SURVIVING THE PEACE

The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina

 

home  ♦  about the blog the book the author buy the book    contact

Bosnia Update, Monday, March 27, 2023
Odds & ends: Cerić
and China; Turkey; Queer Action in Banja Luka
Repression, Separatism, and Denial in the Republika Srpska
Corruption, Diplomas;
Ongoing Creation of the New Government

There's plenty of news from Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, here are a few topical items, and then I'll get into the denser material.

Reis Cerić and China

In a particularly scandalous move, in early January the former Reis (Grand Mufti) Mustafa ef. Cerić, who served in that position from 1993 to 2012, made a visit to China and praised that country's efforts in the "fight against terrorism," mainly directed against Muslims in Xinjiang province (east Turkestan). Most of the world is aware of the genocidal Chinese policies against the Uyghur Muslim population in that corner of China. But on January 8, a 30-member delegation of Islamic leaders from 14 countries visited the Xinjiang capital Urumqi and toured the region.

The tour was led by the World Muslim Communities Council, funded by the United Arab Emirates. In a statement during the tour, Cerić expressed admiration for China's influential role in the world and praised "the Chinese policy of fighting terrorism and de-radicalization for achieving peace and harmony in Xinjiang." Cerić's words not only echoed China's justifications for its massive violation of Uyghur and other Muslims' rights, but also similar statements from some Muslim leaders in other countries. However, the Bosnian Islamic Community did not support Cerić's actions, and co-signed an international statement expressing alarm about the human rights situation in Xinjiang.

Turkey

The devastating earthquakes in southern Turkey and northern Syria started in early February. Thousands of rescue workers came with teams from many parts of the world. Of the countries in the Western Balkans, Bosnia sent the greatest number of rescuers, from both entities. Dozens of cargo trucks made their way to Turkey as well; the trucks in one convoy of 20 were loaned at the owners' expense. Meanwhile, a massive donation drive of blankets, warm clothes, and hygienic items was carried out in Sarajevo, with people donating goods, money (hundreds of thousands of euros), and their time.
When it came time to pack up the goods collected in Sarajevo, volunteers came by the dozens to work long hours sorting and packing. Bosnia's Telecom company donated 150,000 KM. A team of ten doctors from Bihać went to Hatay and donated their time without payment.

Queer Action in Banja Luka

A low-key LGBTQ event was scheduled to take place in Banja Luka, capital of the Republika Srpska, on Saturday, March 18. No Pride march was planned, as none had ever taken place in Banja Luka and it was deemed too risky. As it turned out, the indoor screening of the film "Pride" in a secret location also ended in mayhem, in an incident reminiscent of what happened during a similar event in Sarajevo in 2008.

The organization "BiH Pride Parade" from Sarajevo planned the event in collaboration with the Banja Luka-based organization "Geto." The activists engaged the presumably safe office space of the corruption watchdog organization Transparency International for the showing of the film, to be followed by a round table discussion. They invited colleagues and activists from Banja Luka and beyond, informing the police of their plans. However, both the police and public officials obstructed the peaceful passage of the event.

First, 13 reactionary Serb nationalist organizations wrote a letter to RS President Dodik, to the prime minister, and Banja Luka mayor D
raško Stanivuković asking for the event to be prohibited. Stanivuković responded by saying that "Banja Luka will remain a bulwark of traditional, patriarchal family values." And Dodik stated, “I'm against that right away...any such gatherings. I expect that the Republika Srpska authorities will prevent it from taking place in any open or closed spaces. On what basis? Based on our freedoms. That's because they disturb others.”

As it happened, the local police got in touch with the event organizers and told them that they "couldn't guarantee their security"—in the secret, private location—and that the event must be cancelled. On the day of the film screening the police actually came to the TI office and forced attendants to exit the premises, and then they drove away, leaving the activists exposed to the violence of hooligans who were gathering nearby. A crowd of several dozen toughs came and started beating the activists and some journalists, putting a few of them in the hospital.

Police who were nearby did not react or intervene. And when the fracas was over, the police piled the activists into buses and forced them to evacuate from Banja Luka—even those who were residents of the city.

One of the activists spoke to the press, asking if it is a "traditional value" to attack women physically on the street. The local human rights organization Helsinki Citizens Parliament accused Stanivuković of contributing to a lynch atmosphere with his statements, and that they were going to file a criminal complaint against him and Dodik for incitement and giving a green light to the violence.
 
Stanivuković brushed off the complaint, calling it "classic blackmail" and saying that "Banja Luka remains a free city which has a legacy of democratic values." And Dodik announced that he was going to propose a law that would ban members of any LGBTQ organization from access to kindergartens, schools, and universities, prohibiting them from working, gaining access to, or "doing propaganda" in any of these institutions.

Repression, Separatism, and Denial in the Republika Srpska

For some decades people have been saying that the RS is "like North Korea." This is an exaggeration, but the political and social constraints in the entity are becoming more and more repressive, as evidenced by the example above. The RS is clearly an autocracy with remarkably dishonest electoral practices (see my earlier blog entries here and here) that marginalize not only the newly minted ethnic minorities that were subject to genocide and ethnic cleansing, but also the loyal opposition. Dodik's apparent attempt at lifetime rule is sustained by near-complete control of the media and the entity's law enforcement agencies; and he plays up not only to neighboring Serbia and its autocratic ruler, but is also cozy with Vladimir Putin.

The political structure created by the Dayton constitution makes it easier for autocracy to take hold in the RS than in the Federation, where there is at least an appearance of contention among a plurality of political parties. Not so in the RS. This makes it possible for Dodik to regularly incite his voter base by promising, or threatening, secession. To date, this does more to keep his followers provoked and marching in step than to actually move toward separation. But it also keeps international officials and Bosnian patriots in the other entity off balance, as they are always distracted by having to respond to Dodik's threats.

These threats come in a variety of packaging. One that has taken the fore recently is Dodik's ongoing attempt to usurp state property and make it the RS's own. This pertains especially to valuable military grounds that once belonged to the Yugoslav Army, and were then inherited by Bosnia-Herzegovina upon its independence. By definition and according to the Constitution, such properties belong to the state, not to the entities. And one of the requirements for Bosnia's accession to the EU is that the status of these controversial properties be resolved. They are controversial not because of their actual legal status, but because the RS leadership wishes to expropriate them for use by the entity.

The RS National Assembly has passed laws more than once establishing the properties in question as belonging to the RS, and the High Representative has suspended such laws, directing the Bosnian Constitutional Court to decree on the matter. This happened in 2022, and again in February of this year. Late in that month the RS parliament adopted a similar law, and HR Christian Schmidt suspended it. At the beginning of March the Constitutional Court decreed a stay on the law, pending further deliberation. The High Representative stated that this controversy should be resolved in the state-level parliament, and that there should be a law that settles the question of state property once and for all. But this kind of exhortation is nothing new.

Meanwhile, the RS is nevertheless transferring state property to its own registry; in Doboj some 300,000 square meters of military property were declared RS property pursuant to investment in an industrial plant on this space. A similar process is underway in Han Pijesak. In response to RS encroachments on state property, the US administration placed sanctions on Dragan Stanković, director of an entity agency that administers legal affairs pertaining to property. Then, Dodik declared that if the High Representative or any other international body, or for that matter Bosnian state officials, touch what he considers to be RS property, that will cross a "red line" and constitute grounds for secession.

In mid-March Dodik announced the formation of a committee to compile information and discuss "anti-Dayton activities of American and British diplomats and their interference in the internal affairs of Bosnia...because they are preparing another fraud and robbery related to property that undoubtedly belongs to the RS." The committee will discuss the possibility of discontinuing all contact with diplomats from the two countries.

Most of this talk is hot air, and commentators assert that Dodik knows he cannot usurp property nor secede, but that it plays well for his political base. This has been true to date, but it may not remain the case forever.

Meanwhile, on March 8 the RS administration announced the impending passage of two more laws: one that would institute harsh fines for "libel and insulting speech that causes public damage to someone's honor and reputation," and another that would require non-governmental organizations that receive money from abroad—and there are many such NGOs—to register as "foreign agents."

Dodik explained that the new law on "foreign agents" would basically be a copy, almost word for word, of an American law: "Instead of the US, the law will say 'Republika Srpska.'" He singled out George Soros's Open Society as an example of an organization to be targeted. Banja Luka Mayor Stanivuković, often at odds with Dodik's policies, supported the law. But analysts see the move as yet another way for the ruling coalition to consolidate its power. And the US Embassy commented that the proposed law was based on a Russian model, not the American one.

The proposed law criminalizing libel, "insults," and disclosure of personal information, would levy large fines of up to 100,000 KM against journalists and ordinary citizens who write in the public media, on social networks, or even speak at private gatherings—anywhere that their speech could reach a larger number of people. This has the potential to put a stop to investigative journalism, or any truly independent journalism. Examination of corruption would cease. It is also a possibility that journalists outside of the RS, in the Federation or abroad, could be targeted under the new law. Commentators warn that the law is a "jump back to 50 years ago." Journalists and activists have organized protest demonstrations in RS cities, and even some members of the ruling coalition have stated that the law is too broad.

In a related incident, in announcing the law on libel, Dodik called journalists "freaks and racketeers." Aiming at local journalists who protested the proposed law, Dodik singled out the president of the Banja Luka journalists' association, saying, "Those who oppose this are creating an inappropriate atmosphere...they have been lying for years...we need to enable the journalistic community here to do its job freely." ("Dodik attacks journalists again," Oslobodjenje, March 8, 2023)

The very next day the vehicles of several journalists were bombed, including that of Aleksandar Trifunovi
ć, editor of Buka on-line portal. Trifunović has distinguished himself as a rare truth-teller in the Republika Srpska media environment. He was not injured, but his and a colleague's autos were damaged, along with the facades of nearby apartment buildings. Supporters of Dodik's regime accused the two journalists of bombing their own cars, and said they were lucky to remain unhurt—and that they should watch their backs.

Along with the escalated assault on the media and independent activists in the RS, atrocity denial and historical revisionism carries on. Dodik continues to refer to the country as the "so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina," and to Christian Schmidt as the "illegitimate High Representative." In a statement on March 6, he once again denied the genocide at Srebrenica, saying, "There was no genocide there, everyone in the RS knows this." This public statement put Dodik in direct violation of the law against denial created by the previous High Representative in 2021. In response, the Bosnian State Prosecution announced that it was going to investigate Dodik for violation of the law, leading to possible prosecution. But no one should take bets on this case going anywhere soon.


Corruption, Diplomas, Sebija Izetbegovi
ć

The real business of the Bosnian political elite being corruption, I will describe just a few examples of the practice that take place from the top to bottom of society, and show up in the newspapers every day.

--Early in January Mustafa Vrabac, a Sarajevo-based employee of the state Prosecutor's Office, was arrested on suspicion of taking some 10,000 euros in payment to intervene and use his influence on behalf of an unnamed person under investigation for a crime. Vrabac was filmed accepting a bribe.

--Around the same time
Mladenko Andrić, a veterinary inspector based in Brčko, was arrested for receiving a bribe in order to green-light the importation into Bosnia of foodstuffs of animal origin, without proper examination.

--The auditing board of the Central Election Committee has determined that in just the first ten days of last year's electoral campaign, President Dodik used an entity-owned helicopter seven times to travel to different cities in the RS on the campaign trail. This constitutes an illegal acceptance of non-monetary donation by the entity to a private candidate.

--The trial of Jelena
Majstorović et al, inspectors for the Bosnian indirect tax agency accused of graft and blackmail (which I describe in an earlier blog here) is ongoing. And the trial of Federation Prime Minister Fadil Novalić et al, accused of Covid-related corruption in the "Respirator" case, is in the final statements stage (see previous blog entries here and here).

--The above cases, with the exception of Dodik, involve relatively paltry rip-offs compared to the operations of the big fish. One of these is
Nedim Uzunović, director of Bosnia's largest pharmaceutical company Bosnalijek. Uzunović and several of his cronies have been under investigation for more than 10 years for "organized crime, corruption, money laundering, and making deals that are damaging to the state budget." Bosnalijek has an annual income of well over a billion KM, with a profit of more than 100 million.

Over the years, five members of the company's administration colluded to perform illegal privatizations and sales of company stocks. They also formed phantom companies and negotiated "deals" with them involving payments that did not result in any services, but were diverted to offshore accounts. Money from these accounts was then transferred to family and friends of the crooked operators. The funds siphoned off from Bosnalijek came to nearly ten million KM. There is talk that Mr. Uzunović is preparing to make a plea bargain with the Office of the Prosecutor that would involve a partial payback and a minimal jail sentence.

Commenting on the case, Damjan O
žegović from Transparency International says that there is a lack of political will to fight corruption in Bosnia, and there has been no significant headway against the problem because there is a lack of operative collaboration between law enforcement agencies, a limited exchange of information, and criminal laws are not standardized at all levels throughout the country. Worse yet, there is political influence on prosecution and on police agencies. Mr. Ožegović states that because of these problems, "there is no processing of high corruption, except when it is a case of political revenge. So, for statistical purposes, prosecutors focus on smaller cases."

An illustration of what's behind the political support for corruption can be seen in the backgrounds of some of the recent appointees for members of the state-level Council of Ministers: Nenad Nešić, Minister of Security, was convicted in Serbia of assault on a public official. He was also previously involved in corrupt activities as director of Republika Srpska Putevi (Roads). Zoran Tegeltija, former prime minister and now Minister of Finance and Treasury, was convicted and given a suspended sentence of five months for "irresponsible work in an official capacity (corruption while in office)."
Zukan Helez, Minister of Defense, was convicted of fighting in a bar in Bugojno (in one of several similar incidents) and given a suspended sentence of nine months. He has also been convicted of perjury.

Other appointees to the new cabinet stand out more for lack of qualifications than by a record of abuse of power. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Elmedin Konaković, earned a diploma in Sports and Physical Fitness. Konaković and all the other new appointees achieved their new positions by virtue of their loyalty—or in some cases actual leadership—in their respective political parties, much more than due being suited for the job in question.

It's not a great wonder, then, that on Transparency International's most recent corruption index, Bosnia-Herzegovina has fallen eight places in the organization's ranking of corrupt countries, with Russia and Ukraine the only European countries coming in behind Bosnia.

In a report about the latest rankings, TI chair Srđan Blagovčanin stated, "It is not only that there is no strategy, policy, nor activity of state institutions to prevent corruption; rather, the state institutions, completely entrapped by political control, focus their activities practically completely on practicing corruption. Corruption has unfortunately become the primary reason for the existence of those institutions. The complete symbiosis of organized crime and the state institutions presents a particular danger, which will lead to further destabilization of the country and the collapse of security" ("BiH completely devastated by corruption," Oslobodjenje, January 31, 2023).

Amidst all this corruption is the ongoing sale of college diplomas to unqualified, uneducated buyers, usually from the ranks of political parties. This scandal has been going on for years in several parts of the country, with investigations becoming more active and coming closer to the source in recent months. The matter even verges on drawing in Sebija Izetbegovi
ć, the wife of SDA leader Bakir Izetbegović. She is a professor of medicine at the University of Sarajevo and director of Bosnia's largest hospital, the Clinical Center of Sarajevo University. At the beginning of March her master's degree was revoked, for lack of proof that she had fulfilled all the requirements to receive it. Now this brings into question the validity of her doctoral degree and her right to hold the positions she enjoys. To my mind, while the reasons for the revocation of her degree may be valid, it also smells like there are politics involved in this move. That is not surprising, as there is abiding resentment from some quarters against the power of the Izetbegović dynasty.

More shall be revealed about this fracas, and for space considerations, I've left out most of the simmering story about the diploma scandals. For now, here are the words of a couple of commentators: "Those who blow the whistle, and prosecutors, and inspectors, will be attacked from all sides, while the most corrupt and brutal will again be rewarded. So, the worst swine will get the best pears." Another comment: "Those who are buying diplomas are the most ordinary criminals and wretches who are not capable to achieve them with their effort and knowledge, and others are an even worse sort of criminal, a false academic elite who are the greatest destroyers of our country." ("There is more corruption than knowledge in the universities," Oslobodjenje, February 2, 2023)

Ongoing Creation of the New Government

The state-level government, or Council of Ministers, was formed in January of this year—less than four months after the October elections. That may seem like a long time, but it is actually a record for Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's the way coalition politics works, especially in that country. The government of the Republika Srpska was also formed quickly, but the process is still underway in the Federation. That entity has not seen a new government since 2014, due to obstruction by the Croat nationalist party, HDZ.

But obstruction is equally available to anyone who wants to block political processes in Bosnia. Dodik's name is all but synonymous with obstruction, but in recent months Bosniak leaders have also engaged in the practice.

Without going too much into the eye-glazing details, I note that Bakir Izetbegović,
leader of the most powerful Bosniak party, the SDA, was convincingly defeated in his bid for Bosniak member of the state-level presidency. His party, on the other hand, won the greatest number of Bosniak votes nationwide. However, a coalition of eight other parties, the Osmorka (the "Eight," or "Octet") was able to outnumber the SDA in parliamentary votes, and thus won the right to form a parliamentary coalition—with the HDZ and Dodik's SNSD. This opened the Osmorka to criticism that it was selling out to gain power by cooperating with the ultra-nationalists and wreckers of the country. This is, of course, exactly what the SDA has done throughout most of the years since the first multi-party elections in 1990.

The SDA, because of its votes, still has enough power to put a stick in the gears of Federation politics, especially because it holds a position in the Federation's leadership. A Croat from the HDZ is president of the entity; a Serb from the Social Democrat Party and a Bosniak from the SDA, are vice-presidents. The Federation's Constitution dictates that these three figures must agree on appointments to the cabinet and prime minister of the Federation. Here is where they cannot agree, because the SDA member, Refik Lendo, will not approve some of the nominations. He is being accused of obstruction—but he, in turn, accuses the other members of the Federation presidency of obstruction as well.

Here is where the political process takes on the nature of, let's say, a slow-motion dogfight. For now, five months after the elections, there's no sign of a resolution and no new government in the Federation. High Representative Christian Schmidt's stealth decree on the night of October 2nd—as votes from that day's election were being counted—was supposed to streamline the function of government formation in the Federation and prevent blocking. But, like water seeking its own level, politicians find new and inventive ways to manipulate a system that is eminently ripe for manipulation.

Finally: Will HR Schmidt issue another decree, to make up for the tangle caused by his last one, and thus cause an even worse one? That's today's rumor. Stay tuned.

To respond to this blog, click here to e-mail me.