SURVIVING THE PEACE
The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina
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Bosnia update,
June 9, 2025
Floods; Trump's long arm; Prijedor; Denial; Three "fugitives;" and the ongoing
secession "crisis."
You'll remember that in February of this year, RS President Dodik was convicted
of violating Bosnian state laws and decrees of the High Representative (see a
full description in my previous blog entry,
here). In a first-instance decision, Dodik was sentenced to a year in
prison and banned from participation in politics for six years. The decision was
non-binding, pending appeal. Dodik and his lawyers have appealed; there will be
a hearing on June 12th, and a decision is expected in the fall.
Before I go into the story of Dodik's intensification of his secession attempts
and the escalation of his manufactured crisis, let me go over a few highlights
of real news from Bosnia:
Floods: Late March saw serious flooding in many parts of this country
that boasts well over 200 rivers. Serious damage took place in the north around
Gradiška, Teslić, Doboj, and Maglaj. Banja Luka and Prijedor also witnessed
overflows and damage to hundreds of houses and buildings.
The long arm of Trump: The US president's capricious and destructive
tariff policies are having their impact on Bosnia-Herzegovina; as of early April
the tarrif for the country was placed at 35%, leading to a possible loss of as
much as 60 million KM (over $40 million) annually. All exports to the US are at
risk. Meanwhile, Trump is also pressuring Bosnia, along with Serbia and other
neighboring countries, to receive immigrants who are to be deported from the
US.
Prijedor: May 31 was the 33rd anniversary of the day that local radio and
television announced the demand that Bosniaks and Croats, along with all other
residents who were not Serbs, must wear a white armband when outside of their
homes. This marked the rapid escalation of the extreme Serb secessionist assault
on the municipality, resulting in the establishment of several notorious
concentration camps, the expulsion of most of the non-Serb population, the
murder of well over three thousand people, and the creation of around 400 mass
graves in the area. Attempts to establish a monument to the more than 100
children killed during the war have so far been thwarted. And the Dodik regime
saw fit to come to Prijedor the day before this anniversary to commemorate the
anniversary of the "defense against Muslim and paramilitary formations."
Denial:
In late May Vojin Pavlović,
leader of the Bratunac-based "Istočna Alternativa" (Eastern Alternative) was
convicted of genocide denial and glorification of war criminals, and sentenced
to two and a half years' imprisonment in a first-instance finding. This is the
man whose organization has for years been putting up posters of Putin and Mladić
on the walls of buildings in Bratunac and Srebrenica.
Finally, release of my six-part series on environmental resistance in
Bosnia-Herzegovina is now underway, being published online by the LeftEast
collective. Based on my visits to many environmental activists last fall, the
series discusses river protection; resistance to mining companies; and the
criminal network exploiting coal reserves in many parts of the country. You can
see the series, complete with photos,
here. Four articles are posted, with two more to come.
Dodik's attempts to create a Bosnian "North Korea"; his life as a "fugitive,"
and international response to the "crisis."
I put the word "crisis" in quotation marks because the constant use of the word
over the past 30-odd years has devalued its meaning completely and, along the
way, off-handedly served up a distorted evaluation of the nature of Bosnian
state functions. To put it briefly, let it be understood that crisis is a
permanent condition built into the Dayton system.
The nature of that system is more and more clarified by the ongoing (since
February) phenomenon of three leaders of the Republika Srpska, now regularly
called "fugitives" by the Federation press, coming and going freely across
international borders, creating more and more blatant secessionist measures in
their entity, and flagrantly mocking what passes for the state-level authorities
of Bosnia. This refers to Dodik, RS Prime Minister Radovan Višković, and RSNS (Republika
Srpska National Assembly) Speaker Nenad Stevandić,
all of whom are wanted for undermining the constitutional order of the state and
failure to appear at legal hearings.
In the course of his escalated secessionist moves, in late March Dodik
orchestrated the passage of a series of laws in the NSRS that, among other
things, prohibited the operation of the state police (SIPA), the Bosnian Court,
the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, and the state prosecutor on the
territory of the Serb-controlled entity. Another new law prohibited the
implementation of Constitutional Court decisions in the RS, while punishing
all RS judicial institutions that don't observe the prohibitions. The RS Ministry of
Finance was also directed to cease funding any institution that failed to obey.
Along with these measures, Dodik called for all Serb members of SIPA and other
state institutions to resign and join parallel RS para-state bodies.
The attempt to further separate the RS from Bosnia's state functions carried on
for the next couple of months. Ultimately it turned out that only about a
half-dozen Serbs quit SIPA and other agencies. Meanwhile, there was no serious
attempt to arrest Dodik, Višković, and Stevandić.
There was a feeble attempt to bring in Dodik during his attendance at a meeting
in East Sarajevo, when several unarmed police from SIPA arrived to serve him a
warrant. They were met by RS police who warned that they would use "any means"
to prevent the arrest. The SIPA officials left, and soon afterwards, the RS
Prosecutor announced charges against seven of them for an
"illegal attempt
to arrest" and for "abuse of official position or authorization." The Bosnian
prosecutor filed counter-charges against the RS officers who resisted Dodik's
arrest. The whole affair looked more like a performance than an actual arrest
attempt.
Meanwhile, both Dodik and Stevandić
have made several public trips across international borders, leading to the
Bosnian state court's request of Interpol to issue an international warrant for
their arrest. Interpol declined to honor the request, and an appeal of this
decision failed.
One
notable voyage by Dodik in late March took him to Israel via Serbia, ostensibly
to participate in a "conference against antisemitism" in Jerusalem. While in
Israel, Dodik attempted to make the most of his affinity for the country and, as
he expressed it, the historical commonality between Serbs and Jews, saying:
"Serbs and Jews are peoples who have faced attempts at total eradication—and
they survived. That is why we understand each other. And that is why we stand
together,” and "Just as Israel defends itself unapologetically, Republika Srpska
defends its right to exist, decide, and uphold the legacy of its ancestors."
With these statements, Dodik reinforced the crass equation of Zionism with
Judaism; echoed the US administration's weaponization of a dishonest definition
of antisemitism; and played to his home audience by pulling out the perennial
victim card. He tried to cozy up to the Israeli regime as a way to counter
burgeoning criticism and sanctions from the West.
Dodik clearly expressed commonality with an authoritarian, racist regime. In
this vein, in early April he announced support of French extremist Marine Le
Pen. He compared himself with her, saying, "She too is paying the price because
she has the support of her people...I support her dedication to the
strengthening of the sovereignty of her people and the state. I support her
advocacy for the defense of traditional Christian and family values." Along
these lines, Dodik's close ally,
Željka Cvijanović, Serb member of the three-part state level presidency,
recently traveled to UN headquarters in New York. There, she
made a show of
unctuous flattery directed at the current US regime—again, in keeping with her
(and Dodik's) instinctive sense of commonality with the new US government.
The sycophantic display by Dodik and his ilk towards Western authoritarians
(Netanyahu, Trump) has, for now, fallen flat, leaving a pathetic picture. It's
different with the authoritarians on the other side. Putin and Orban are only
too happy to pal around with Dodik, and
Serbian president Vučić has his uses for the RS president as well. Dodik
recently announced that he will seek to have the RS join a military alliance
between Serbia and Hungary. It is doubtful that there's any constitutional
foundation for such an arrangement between a Bosnian entity and a foreign
government.
Dodik's venture in Israel failed dramatically. It was just hours after his
arrival at the Jerusalem conference that the Bosnian court contacted Interpol
seeking an international warrant for Dodik's arrest. It was not known for
several days yet that Interpol would reject this request, and the Israeli
authorities "politely" requested Dodik's departure from the conference. Several
prominent rabbis and analysts had declined to participate in the conference
because of Dodik's presence, pointing out his history of genocide denial. Dodik
failed to obtain the attention and support he sought from Netanyahu and, on his
departure, stated, "I came to Israel to speak against antisemitism. Instead of
that, I felt unwelcome, like an intruder."
International pressure against Dodik has steadily increased over the past few
months; Germany and Austria have sanctioned both Dodik and the Republika Srpska,
suspending millions of euros in infrastructure projects in response to his
undermining of the constitutional order. The two countries also imposed travel
bans on Dodik, and on Višković and Stevandić as well. The UK and the US have
placed sanctions on Dodik twice since 2017, and there is bilateral pressure in
Congress to strengthen those measures. Poland and the Netherlands are both
preparing sanctions, and Lithuania also recently imposed them.
In response, Dodik has lashed out in various directions: He reacted malevolently
to the German moves against him, saying, "Germany will never get our lithium
because Germany is our enemy and has always been the enemy of the Serb people."
He also engaged an Israeli lawyer—to the tune of $840,000—to lobby Trump for the
removal of sanctions against him. The lawyer, Marc Zell, is a settler who lives
in the occupied West Bank, and has offices in New York, Washington DC, Moscow,
and several other countries.
Furthermore, in early April Germany’s Minister for Europe and Climate, Anna
Lührmann, visited Banja Luka to meet with members of the opposition. However,
the meeting was summarily canceled when the RS Ministry of the Interior declared
Lührmann persona non grata and ordered police to escort her out of the entity.
None of this behavior bodes well for the Republika Srpska, whose fourth-largest
trading partner is Germany. Ms. Lührmann was unflappable, saying that "It is
clear that Dodik does not speak on behalf of the population. People there want
good relations with Germany and the European Union. They know that the European
path leads to stability and prosperity. Many German companies want to invest in
Republika Srpska." She added, "One of the reasons for my trip to Banja Luka was
to explain to the people that sanctions against Dodik and his inner circle are
not aimed at citizens but rather to show that we stand with them." Lührmann
wrapped up her comments by saying, "I have yet to meet a person from Republika
Srpska who wants to emigrate to Russia. People want to go to Germany, Austria,
and the European Union. That is a clear signal."
Dodik made an attempt to ingratiate Trump in order to get him to reduce
sanctions: he proposed a Ukraine-style minerals deal, saying that "the RS is
ready to explore a partnership in the field of strategic minerals with Hungary
and the [USA]," adding, "We are seeking the America that once was, and that it
can be again...as a guarantor of peace, a partner in development, and a
protector of our sovereignty." So far, the current US regime has shown no
interest nor sympathy for Dodik's situation.
Constitutional Court pushes back
In late May the state-level Constitutional Court finally reacted to the RS
Parliament's passage of the above-mentioned laws barring state institutions from
functioning in the Republika Srpska. It annulled the prohibitions against the
Bosnian Court, the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, and SIPA. It also
struck down the notorious "foreign agents law," which stigmatized NGOs and
excluded them from engaging in public policy or in political discussion. The
Court reiterated that the entity government may not override state-level
authority; only the state Parliament can do so.
Dodik responded by calling High Representative Schmidt, who supported the
Constitutional Court's decisions, "a tourist" with no official power,
threatening to arrest him if he enters the RS. He lashed out at Bosniaks in
general, saying that the "Muslims are the most ordinary genetic liars" and that
they should "return to their original Catholic or Orthodox religion—then we will
see that Serbs are in the majority in Bosnia."
Meanwhile, neither SIPA nor any other state or entity police agency has made a
serious attempt to detain Dodik or the other fugitives. This is not to say that
SIPA has obeyed the RS's unconstitutional law that the agency must refrain from
working in the entity. Between Dodik's conviction and early April, SIPA had
already conducted four operations in the RS, including a raid of ten locations
in Banja Luka that resulted in the arrest of numerous suspects for human
trafficking.
There's a certain logic to putting off an attempt to arrest Dodik, in that while
the RS does not have an army that could establish secession and independence,
Dodik controls several paramilitary outfits and the militarized RS police. Any
one of these will probably employ violence in response to an arrest attempt, and
it is smart to avoid this.
This brings us to the question of what the outcome could be of the present
episode of the crisis. I would not venture to make a prediction, but I don't see
Bosnia teetering on the edge of dissolution. You may dispute my assertion, as
some people have. I have never thought that there would be a violent dissolution
nor an outright secession—for that matter, I have not read any of Dodik's dozens
of crises as the "real thing," including the present one. Rather, I have seen
them as performances that push along a trend from political stagnation, which is
what Bosnia has now, toward a resigned de facto separation. Somewhere in that
continuum, depending on your evaluation, is where Bosnia stands now. Where it
will proceed to is up for discussion.
As columnist Gojko Berić
recently wrote, the hunt for Milorad Dodik is unfolding mainly in the media—and
you could say that that's
where the
"crisis" is primarily taking place, as well. On the other hand, one seasoned
observer (initials CH) of Bosnia reminded me that the Dragan Čović, leader of
the Croat nationalist party, has been making significant inroads towards his own
brand of separatism or autonomy, while supporting Dodik's similar trend with
dedication. That's another can of worms that's more than I can discuss here. But
it lends weight to the possibility that the secessionist forces—and this refers
not only to Serbs—could actually prevail. One variant short of actual political
separation that might satisfy the secessionists would be the functional
operation of three different ethno-states in all but name.