SURVIVING THE PEACE
The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina
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Bosnia Update,
Monday, March 27, 2023
Odds & ends: Cerić
and China;
Turkey;
Queer Action in Banja Luka
Repression, Separatism, and Denial in the Republika Srpska
Corruption, Diplomas;
Ongoing Creation of the New Government
There's plenty of news from Bosnia-Herzegovina. First, here are a few topical
items, and then I'll get into the denser material.
Reis Cerić and China
In a particularly scandalous move, in early January the former Reis (Grand
Mufti) Mustafa ef. Cerić, who served in that position from 1993 to 2012, made a
visit to China and praised that country's efforts in the "fight against
terrorism," mainly directed against Muslims in Xinjiang province (east Turkestan).
Most of the world is aware of the genocidal Chinese policies against the Uyghur
Muslim population in that corner of China. But on January 8, a 30-member
delegation of Islamic leaders from 14 countries visited the Xinjiang capital
Urumqi and toured the region.
The tour was led by the World Muslim Communities Council, funded by the United
Arab Emirates. In a statement during the tour, Cerić expressed admiration for
China's influential role in the world and praised "the Chinese policy of
fighting terrorism and de-radicalization for achieving peace and harmony in
Xinjiang." Cerić's words not only echoed China's justifications for its massive
violation of Uyghur and other Muslims' rights, but also similar statements from
some Muslim leaders in other countries. However, the Bosnian Islamic Community
did not support Cerić's actions, and co-signed an international statement
expressing alarm about the human rights situation in Xinjiang.
Turkey
The devastating earthquakes in southern Turkey and northern Syria started in
early February. Thousands of rescue workers came with teams from many parts of
the world. Of the countries in the Western Balkans, Bosnia sent the greatest
number of rescuers, from both entities. Dozens of cargo trucks made their way to
Turkey as well; the trucks in one convoy of 20 were loaned at the owners'
expense. Meanwhile, a massive donation drive of blankets, warm clothes, and
hygienic items was carried out in Sarajevo, with people donating goods, money
(hundreds of thousands of euros), and their time.
When it came time to pack up the goods collected in Sarajevo, volunteers came by
the dozens to work long hours sorting and packing.
Bosnia's Telecom
company donated 150,000 KM. A team of ten doctors from
Bihać went to Hatay and donated their time without payment.
Queer Action in Banja Luka
A low-key
LGBTQ event was scheduled to take place in Banja Luka, capital of the Republika
Srpska, on Saturday, March 18. No Pride march was planned, as none had ever
taken place in Banja Luka and it was deemed too risky. As it turned out, the
indoor screening of the film "Pride" in a secret location also ended in mayhem,
in an incident reminiscent of what happened during a similar event in Sarajevo
in 2008.
The organization "BiH Pride Parade" from Sarajevo planned the event in
collaboration with the Banja Luka-based organization "Geto." The activists
engaged the presumably safe office space of the corruption watchdog organization
Transparency International for the showing of the film, to be followed by a
round table discussion. They invited colleagues and activists from Banja Luka
and beyond, informing the police of their plans. However, both the police and
public officials obstructed the peaceful passage of the event.
First, 13 reactionary Serb nationalist organizations wrote a letter to RS
President Dodik, to the prime minister, and Banja Luka mayor Draško
Stanivuković asking for the event to be prohibited. Stanivuković responded by
saying that "Banja Luka will remain a bulwark of traditional, patriarchal family
values." And Dodik stated,
“I'm against that
right away...any such gatherings. I expect that the Republika Srpska authorities
will prevent it from taking place in any open or closed spaces. On what basis?
Based on our freedoms. That's because they disturb others.”
As it happened, the local police got in touch with the event organizers and told
them that they "couldn't guarantee their security"—in the secret, private
location—and that the event must be cancelled. On the day of the film screening
the police actually came to the TI office and forced attendants to exit the
premises, and then they drove away, leaving the activists exposed to the
violence of hooligans who were gathering nearby. A crowd of several dozen toughs
came and started beating the activists and some journalists, putting a few of
them in the hospital.
Police who were nearby did not react or intervene. And when the fracas was over,
the police piled the activists into buses and forced them to evacuate from Banja
Luka—even those who were residents of the city.
One of the activists spoke to the press, asking if it is a "traditional value"
to attack women physically on the street. The local human rights organization
Helsinki Citizens Parliament accused Stanivuković of contributing to a lynch
atmosphere with his statements, and that they were going to file a criminal
complaint against him and Dodik for incitement and giving a green light to the
violence.
Stanivuković brushed off the complaint, calling it "classic blackmail"
and saying that "Banja Luka remains a free city which has a legacy of democratic
values." And Dodik announced that he was going to propose a law that would ban
members of any LGBTQ organization from access to kindergartens, schools, and
universities, prohibiting them from working, gaining access to, or "doing
propaganda" in any of these institutions.
Repression, Separatism, and Denial in the Republika Srpska
For some decades people have been saying that the RS is "like North Korea." This
is an exaggeration, but the political and social constraints in the entity are
becoming more and more repressive, as evidenced by the example above. The RS is
clearly an autocracy with remarkably dishonest electoral practices (see my
earlier blog entries
here and
here) that marginalize not only the newly minted ethnic minorities that were
subject to genocide and ethnic cleansing, but also the loyal opposition. Dodik's
apparent attempt at lifetime rule is sustained by near-complete control of the
media and the entity's law enforcement agencies; and he plays up not only to
neighboring Serbia and its autocratic ruler, but is also cozy with Vladimir
Putin.
The political structure created by the Dayton constitution makes it easier for
autocracy to take hold in the RS than in the Federation, where there is at least
an appearance of contention among a plurality of political parties. Not so in
the RS. This makes it possible for Dodik to regularly incite his voter base by
promising, or threatening, secession. To date, this does more to keep his
followers provoked and marching in step than to actually move toward separation.
But it also keeps international officials and Bosnian patriots in the other
entity off balance, as they are always distracted by having to respond to
Dodik's threats.
These threats come in a variety of packaging. One that has taken the fore
recently is Dodik's ongoing attempt to usurp state property and make it the RS's
own. This pertains especially to valuable military grounds that once belonged to
the Yugoslav Army, and were then inherited by Bosnia-Herzegovina upon its
independence. By definition and according to the Constitution, such properties
belong to the state, not to the entities. And one of the requirements for
Bosnia's accession to the EU is that the status of these controversial
properties be resolved. They are controversial not because of their actual legal
status, but because the RS leadership wishes to expropriate them for use by the
entity.
The RS National Assembly has passed laws more than once establishing the
properties in question as belonging to the RS, and the High Representative has
suspended such laws, directing the Bosnian Constitutional Court to decree on the
matter. This happened in 2022, and again in February of this year. Late in that
month the RS parliament adopted a similar law, and HR Christian Schmidt
suspended it. At the beginning of March the Constitutional Court decreed a stay
on the law, pending further deliberation. The High Representative stated that
this controversy should be resolved in the state-level parliament, and that
there should be a law that settles the question of state property once and for
all. But this kind of exhortation is nothing new.
Meanwhile, the RS is nevertheless transferring state property to its own
registry; in Doboj some 300,000 square meters of military property were declared
RS property pursuant to investment in an industrial plant on this space. A
similar process is underway in Han Pijesak. In response to RS encroachments on
state property, the US administration placed sanctions on Dragan Stanković,
director of an entity agency that administers legal affairs pertaining to
property. Then, Dodik declared that if the High Representative or any other
international body, or for that matter Bosnian state officials, touch what he
considers to be RS property, that will cross a "red line" and constitute grounds
for secession.
In mid-March Dodik announced the formation of a committee to compile information
and discuss "anti-Dayton activities of American and British diplomats and their
interference in the internal affairs of Bosnia...because they are preparing
another fraud and robbery related to property that undoubtedly belongs to the
RS." The committee will discuss the possibility of discontinuing all contact
with diplomats from the two countries.
Most of this talk is hot air, and commentators assert that Dodik knows he cannot
usurp property nor secede, but that it plays well for his political base.
This has been true to date, but it may not remain the case forever.
Meanwhile, on March 8 the RS administration announced the impending passage of
two more laws: one that would institute harsh fines for "libel and insulting
speech that causes public damage to someone's honor and reputation," and another
that would require non-governmental organizations that receive money from
abroad—and there are many such NGOs—to register as "foreign agents."
Dodik explained that the new law on "foreign agents" would basically be a copy,
almost word for word, of an American law: "Instead of the US, the law will say 'Republika
Srpska.'" He singled out George Soros's Open Society as an example of an
organization to be targeted. Banja Luka Mayor Stanivuković, often at odds with
Dodik's policies, supported the law. But analysts
see the move as
yet another way for the ruling coalition to consolidate its power. And the US
Embassy commented that the proposed law was based on a Russian model, not the
American one.
The proposed law criminalizing libel, "insults," and disclosure of personal
information, would levy large fines of up to 100,000 KM against journalists and
ordinary citizens who write in the public media, on social networks, or even
speak at private gatherings—anywhere that their speech could reach a larger
number of people. This has the potential to put a stop to investigative
journalism, or any truly independent journalism. Examination of corruption would
cease. It is also a possibility that journalists outside of the RS, in the
Federation or abroad, could be targeted under the new law. Commentators warn
that the law is a "jump back to 50 years ago." Journalists and activists have
organized protest demonstrations in RS cities, and even some members of the
ruling coalition have stated that the law is too broad.
In a related incident, in announcing the law on libel, Dodik called journalists
"freaks and racketeers." Aiming at local journalists who protested the proposed
law, Dodik singled out the president of the Banja Luka journalists' association,
saying, "Those who oppose this are creating an inappropriate atmosphere...they
have been lying for years...we need to enable the journalistic community here to
do its job freely." ("Dodik attacks journalists again," Oslobodjenje, March 8,
2023)
The very next day the vehicles of several journalists were bombed, including
that of Aleksandar Trifunović,
editor of Buka on-line portal. Trifunović has distinguished himself as a rare
truth-teller in the Republika Srpska media environment. He was not injured, but
his and a colleague's autos were damaged, along with the facades of nearby
apartment buildings. Supporters of Dodik's regime accused the two journalists of
bombing their own cars, and said they were lucky to remain unhurt—and that they
should watch their backs.
Along with the escalated assault on the media and independent activists in the
RS, atrocity denial and historical revisionism carries on. Dodik continues to
refer to the country as the "so-called Bosnia-Herzegovina," and to Christian
Schmidt as the "illegitimate High Representative." In a statement on March 6, he
once again denied the genocide at Srebrenica, saying, "There was no genocide
there, everyone in the RS knows this." This public statement put Dodik in direct
violation of the law against denial created by the previous High Representative
in 2021. In response, the Bosnian State Prosecution announced that it was going
to investigate Dodik for violation of the law, leading to possible prosecution.
But no one should take bets on this case going anywhere soon.
Corruption, Diplomas, Sebija Izetbegović
The real business of the Bosnian political elite being corruption, I will
describe just a few examples of the practice that take place from the top to
bottom of society, and show up in the newspapers every day.
--Early in January Mustafa Vrabac, a Sarajevo-based employee of the state
Prosecutor's Office, was arrested on suspicion of taking some 10,000 euros in
payment to intervene and use his influence on behalf of an unnamed person under
investigation for a crime. Vrabac was filmed accepting a bribe.
--Around the same time
Mladenko Andrić,
a veterinary inspector based in
Brčko, was arrested for receiving a bribe in order to green-light the
importation into Bosnia of foodstuffs of animal origin, without proper
examination.
--The
auditing board of the Central Election Committee has determined that in just the
first ten days of last year's electoral campaign, President Dodik used an
entity-owned helicopter seven times to travel to different cities in the RS on
the campaign trail. This constitutes an illegal acceptance of non-monetary
donation by the entity to a private candidate.
--The trial of Jelena
Majstorović et
al, inspectors for the Bosnian indirect tax agency accused of graft and
blackmail (which I describe in an earlier blog
here)
is ongoing. And the trial of Federation Prime Minister Fadil
Novalić et al, accused of Covid-related corruption in the "Respirator" case, is
in the final statements stage (see previous blog entries
here
and
here).
--The above cases, with the exception of Dodik, involve relatively paltry
rip-offs compared to the operations of the big fish. One of these is
Nedim Uzunović,
director of Bosnia's largest pharmaceutical company Bosnalijek. Uzunović and
several of his cronies have been under investigation for more than 10 years for
"organized crime, corruption, money laundering, and making deals that are
damaging to the state budget." Bosnalijek has an annual income of well over a
billion KM, with a profit of more than 100 million.
Over the years, five members of the company's administration colluded to perform
illegal privatizations and sales of company stocks. They also formed phantom
companies and negotiated "deals" with them involving payments that did not
result in any services, but were diverted to offshore accounts. Money from these
accounts was then transferred to family and friends of the crooked operators.
The funds siphoned off from Bosnalijek came to nearly ten million KM. There is
talk that Mr. Uzunović is preparing to make a plea bargain with the Office of
the Prosecutor that would involve a partial payback and a minimal jail sentence.
Commenting on the case, Damjan Ožegović
from Transparency International
says that there
is a lack of political will to fight corruption in Bosnia, and there has been no
significant headway against the problem because there is a lack of operative
collaboration between law enforcement agencies, a limited exchange of information,
and criminal laws are not standardized at all levels throughout the country.
Worse yet, there is political influence on prosecution and on police agencies.
Mr. Ožegović
states that because of these problems, "there is no processing of high
corruption, except when it is a case of political revenge. So, for statistical
purposes, prosecutors focus on smaller cases."
An illustration of what's behind the political support for corruption can be
seen in the backgrounds of some of the recent appointees for members of the
state-level Council of Ministers: Nenad Nešić, Minister of Security, was
convicted in Serbia of assault on a public official. He was also previously
involved in corrupt activities as director of Republika Srpska Putevi (Roads).
Zoran Tegeltija, former prime minister and now Minister of Finance and Treasury,
was convicted and given a suspended sentence of five months for "irresponsible
work in an official capacity (corruption while in office)."
Zukan Helez,
Minister of Defense, was convicted of fighting in a bar in Bugojno (in one of
several similar incidents) and given a suspended sentence of nine months. He has
also been convicted of perjury.
Other appointees to the new cabinet stand out more for lack of qualifications
than by a record of abuse of power. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Elmedin
Konaković, earned a diploma in Sports and Physical Fitness. Konaković and all
the other new appointees achieved their new positions by virtue of their
loyalty—or in some cases actual leadership—in their respective political
parties, much more than due being suited for the job in question.
It's not a great wonder, then, that on Transparency International's most recent
corruption index, Bosnia-Herzegovina has fallen eight places in the
organization's ranking of corrupt countries, with Russia and Ukraine the only
European countries coming in behind Bosnia.
In a report about the latest rankings, TI chair Srđan Blagovčanin stated, "It is
not only that there is no strategy, policy, nor activity of state institutions
to prevent corruption; rather, the state institutions, completely entrapped by
political control, focus their activities practically completely on practicing
corruption. Corruption has unfortunately become the primary reason for the
existence of those institutions. The complete symbiosis of organized crime and
the state institutions presents a particular danger, which will lead to further
destabilization of the country and the collapse of security" ("BiH completely
devastated by corruption," Oslobodjenje, January 31, 2023).
Amidst all this corruption is the ongoing sale of
college diplomas to unqualified, uneducated buyers, usually from the ranks of
political parties. This scandal has been going on for years in several parts of
the country, with investigations becoming more active and coming closer to the
source in recent months. The matter even verges on drawing in Sebija Izetbegović,
the wife of SDA leader Bakir
Izetbegović.
She is a professor of medicine at the University of Sarajevo and director of
Bosnia's
largest hospital, the Clinical Center of Sarajevo University. At the beginning
of March her master's degree was revoked, for lack of proof that she had
fulfilled all the requirements to receive it. Now this brings into question the
validity of her doctoral degree and her right to hold the positions she enjoys.
To my mind, while the reasons for the revocation of her degree may be valid, it
also smells like there are politics involved in this move. That is not
surprising, as there is abiding resentment from some quarters against the power
of the Izetbegović
dynasty.
More shall be revealed about this fracas, and for space considerations, I've
left out most of the simmering story about the diploma scandals. For now, here
are the words of a couple of commentators: "Those who blow the whistle, and
prosecutors, and inspectors, will be attacked from all sides, while the most
corrupt and brutal will again be rewarded. So, the worst swine will get the best
pears." Another comment: "Those who are buying diplomas are the most ordinary
criminals and wretches who are not capable to achieve them with their effort and
knowledge, and others are an even worse sort of criminal, a false academic elite
who are the greatest destroyers of our country." ("There is more corruption than
knowledge in the universities," Oslobodjenje, February 2, 2023)
Ongoing Creation of the New Government
The state-level government, or Council of Ministers, was formed in January of
this year—less than four months after the October elections. That may seem like
a long time, but it is actually a record for Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's the way
coalition politics works, especially in that country. The government of the
Republika Srpska was also formed quickly, but the process is still underway in
the Federation. That entity has not seen a new government since 2014, due to
obstruction by the Croat nationalist party, HDZ.
But obstruction is equally available to anyone who wants to block political
processes in Bosnia. Dodik's name is all but synonymous with obstruction, but in
recent months Bosniak leaders have also engaged in the practice.
Without going too much into the eye-glazing details, I note that Bakir
Izetbegović,
leader of the
most powerful Bosniak party, the SDA, was convincingly defeated in his bid for
Bosniak member of the state-level presidency. His party, on the other hand, won
the greatest number of Bosniak votes nationwide. However, a coalition of eight
other parties, the Osmorka (the "Eight," or "Octet") was able to outnumber the
SDA in parliamentary votes, and thus won the right to form a parliamentary
coalition—with the HDZ and Dodik's SNSD. This opened the Osmorka to criticism
that it was selling out to gain power by cooperating with the ultra-nationalists
and wreckers of the country. This is, of course, exactly what the SDA has done
throughout most of the years since the first multi-party elections in 1990.
The SDA, because of its votes, still has enough power to put a stick in the
gears of Federation politics, especially because it holds a position in the
Federation's leadership. A Croat from the HDZ is president of the entity; a Serb
from the Social Democrat Party and a Bosniak from the SDA, are vice-presidents.
The Federation's Constitution dictates that these three figures must agree on
appointments to the cabinet and prime minister of the Federation. Here is where
they cannot agree, because the SDA member, Refik Lendo, will not approve some of
the nominations. He is being accused of obstruction—but he, in turn, accuses the
other members of the Federation presidency of obstruction as well.
Here is
where the political process takes on the nature of,
let's say, a slow-motion dogfight. For now, five months after the elections,
there's no sign of a resolution and no new government in the Federation. High
Representative Christian Schmidt's stealth decree on the night of October 2nd—as
votes from that day's election were being counted—was supposed to streamline the
function of government formation in the Federation and prevent blocking. But,
like water seeking its own level, politicians find new and inventive ways to
manipulate a system that is eminently ripe for manipulation.
Finally: Will HR Schmidt issue another decree, to make up for the tangle caused
by his last one, and thus cause an even worse one? That's today's rumor. Stay
tuned.
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