockage of funds to Russia and Belarus. Serb members opposed the measure, so it
did not pass.
In a further manifestation of ties between the RS and Russia—via Serbia—members
of the RS's Civil Defense corps have cut off coordination of training exercises
with the state-level
Ministry of Defense. Instead, the RS has arranged for training in Serbia, at a
"Russian/Serbian humanitarian center in Niš.
International officials have identified this institution, opened 10 years ago,
as an intelligence-gathering site for Russian operatives.
Bosnia and the Ukraine War
Russian Ambassador to Bosnia Igor Kalabuhov thanked Bosnia for its "neutral
stance on the Ukraine war." But, repelled by Russia's aggression, activists in
Sarajevo circulated a petition proposing that the name of the street where the
Russian Embassy is located be changed to "Ukraine Street." Meanwhile the Council
of Ministers voted to allow special status, amounting to a renewable six months'
residence in Bosnia, for Ukrainian refugees.
The Bosnian response to the Ukraine war varies from place to place. Activists in
Sarajevo also gathered 20 tons of humanitarian aid to be shipped to Ukraine. But
in
Višegrad 50 people, including entity officials, gathered at a military cemetery
to commemorate the participation of Russian volunteers in the 1990s war in
Bosnia, on the side of the separatists. During the war some 700 Russians took
part, of whom nearly 40 were killed.
On the thirtieth anniversary of the start of the Bosnian war (April 1992), many
commentators have noted the similarities between the Ukraine war and what took
place in Bosnia. On April 7 the columnist Gojko Berić wrote in Oslobodjenje that
"Fascists are on the march again. You don't have to look for the proof in gas
chambers and Eichmann's death convoys; the TV images of columns of Ukrainian
refugees and the pictures of their destroyed cities and villages are sufficient
enough.
"Under the impact of Russia's rockets and bombs in Ukraine, as thirty years ago
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whole cities are disappearing from the face of the earth.
And today in Ukraine as in Bosnia thirty years ago, the dead are being buried in
parks beside residential high-rises; today, as then, hospitals, nurseries, and
theaters are being bombed; hundreds of thousands of women, children, and elderly
are fleeing with their bundles ahead of the advance of death...information
arrives about rape perpetrated by Russian soldiers in occupied territory. In the
city of Bucha mass graves have been discovered with hundreds of dead. Is there
any limit to human cruelty?" (5)
And just like Karadžić and
Šešelj
in the 1990s, Russian officials deny the crimes of their army, which
have, in my opinion, accurately been characterized as genocidal. Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov called the evidence of massacres at Bucha a "pre-arranged
display."
The similarities go on. Just like in Serbia and the RS, the fascist voice in
Russia co-opts anti-fascism for its own spurious use. In Serbia and the RS the
WWII Chetnik leader
Draža Mihailović has long since been rehabilitated; in Russia the 20th century
pro-fascist philosopher Ivan Ilyin, promoted by the latter-day Rasputin
Alexander Dugin (look them up
here),
has been resurrected as Putin's guiding light. And Putin pre-empts accusations
directed toward his regime by labeling all who identify as Ukrainians as
fascists (6).
People are on pins and needles observing the Ukraine war in an already tense
Bosnia where Croat and Serb secessionist leaders are rooting for the aggressor,
their wartime hopes revived. The breakaway Moldovan territory of Transdniester,
strongly evocative of the RS, is next on Russia's list of targets for
"liberation." And then, what about the RS? It is not far-fetched to imagine that
with continued escalation of tensions, Serbia could play Russia's role,
"rescuing" beleaguered brother Serbs in that entity. Here, again, it is clear
that Ukraine is fighting not only for its own survival, but for the freedom of
the rest of Europe. So it is to be fervently hoped that a Ukrainian victory will
take the wind out of the sails of European fascism ascendant.
But there are problems with this hopeful scenario. How much is Europe, backed by
the US, willing to stand up to Russian aggression? The weapons sent to Ukraine
have made a difference. But Europe is still buying oil, gas, and coal from
Russia to the tune of a billion dollars a day—and much of that fuel is still
being transported through Ukraine! The willingness of Europe truly to oppose
Russian force could be measured by its willingness to suffer through deprivation
of fuel for a while.
Now is a time to recognize that oil trade fuels war, and now is a time to
convert, belatedly, to sustainable, green energy sources. Germany has announced
that it hopes to wean itself from Russian fuel sources by the end of 2022. Will
there be anything left of an independent Ukraine by then?
Amidst all the similarities between 1990s Bosnia and today's Ukraine, there are
a couple of outstanding differences. First, on February 24, Ukraine already had
an army, while in April of 1992, Bosnia was barely cobbling together some
pro-government militias. Secondly, the West has avidly been supplying Ukraine
with the most up-to-date weapons, while conversely, in Bosnia it was
implementing an arms embargo. Given all this, it's a miracle that Bosnia was
even able to save half its territory.
Furthermore, it would not be acceptable to ignore the hypocrisy of Poland and
other front-line states in welcoming the White, Christian refugees from
Ukraine—as they fully deserve—while the same states are rejecting and abusing
other arrivals from Ukraine including Roma, African students, and "migrants"
from north Africa and the Middle East. Of the many commentators who have pointed
this out, not one begrudged the Ukrainian refugees their rights, under
international law, to shelter in nearby states. The same respect and rights are
due, but not afforded, to Yemenis, Palestinians, Central American migrants, and
many others around the world.
Elections
Bosnia's national elections are due to take place on October 2 of this year;
both houses of parliament in both entities will be elected, along with members
of the three-part, state-level presidency. There are multiple levels of problems
in the functioning of these elections over the years, and they break down into
two broad categories: one is technical, and the other political.
In the technical category, there are a handful of decisions by the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) that have sought to rectify anti-democratic
dynamics built into the Dayton Constitution. These include the fact that only a
Serb can run for member of the state-level presidency in the RS, and a Serb
cannot run for that office from the Federation. Similarly, a Jew, Rom, "Other,"
or someone who identifies as a Bosnian cannot run for that office from any part
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The ECHR has—ever since 2009—called for the rectification
of these problems, but nothing has been done. Meanwhile, there are matters of
transparency and honesty in elections that could be addressed by technical
changes in the electoral law, but have not.
The other group of problems pertains to the election of the Croat member of the
state-level presidency from the Federation, as well as the way members of the
upper chamber of parliament, the House of Peoples, are elected both in the
Federation and at the state level. For three of the past four national elections
Željko Komšić, an anti-nationalist politician who identifies as a Croat, has
taken the Croat membership in the state-level presidency, defeating HDZ chief
Dragan Čović each time. Because any voter can vote for any candidate in the
Federation, Bosniak voters played a critical role in electing the Croat
member—while in recent years, Croats also have gradually voted less and less for
the nationalist candidate.
The HDZ (the strongest party among the Croats) has more and more strongly
objected to this dynamic over the years, demanding a version of electoral reform
that would ensure the victory of that party in perpetuity. The party's objection
to the ongoing functioning of the government of the Federation in the old way
has been so strong that it has obstructed the creation of a new government in
that entity ever since the 2018 national elections.
In the past year there have been many rounds of negotiations between the HDZ and
leading "pro-Bosnia" parties—principally the SDA (led by Bakir Izetbegović), to
hammer out electoral reforms. Discussions were held in Neum, in Sarajevo, and in
Brussels up until quite recently, with no results. The HDZ ignored the ECHR
findings, and the SDA and others declined to cave in to the HDZ's demands.
With an early May deadline for changes in electoral law looming, international
officials who were promoting electoral reform—often in very ill-thought out
ways—gave up on the process. But the HDZ did not, and in the last week of April
the party was calling for the last-minute, streamlined adoption of the same
skewed package of changes.
The essence of the HDZ proposal is that votes for the Croat member of the
state-level presidency should be counted, not from each of the ten Cantons in
the Federation, but from the five Cantons where Croats are in the majority and
where support for the HDZ is the strongest. Among other objections to this
proposal, it would marginalize the Croat population in the Cantons where Croat
numbers are smaller. Above all, the proposal is seen as an unconstitutional way
to revive the wartime statelet of Herceg-Bosna in the form of a de facto third
entity.
Pro-Bosnia parties, led by the SDA, boycotted the House of Peoples session where
the HDZ proposal was to be aired, so that at the end of April, no reform has
been achieved. There is a danger that Croat nationalist leaders could decide to
boycott the October elections. The elections could also be delayed by virtue of
lack of funding, which comes from the state treasury. So far—and the time is
getting very close—the government has not allocated the 11.7 million KM needed
to run the elections.
Both Minister of Finance Vjekoslav Bevanda, a Croat and member of the HDZ, and
Zoran Tegeltija, Chairman of the Council of Ministers (equivalent to Prime
Minister of Bosnia), have obstructed earmarking of these funds. One excuse is
that the state budgets for 2021 and 2022 have not been adopted; state functions
are running on special allocations. Meanwhile, Tegeltija has refused to place
the question of election finance on the Council of Ministers' agenda—even though
that body has adopted other funding measures. It is hard to avoid the conclusion
that in yet another way, Croat and Serb separatists are colluding to destabilize
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Central Election Commission has fought to obtain funding, which must be
available by mid-May, pointing out that there are budget surpluses from previous
years, that can be used to adequately fund the elections.
In promotion of a Croat boycott of the elections, some Croat officials have
stated openly that, without (their version of) reform, there is no basis to hold
elections. Pro-Bosnian commentators have pointed out that Dragan Čović has won
elections several times under the very laws that are now in question. Western
international officials have lined up to proclaim that the elections must go on.
And in late April Čović himself commented that he did not expect there to be a
boycott, but that the final decision on this would come from the HNS (Hrvatski
Narodni Sabor/Croatian National Assembly) a nationalist organization of Croats
that supports the idea of a third entity. A Croat boycott could become the big
controversy of the season, or it could fizzle. Time will tell.
Citations
1.
Govornik na skupu u Banjoj Luci upitao okupljenu masu:
Jeste li vi genocidan narod? - Uslijedio gromoglasan odgovor: Jesmo! (Speaker at
rally in Banja Luka asked the gathered crowd: "Are you a genocidal people?" - A
thunderous answer followed: "Yes!" Oslobodjenje, April 22, 2022
2. U.S. Department of the Treasury: -Press
Release-
Treasury Targets Actors for Destabilizing Behavior throughout the Western
Balkans, April 11, 2022
3.
UK Government Announces Sanctions,
UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, April 11, 2022
4. "Nastavak
rušenja bh. institucija"
(Ongoing wrecking of Bosnian-Herzegovinan institutions), Oslobodjenje, March 21,
2022
5. "Bilo
jednom u Bosni, ponovilo se u Ukrajini"
(It happened in Bosnia, and again in Ukraine), by Gojko Berić, Oslobodjenje,
April 7, 2022.
6. "
Ivan Ilyin, Putin’s Philosopher of Russian Fascism,"
by Timothy Snyder, New York Review of Books, March 16, 2018.
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