SURVIVING THE PEACE The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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Bosnia update, Thursday, December 4, 2025
Dodik no longer RS president; Republika Srpska parliament annuls secessionist laws; OFAC lifts sanctions; Dodik 2.0 "wins" snap elections

This blog entry will describe an unexpected turnaround in US sanctions policy targeting the Republika Srpska (RS) entity's former president Dodik, his family, his cronies, and his favored companies. That development, in late October, followed conciliatory measures by the Dodik-controlled RS National Assembly, and in late November special elections resulted in the questionable election of a Dodik political clone.

You'll recall that earlier in the year, Dodik was convicted in a binding second-instance court judgment of violating laws decreed by High Representative Christian Schmidt; removed from office; banned from political activity for six years; and sentenced to a year in prison. As the law permits, Dodik bought his way out of serving that sentence at the rate of 100 KM per day and appointed Ana Trišić-Babić as acting RS President. Trišić-Babić, while said to be an advocate of Bosnia's membership in NATO, has worked for some years as Dodik's close advisor.

Before I launch into this, let me remind you of my six-part series on environmental activism in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was published by LeftEast this spring, here. And in the second half of October I visited the country for a followup on that material; I wrote an informal journal about that visit here. There will be more writing on that subject in the future.

Dodik president? Or not?

For several months after Dodik's removal from office, he continued to assert that he was the president of the RS. He assumed the paradoxical position of having effectively respected the higher Bosnian courts and prosecutors at the state level, while also stating that he answers only to the voters of the RS, who elected him and still support him.

As RS prime minister or president, and as one-term member of the state-level presidency, Dodik has continuously held high office since 2006, after a shorter stint in the late 1990s. For all that time, he has been the president of his party, the SNSD. This is the key to his power: the reins of the most popular (Serb nationalist and separatist) party in the entity. The question prevailing in the fall of this year has been whether, as some commentators say, Dodik's political career is winding down. Without office, can he still run the entity and continue to undermine the stability of Bosnia? We'll see.

Under a Serb president, the RS by law has a Bosniak and a Croat vice-president. In mid-September the latter official, Davor Pranjić, signed into effect some laws passed by the RS National Assembly (NSRS). While this provided de facto confirmation of the removal of Dodik as president, Dodik's explanation was that he still made the important decisions regarding the entity, but he avoided signing them, so as not to give state-level authorities an excuse to prosecute him further.

US President a peacemaker?

In a bizarre sideshow, on October 14 the three-part state-level presidency, comprising Željko Komšić (Croat), Denis Bećirović (Bosniak), and Žejlka Cvijanović (Serb), voted unanimously to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. The nomination was made in recognition of the US president's "efforts to establish lasting peace in the Gaza Strip."

I can only guess that this long-shot sycophancy was yet another instance of leaders the world 'round kissing up to the narcissist president. I wonder how Bećirović and Komšić, who probably have at least some sympathy for the Palestinians, feel today when, after a so-called "ceasefire," about hundreds more Gazans have been killed by the Israeli army, and the trickle of food into the territory stands around 20% of what was promised. For Cvijanović, I don't suppose she feels any differently from the way she felt when she had single-handedly nominated Trump for the same award a couple of months earlier.

RS annulls separatist laws

On October 19 the NSRS, in a streamlined procedure, annulled numerous laws it had passed during 2023 and 2024 in response to laws decreed by High Representative Schmidt. Dodik and his separatist accomplices considered that Schmidt's laws had compromised RS "sovereignty"—while in fact they put a damper on the separatists' aspirations to secede from Bosnia.

To many people's surprise, the NSRS annulled the prohibition on observing Schmidt's decrees (Law on the Non-Application of Laws and Prohibition of the Activities of Extra-Constitutional Institutions of BiH); a separatist entity electoral law (Election Law of Republika Srpska); a prohibition on observing decisions by the state-level Constitutional Court (Law on the Non-Application of Decisions of the Constitutional Court of BiH); the creation of an entity High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (Law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council of Republika Srpska); and laws governing the use of state property in the entity (Law on Immovable Property Used for the Functioning of Public Authorities). All of these laws, clearly, were meant to undermine the constitutional order of the state, and they had all already been declared void by the Constitutional Court.

The annulments followed the October 17 lifting by the US Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of sanctions on four minor RS officials who had been involved in the support of Dodik's creation of January 9 as an entity holiday. This holiday, the commemoration of an early move that led to the establishment the RS, had quickly been declared unconstitutional by the state-level Constitutional Court; a finding that has annually been ignored by the RS. The four officials' sanctions were removed, according to OFAC, because now that Dodik is no longer president, this nullifies their capability to undermine Bosnia's stability.

People around the country were surprised by the NSRS's annulments; as some kind of quid-pro-quo, the removal of sanctions on a few minor figures was too weak an explanation for the annulments. People I talked to—as I was traveling in both entities just then—uniformly insisted that there had to have been some significant deal made between Dodik's advocates and the US administration. Among other hypotheses, speculation had it that Dodik had secured an agreement to have the Office of the High Representative closed—something he had long advocated for, with the support of Russia, China, and Hungary.

The day after the annulments, Željka Cvijanović declared that this measure was "the sign of an outstretched hand." In her customary praise of President Trmp's policies, she continued, "If the Americans can annul the damaging results of the Biden era, why can't we do the same in Bosnia-Herzegovina? ...It's apparent that not all in Bosnia want to renounce Biden, but we in the RS do. Because of the damage they [Biden's measure, e.g., sanctions], we were glad of Trump's victory...the NSRS has the strength to show our readiness for a new arrangement."

And Dodik declared, "The RS is completely stable, economically and politically. Decadent forces from Sarajevo and part of the international community are attacking us. But we have now completely changed the situation in our favor; we have adopted a [different] political approach in order to strengthen the position of the RS."

Dodik had arranged to hold a referendum throughout the RS on October 25, as a vote of confidence in himself after his second-instance conviction. But this day came and went without a mention of the referendum, which ostensibly was postponed to take place the next January 9.

Meanwhile, there was a back-and-forth wrangle between the Central Elections Commission (CEC) and the Constitutional Court debating whether the ban on Dodik's political activity extended to his leadership of his SNSD party. In the course of this discussion, Dodik declared the Constitutional Court "an Inquisitional court" and called the members of the CEC "poltroons." But apparently, he had at least one insider on the CEC. After some contention, it was agreed that Dodik would be allowed to continue running the SNSD.

Just before the end of October, OFAC undertook a measure that explained why Dodik and his parliament had backed off from their separatist moves. On October 29, OFAC lifted the long-running sanctions against Milorad Dodik, Željka Cvijanović, all of Dodik's relatives, and several other high-profile political cronies of Dodik. Altogether, sanctions on around 30 persons were removed, and about 25 companies were also freed from the sanctions, including companies owned by Dodik's son and daughter, other close relatives, and business cronies.

In response, Dodik thanked Trump "for correcting a great injustice that had been committed against the Republika Srpska, its representatives, and families, as perpetrated by Obama and Biden. This is a legal and moral rehabilitation; everything that was said against us was lies and propaganda, [the result of] a huge disorder created by [High Representative] Schmidt." Here, naturally, Dodik equates the RS with himself—and elides the fact that the first sanctions against him were officially announced at the beginning of the first Trump administration.

OFAC lifts sanctions

If ordinary Bosnians were surprised by the Serb-controlled entity's annulment of its anti-Bosnian laws, they were shocked by OFAC's mass removal of Dodik and his cronies from the blacklist. Comments and theories proliferated. Mayor of Bijeljina Ljubiša Petrović, a strong opponent of mining in nearby Majevica (see this article), opined that Dodik had made a deal with Trump for the lithium found under that mountain—indeed, Dodik had publicly made such an offer some months earlier. Others speculated that Dodik had "sold part of the RS for a third [Croat-run] entity, to save his empire."

What is most plausible is that intensive, long-term lobbying in the US bore fruit. Dodik paid lobbyists an estimated $300,000 monthly, including $1 million to lobbyist Marc Zell for a year of services. Well-known MAGA-associated figures including "influencer" Laura Loomer, Michael Flynn, and Rod Blagojevich publicly advocated for relief for Dodik and friends.

Loomer called Dodik "a Christian leader, who has endured ruthless political attacks from a coalition of Muslims and globalists." Rudy Giuliani visited Dodik's entity, wearing a "Make Srpska Great Again" cap. James J. Carafano, a highly placed ideologue in the right-wing Heritage Foundation, was also instrumental in swaying the attitude of the US administration.

A key to the change in position is said to have been the guidance of Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau. He is quoted as saying, "The Trump administration is prepared to try a different approach; that means we're prepared to listen and collaborate with all sides." State Department officials further stated that the sanctions were removed "because of constructive measures by the NSRS, which should improve the stability of Bosnia-Herzegovina and enable a partnership with the US based on mutual interests, economic potential, and mutual prosperity."

Washington DC Bureau Chief for Aljazeera Ivica Puljić commented that "the US administration expects concrete measures [from the RS leaders], and consistency. [Dodik must] not only withdraw from the government and support the NSRS annulment [of destabilizing laws], but he must also not become a shadow ruler of the RS. It is key that [acting RS President] Ana Trišić-Babić not just serve to rubber-stamp Dodik's orders. The US will support Bosnia's accession to the European Union." Puljić further noted that it was mainly far-right figures who supported the removal of sanctions—"the same people who are authors of conspiracy theories, who lie every day, poisoning US society. Dodik seeks advantage only for himself and his cronies."

A New York Times headline on this occasion read, "Sanctions Lifted on a Putin-Backed Autocrat After Lobbying by Trump Allies."

One significant point of contact between the RS regime and pro-Dodik figures in the US administration was the visit by Željka Cvijanović to the US in early September, accompanied by Trišić-Babić. During this time, the two met with Christopher Landau; this was at least Cvijanović's second meeting with him. It was during this meeting, among other occasions, that the US administration (via Landau) communicated to Dodik elements of the US "de-escalation plan" of the ongoing crisis, including conditions for lifting the sanctions against him.

Members of the opposition parties in the Republika Srpska were dissatisfied with the lifting of sanctions against their nemesis. Officials from the largest opposition party, the SDS, pointed out that their party had been on the blacklist "for decades," but their sanctions remained in place. They complained about Dodik "appointing a NATO lobbyist acting president of the RS, foregoing the referendum," and in general "betraying the entity's institutions, dignity, and faith in justice." All this highly critical language pertained to Dodik's apparently making deals with the US, more than his behaving differently than a nationalist and separatist regime would have done in the RS under the leadership of some other party.

Opposition Mayor of Banja Luka Draško Stanivuković criticized Dodik's arrangement, saying, "They sold the NSRS, so that Agape [Dodik's daughter's restaurant] and Eko Fruit [Dodik's son's farm] could get subsidies. They gave up on the referendum so that [Dodik and his cohort] could have their personal bank accounts unblocked. They went to the Court of Bosnia—which they don't acknowledge—so that they could be allowed to travel...and so that Prointer [a company that Dodik's son is involved with] could rob again.

Dodgy elections elect Dodik #2

To the extent that anyone in the US administration expected Dodik to fade away and that whatever new regime that replaced him would contribute to the stability of Bosnia, they were soon to be disappointed. A perhaps more relevant question is whether anyone in the US administration actually cares about stability in Bosnia. In any case, developments in November of this year came to answer questions about the wisdom of the US administration's change of heart and the prospects for stability.

As mandated by law and arranged by the Central Elections Commission (CEC), snap elections for a new president of the Republika Srpska were scheduled for November 25. Early on, the ruling SNSD party under Dodik declared that they would ignore these elections and carry on business as usual. The SNSD stalwart who ran the Bosnian Ministry of Finance and Treasury refused to sign off on funding for the elections, so his Bosniak deputy minister signed.

By late September Dodik's party changed tack and decided to participate. It hired the notorious Paul Manafort as adviser to the SNSD for the election. Manafort had been Trump's campaign manager in the 2016 election, and before that, lobbyist for Ferdinand Marcos, among many other accomplishments. In case you don't remember, in 2019 he was convicted of felonies for defrauding the United States and witness tampering, and was pardoned by Trump the next year.

Dodik, barred from candidacy, said, "I was president of the RS, and I will be again, when I have the opportunity to run." Meanwhile, Željka Cvijanović said that she hoped that the US would send observers to monitor the elections. In response, opposition candidate from the SDS party, professor Branko Blanuša, said, "If the Americans were to come and observe the RS elections, they would leave on the first available plane. If they saw all the ways your party manipulated the election results...stealing and replacing ballot bags, with the deceased rising and voting, with 10% of ballots being counted as invalid, and votes being bought and sold like cucumbers...they would flee regardless."

Apparently the good professor of electrical engineering is not aware of the state of electoral engineering as it is being perfected in the United States.

Mr. Dodik announced the nomination of Siniša Karan for president; he has been RS Minister for Scientific Development and Higher Education—and a career policeman, as well as former RS Minister of the Interior. Karan had been under OFAC sanctions along with Dodik.

The SNSD party had cohesion; it was rather the opposite among the opposition parties, but they strove to unite behind Blanuša. Although the CEC had resolved to install all manner of election-tightening devices to make them honest, they were not able to pull this together before November of this year. These measures were to include ballot scanners; biometric devices; electronic finger-printing; and video monitoring. Perhaps they will be installed for the main elections due to take place in the fall of 2026.

In the event, the elections that took place were in some ways a slimmed down re-run of the ballot massacre that happened during the last main elections, in November of 2022 (see my description here). The watchdog group Pod Lupom (Under the Microscope) reported numerous violations even before the start of the voting, with parties breaking the "pre-election silence," then the blocking of observers from some polling stations; lack of voting materials in some places; widespread "family voting" (unauthorized assistance at the voting booth); and party propaganda posted in the vicinity of the polling stations.

Furthermore, at border crossing points between Serbia and Bosnia there were long lines of cars coming east to west, an unusual traffic jam on a Sunday. People were coming across to vote, and the personal documentation offices were open for twelve hours that day.

At the end of the voting, it was reported that in several places, ballots and final results took hours longer to be delivered to the central counting locations than average, leading to suspicions that the counts were being "adjusted." Opposition members paid particular attention to Doboj and Zvornik, traditional locations of SNSD vote stealing; also to Laktaši, the home of Dodik.

Turnout was around 35%, the lowest since the end of the war. In most places, the vote was much closer than it had customarily been; in past elections the SNSD has tended to run away with the winning numbers. This time—except in the three locations mentioned above, the opposition often defeated Karan or came in much closer than before. Blanuša won in Bijeljina, East Sarajevo, the anti-SNSD stronghold of Banja Luka, and even the the normally separatist Prijedor. But in Doboj, Zvornik, and Laktaši, the turnout remarkably surpassed 70% or even 80%.

The late result, with over 99% of the votes counted, had Karan winning by over 8,000 votes—a pretty close finish in comparison with earlier contests.

Dodik, declaring victory for his party, commented, "They wanted me out. Now they will have two Dodiks."

The opposition, naturally, complained. The SDS attributed the suspicious, unbalanced turnout in three municipalities, and the lateness of delivery of the ballots and results from those locations, to SNSD party operatives adding the signatures of people who were on the voter rolls but had not voted, and of people who were deceased but who had not been removed from the lists. One opposition leader commented, "The wish of the people disappeared in SNSD's Bermuda Triangle." Another said, "The Mafia rules in Zvornik and Doboj. They regularly steal the elections."

An opposition observer of the vote counting reported, "In Doboj electoral trickery has long since been part of system. [The counting center] was not a place where results were delivered, but they were also created there. In Doboj, I was the only witness to the counting in five different offices. That is not a failure, it is the intention, for the manipulation to be invisible. In some cases, the voting records arrived at one building, but the bags of ballots to another. And 98% of the presidents of the polling station committees were members of the SNSD. [I saw] seven bags that were not packed and sealed according to the rules. Bags from polling stations in the city arrived at the central counting station later than the bags from the villages."

The opposition is calling for the CEC to hold a recount: to open the ballot bags and recount them, and to check the signatures on the apparently bloated polling results reports from the three municipalities in question. To date, the CEC has started to re-count the ballots from three stations—not a measure that will affect the outcome of the election.

Indications as described above point to significant electoral manipulation in favor of Karan, and they cry out for a recount, as demanded by the opposition. This is no different from the situation after the 2022 elections. Then, the party that seemed to have stolen the elections got away with the crime. I will be surprised if the outcome is any different this time.

The Democratization Policy Council's analyst Kurt Bassuener criticized the lack of international attention to the dodgy elections, saying, "I don't see an adaptation on the part of the EU to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the absence of involvement from the United States. A sense of strategic coherence is lacking" (my paraphrase from an article in Bosnian). Bassuener predicted, reasonably, that the SDS and Blanuša will file a complaint. He concluded, "Essentially, things have not changed: the party leaders are feudal heads of their feudal holdings in the Dayton system, without any serious change on the international plane.

And the vice-president of the opposition PDP, Igor Crnadak, commented that, given the close vote and possible blow to SNSD's power, "voters have finally opened their eyes and begun to understand that the reason our state [sic] is in this condition is not the CIA, nor Sarajevo, nor Schmidt, but because of a government that is corrupt to the core, which brutally plunders in the hundreds of millions of marks and which reckons cruelly with anyone who wishes to think for himself."

Despite the apparent dishonest practices during the elections, a number of commentators declared that in a sense, they were a victory for the opposition because the closeness of the tally—albeit most probably falsified—portends the defeat of the SNSD in the regular elections a year from now.

If that prediction comes true, then another question is, what is to stop the otherwise nationalist opposition from creating its own regime of plunder? And for that matter, will there be anything that stops the new leaders from calling their entity a "state," and from bowing to Trump and Putin?