SURVIVING THE PEACE The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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Bosnia update, Sunday, June 18, 2023
Corruption ~ the Stanišić and Simatović decision ~ Dodik's love affair with Russia ~ and more.

Some noteworthy news headlines have emerged in the last month or so: Prominent political officials have been arrested on corruption charges; flooding has taken place in much of Bosnia; RS President Dodik visited Russia; and the prosecution of Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović has finally come to an end after 20 years. I will go over a couple of the shorter topics first.

Floods

Unseasonably wet weather has prevailed in much of Bosnia over the past month, resulting in flooding that has hit areas from Podrinje in the northeast, through Krajina in the northwest, and all the way down into western Herzegovina. In Janja near Bijeljina, from mid-May Bosniak returnee farmers lamented that their plantings were under water. There were similar problems all the way from Zvornik over to the Tuzla area. A farmer from Janja voiced the folksy sentiment, "You invest your coat, but all you get back is a sleeve."

It has been similar in much of the Krajina, both in the RS and the Federation, especially in the towns along the Una and Sana Rivers: Bihać, Bosanska Krupa, and Ključ. Citizens have complained about carelessness of municipal officials who have not taken care to maintain canal and ditch networks.

Early in June flooding hit Mostar hard, with people unable to approach their parked cars because the streets were under water. There was too much water for the drainage system to carry it away.

Names and Symbols

While we're at Mostar, the news is that after many years of controversy, municipal authorities finally saw to it that the names of six streets were changed. Since the 1990s war, these had borne the names of World War II Ustashe (fascist collaborators). The street named for WWII collaborator Milo Budak was changed back to its pre-1990s name Aleksa Šantić (the great local poet and Bosnian-Herzegovinan patriot). Several other names of Ustashe leaders were changed to those of earlier literary or historical figures. Likewise, in nearby Čapljina the street named for Budak was changed to "Jelena Zrinski," for a 17th-century noblewoman and heroine.

In Sarajevo, however, there has been no progress in replacing the names of streets and schools that, after the 1990s war, were renamed after WWII Nazi collaborationist figures. Prominent among them is the elementary school named after Mustafa Busuladžić, a prominent WWII-era supporter of the Ustashe regime in Sarajevo. Busuladžić wrote and expounded extensively on anti-Semitic themes. The SDA rehabilitated his name in Sarajevo in 2016, and more progressive politicians have been calling for the reversal of this measure ever since. Some Bosniak nationalists have worked to preserve the name, treating Busuladžić as a WWII hero who "fought for the survival of Bosnian Muslims." Busuladžić's name is only one of at least a half-dozen fascist collaborators whose names disgrace the city of Sarajevo. One commentator has noted that if Sarajevo were able to replace the offending names, this would help to remove the stain of hypocrisy that arises when people from that city criticize other communities that have named some of their streets after WWII collaborators.

This brings up the matter of finger-pointing and guilt. I don't mean to equate the guilt and responsibility on all sides—all parties hold grievances, no matter how much they are justified. As an old friend in Sarajevo once said to me, "Svačija patnja je najdraža" – Each person's suffering is the dearest. But someone has to start the process of healing by recognizing their own responsibility. Anyone from any side can do this—if they're mature enough to understand that doing so doesn't exonerate anyone else.

Corruption

In the rubric of the police action named "Start," in the first part of May police and security forces in Sarajevo Canton raided more than 30 locations in an effort to target corrupt officials and their cronies. The raid was prompted as a result of information gathered when the "Sky" encryption application was deciphered, leading to great amounts of evidence incriminating operators from across the gangster-politician network. Interpol, along with Dutch and French police, began to crack the code a couple of years ago, and since then drug traffickers and other organized crime gangs, along with political officials who collaborate with them, have been exposed to police attention not only in the Balkans but throughout Europe and beyond. People who trusted Sky encryption to safeguard their dealings are in trouble.

On May 9 police raided homes and offices in the Sarajevo neighborhoods of Stari Grad, Novo Sarajevo, Vogošča, and Ilidža, confiscating luxury cars, jewelery, and suspicious troves of money amounting to tens of thousands of euros. They also blocked some 15 bank accounts amounting to more than a half million euros, tied to suspected politicians and their collaborators. Police additionally discovered several pistols and ammunition, along with nearly 250 machines for mining crypto-currency, worth more than a million dollars.

Most prominent among those arrested was the popular and theretofore untouchable mayor of Stari Grad municipality (in the old part of Sarajevo), Ibrahim Hadžibajrić. He was suspected of participating in organized crime, money laundering, "abuse of position or authority" (the catch phrase for corruption), and for receiving and giving bribes. While Hadžibajrić refrained from communications via encrypted cell phone, colleagues and members of his family trusted the Sky application, thus leaving prolific evidence of the group's operations.

One of those operations was Mayor Hadžibajrić's renting of coveted, convenient parking spaces in the core of Stari Grad to favored businessmen, often dislocating people who had already secured legitimate access to those spots. Hadžibajrić's tough guys would drive out those people and take cash from their usurpers. The mayor pressured municipal employees to sign off on such transactions to make them look legitimate. Six such employees refused to participate in the operation; Hadžibajrić fired them—another crime for which he is now under investigation. He subsequently hired a new clerk who signed everything.

Hadžibajrić, his son Seid, and several other operators have been arrested, and most of them are still in jail pending charges. A couple of weeks later, authorities arrested former mayor of Sarajevo Abdulah Skaka on suspicion that he committed many criminal acts, including the illegal employment of four advisors, that is, illegal spending of funds from the city budget. Among other things, Skaka is also accused of giving gifts as a means of pressure to be allowed to retain his position as mayor; giving city grant funds to NGOs close to him. Relatives of Skaka were members of some of these NGOs. Hadžibajrić is also charged with illegally approving funding for the installation of lighting in a neighborhood in the Republika Srpska where he owned a vacation cottage.

Ex-mayor Skaka and Hadžibajrić were both members of the SDA, until 2021 when Hadžibajrić formed his own party, the NES (New European Council). Another charge he faces alleges that he presented forged documents to support the registration of his new party by inflating the number of signatories.

In other corruption news. Danko Kajganić was arrested for stealing a car in Laktaši, in the northern part of the Republika Srpska. This would not be noteworthy, except for the fact that his brother Milanko is the chief prosecutor for the entire State of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Meanwhile, head of the pharmaceutical company Bosnalijek, Nedim Uzunović, still walks free after more than seven years of investigation for corrupt practices dating back much further. I have mentioned him in previous blogs but, to put it briefly, Uzunović is suspected of manifold acts of corruption including illicit sale of company shares, preventing stockholders from attending meetings, and vast rake-offs to enrich himself and his family. There are rumblings that the investigation of Uzunović will finally lead to charges and arrest soon, but that is not yet news. In any case, the Bosnia office of Transparency International has characterized the Bosnalijek case as one of the five top corruption scandals of the last year.

I have noted these corruption cases for two reasons: first, to illustrate, yet again, the essence of Bosnian politics, wherein the most powerful operators have the greatest opportunities to enrich themselves, through complete disregard for law and justice. In this, the Dayton system that upholds three ethnocracies is the foundational structure that nurtures the system, and if you scrape away the acerbic ethnic sniping that is a constant distraction, you can see that the leading figures in each of the three cliques are not so different in their behavior, regardless of their rhetoric.

Secondly, the majority of the figures in the Federation who have been targeted in recent months are present or former members of the SDA. (This includes Fadil Novalić and Sebija Izetbegović, discussed at length in earlier blog entries.) What they all have in common is that their alleged criminality was tolerated for years, and in some cases decades, under previous governments. Now that the SDA is in opposition (see my previous blog here), the present series of arrests is happening for one of two possible reasons, or a combination of the two. One reason is that the new coalition, headed by the SDP (Social Democrats) is waging a political vendetta against the SDA. The other reason is, perhaps, that the new coalition is determined to wipe out corruption, starting by making an example of the previous regime.

My bet is that both impulses are in play. But it's a bit early to tell whether the new coalition (the "trojka") is really bent on eradication of corruption. Certainly there's ongoing pressure from the international community in this direction. But the SDP and the other parties involved (with the possible exception of Naša Stranka) do not have a good track record in this matter. That is, in previous instances when they have had the opportunity, they too have been involved in corruption.

The response from the SDA, predictably, has been a complaint that the new ruling coalition is waging a vendetta against that party and this, as such, constitutes an attack on the Bosniak population of Bosnia, since the SDA receives the most Bosniak votes of any party. Recall that the SDA received a plurality, but not a majority, of Bosniak votes, as I pointed out in my previous blog entry. So the SDA is, in effect, bitter first about the way parliamentary politics function, and secondly, about the fact that they have, for the moment, lost their enduring and lucrative position as the party that gets the perks.

Some SDA stalwarts have gone so far as to call members of the trojka "traitors," which not only takes internecine party rhetoric to new heights, but is also reminiscent of Dodik's calling his opposition in the RS "traitors."

Perhaps a "traitor" is anyone who threatens to take your privilege of corruption away from you? In any case, there are two possible reasons that anyone can favor one corrupt (or potentially corrupt) party or regime over another. One is that they (the critics) are so immersed in the Dayton system that they can't see that that system provides the oxygen that corruption breathes. The other reason is that they are actual beneficiaries of the corruption. In either case, what's forgotten here is that it is the Dayton system, not a particular party or leader, that engenders the regime of exaggerated corruption characterizing the Bosnian state.

I close this section by quoting from an article by the columnist and commentator Gojko Berić, from the May 18 edition of the Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje." He writes,

"...these are our party leaders, our ministers and prime ministers, our corrupt chiefs of the crime police who cooperate with the mafia, and the policemen who earn a salary by dealing drugs; these are the heads of the intelligence services who, instead of working for the state, work for the oligarchs of their parties; these are the unscrupulous politicians...these are the respectable mayors of municipalities who launder money; these are our blackmailed prosecutors and judges, in short - this is the whole crowd that has been running this country for decades, so it is a real miracle that it exists in the form of a state at all. And all of them were elected in elections, appointed, placed in position, decorated, photographed for television and newspapers. Why most affairs are related to SDA cadres is a question that is very important both for the party itself and much more widely...

 "...News of one new arrest follows another...whether and when it will be the turn of the biggest fish, without whose political patronage and perhaps direct involvement many illegal activities would not be possible, is a question that remains in the shadow of disbelief. Examples from the past show that the existing corrupt system protects them from the punishment they deserve...The responsibility for the decline of Bosnia and Herzegovina is borne by a whole set of politicians. Many of the resulting damages are irreparable, such as the mass departure of young people, who do not believe that their homeland has an attractive future."

Russia and Republika Srpska

Republika Srpska President Dodik continues to strengthen his autocracy, to present revisionist versions of wartime history, and to advocate for the secession of his Serb-controlled entity. A recent proposal for an anti-libel law in the RS would impinge on freedom of speech not just for journalists, but also for anyone using Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, or other social media. This would make criticism of the RS regime so much the more dangerous.

On May 12 leaders of the entity honored the VRS (Republika Srpska Army), which has not existed since 2004. Dodik was present in the company of high RS military figures. He stood up when the RS hymn, "Moja Republika" (My Republic) was intoned, but demonstratively sat down when the hymn of Bosnia-Herzegovina was played.

And most recently, Dodik caused an outrage in parts of the country when he denied that Sarajevo had been under siege during the 1990s war, calling that a "notorious lie," and saying that Serbs were and had been the most endangered people in the country.

Meanwhile, a love-fest between the RS and Russia—or between Dodik and Putin—is ongoing. Banja Luka celebrated WWII Victory Day on May 9th with a parade in which "Putin's favorite bike gang," the Night Wolves, participated. Russian Ambassador to Bosnia Igor Kalabuhov declared that Russia "is now fighting fascism in Ukraine, and against a totalitarian, unipolar world." He also asserted that Russia "prevented aggression" with its "military intervention."

In preparations for a visit to Russia later in May, Dodik announced that he was going to give Putin the RS Order of Merit, saying that "Russia is a traditional friend of the Serb people, and a guarantor of the Dayton agreement."

There was a spate of award-giving all around. While in Russia, Putin presented Dodik with the Order of Alexander Nevsky for a "great contribution to the development of cultural-humanitarian ties of the peoples of the Russian Federation and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Early in June, Dodik gave Alexander Zaldastanov the RS Order of Honor. Zaldastanov, a former physician, is the head of the Night Wolves bike club and is banned from entry into Bosnia. Upon presenting Zaldastanov the award on Dodik's behalf, an RS emissary in Moscow said, "..presenting the order made us happy and proud because the reward, like justice, always comes into the hands of the one who deserves it. The ties and friendship of the Serbian and Russian people cannot be ignored or broken."

In mid-June Zaldastanov presided over the placement of a statue of Slobodan Milošević in Europe Square in the center of Moscow. The two-meter sculpture was created in Serbia and accompanied to Russia by members of the Serbian branch of the Night Wolves.

While meeting with Putin, Dodik discussed ways of financing RS purchases of natural gas from Russia, including offering to pay for the gas in rubles if that was required. The two negotiated Russian assistance for energy extraction development in the RS, including work on coal mines and the reconstruction of a coal-fired plant. Dodik also announced the purchase of three helicopters from Russia.

Besides ideology and a common leaning toward autocracy, there are critical economic factors behind Dodik's courting of Russia. The RS must repay half a billion euros this year in loans coming due—including 300 million KM this month (June 2023). The RS has an income from indirect taxation, among other things, but it has spent millions frivolously on consumption projects in lieu of development. Such expenditures include 55 million KM for a ski resort in Vlasenica, and more money for a hotel at the winter vacation spot at Jahorina. The RS government also distributed two tranches of 100 KM each to students and pensioners just before last October's elections.

While these expenditures spend down the government's budget, loan debts pile up. Analysts say that, Dodik's courting of Putin notwithstanding, all of Russia's investments in the RS in the last 20 years have been ineffective, and that there is no evidence that Russia is truly willing to invest enough in the entity to bail it out (see Bosnia Daily, May 31). It is important to Russia to string Dodik along perpetually, because support for him amounts to continued destabilization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is a prime goal of Russia in the Balkans. But this is not equivalent to significant financial support. Meanwhile, not only is the RS getting some financial support from Dodik's pal in Hungary, fellow autocrat Viktor Orban, but the European Commission recently lifted the suspension of European Union funds for the RS, which had been held back in response to Dodik's ongoing threats of secession.

Stanišić and Simatović Decision

The appeals trial of former state security officials Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović finally finished at the end of May. This brings to a close all the trials initiated by the International Criminal Tribune for the former Yugoslavia, the ICTY. The two had been powerful and feared top officials in Slobodan Milošević's regime during the 1990s wars, and were originally indicted for their part in directing Serbian paramilitary groups that operated in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

The pair were originally tried in legal proceedings that lasted from 2003 to 2013 for participation in a joint criminal enterprise aimed at the ethnic cleansing of Croats, Bosniaks, and others from Serb-held territories in Croatia and Bosnia. They were acquitted, but then the ICTY ordered a retrial in 2015. That trial resulted in a guilty finding in 2021, which was then appealed.

The several trials constitute the longest-lasting international war crimes proceedings that have ever taken place. And the results are among the most significant to the record of the war in Bosnia, especially, because they confirm, once and for all, the international nature of the war. Put more simply, they prove that Serbia was involved in military aggression against the independent state of Bosnia.

For my taste, this is a legal fine point, because it has been clear since 1992 that Serbia was fomenting, organizing, and logistically and financially supporting the Bosnian Serb separatists in their operations to ethnically homogenize as much of the country as they could control. The Yugoslav National Army supported Bosnian Serb separatists from the outset; the Serbian regime provided coordination and strategic support for the new RS army, along with officers under Serbian tutelage, and these people, and many more, were on the Serbian payroll during the war and for years afterwards. However, while what I have just recounted is common knowledge, a legal finding from an international court is important for the record.

In the first-instance trial that ended in 2021, Stanišić and Simatović were convicted of only one charge, related to a Serb attack on the northern Bosnian town of Bosanski Šamac, where Croat and Bosniak citizens were rounded up and murdered or expelled. At that time the pair were each sentenced to 12 years in prison, but were freed pending appeal.

The appeals trial, conducted by the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT), the heir to the ICTY's cases, found Stanišić and Simatović guilty of an additional, very significant list of charges, first of all broadening the geographical scope of the pair's illegal behavior to several additional Bosnian municipalities and into Croatia. The presiding judge found Stanišić and Simatović guilty of participating in a joint criminal enterprise indeed, saying that they "shared the intent to further the common criminal plan to forcibly and permanently remove the majority of non-Serbs from large areas of Croatia and Bosnia."

Locations identified as places where Stanišić and Simatović operated include Bijeljina, Zvornik, Doboj, Trnovo, and Sanski Most in Bosnia, and Dalj Planina in Croatia. The list of crimes attributed to the pair include deportation, inhumane acts, persecution, and murder.

The prison sentence for Stanišić and Simatović was increased from 12 to 15 years. The light touch of the law in these cases of mass murder always astonishes me. But low sentences seem to be the norm for war crimes in the Yugoslav wars; an African-American man in the US can do more time for robbing a gas station. Furthermore, given the 10-odd years that Stanišić and Simatović have already spent in prison, both of them are due to be released on "good behavior" by early 2025.

This outcome does not set well with the survivors of the crimes, but there is much satisfaction simply for the establishment of guilt and the confirmation of international participation on the part of Serbia. An important part of the proof of guilt comes from records of payments by Serbian Interior Ministry's security service to paramilitary outfits such as the Red Scorpions and Arkan's Tigers throughout significant periods of the Bosnian war.

After the trial's conclusion, Serge Brammertz, chief prosecutor of the Appellate Council of the IRMCT, stated that the result "reaffirmed that the there was not a civil war, but an international conflict." I find this to be an oversimplification, but the common characterization of a civil war is used by separatists and their apologists (and people who don't know any better) to whitewash the responsibility of the aggressors and to equate blame on all sides. Now the record refutes that position.

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