SURVIVING THE PEACE The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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December 2, 2021

Bosnia crisis update: More of the same, but moving toward a fatal deal on "electoral reform."

As I review my last blog entry, of October 17, what leaps out at me is that there's really not so much news, in spite of the "crisis." There's a bit of theater, and an abundance of sniping by one politician at another. Add to that the meaningless phrases churned out by international officials, and you see that in the last month and a half, positions are about the same—with both Bosnian and international commentators warning about a dire outcome nevertheless.

You'll recall that after outgoing High Representative Inzko decreed new criminal laws against genocide denial and glorification of war criminals, Serb officials led by President Milorad Dodik began to boycott state-level institutions of the government, including the three-part presidency, the Parliament, and the Council of Ministers. Additionally, the Republika Srpska Parliament outlawed the public use of the word "genocide" in the entity, along with any "defamation" of the RS.

Serb leaders further announced plans to withdraw from state-level institutions and ban their activities on the territory of the RS. They started by withdrawing from the pharmaceutical agency that determines usage and availability of medicines and medical equipment. This has been characterized as the first step in the secession of the RS—and the last straw, as announced, would be the formation of an entity-based Army of the Republika Srpska.

Among other actions to underscore the separatist intentions of the RS, in mid-October armed units of the entity's special police forces and gendarmerie carried out commando-style "anti-terrorist" exercises at a ski resort on Mt. Jahorina above Sarajevo, and in Mrkonjič Grad in western Bosnia. While the endeavor was billed as a simple "readiness" exercise, it was hard not to see it as a provocation and a means to raise already simmering tensions and fear of an outbreak of violence.

I would submit here that this is one example of President Dodik's well-developed skill at manipulating the level of tension throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina at his will. There are many more examples. Similarly, a week into November, RS police forces combined with those of neighboring Serbia in a joint tactical exercise on the border between the two countries. At this time, Serbian Defense Minister Aleksandar Vulin said, "I am thankful that the exercise demonstrated that there can be and should be no border between the Serbs, and that we are here for each other if and whenever needed,” driving home mutual aspirations between the leaders of Serbia and the Bosnian Serb-controlled entity.

I find it unusual that military-style exercises can be implemented—not between two countries, which happens periodically—but between one sovereign country and the autonomous, but not independent, territory of another. But that's a manifestation of the dysfunctionality of the Dayton political structure, as well as of the continued expansionist impulses of the Serbian regime.

The international response to threats of secession by the RS leaders, and to their ever-escalating disregard and disrespect for the Office of the High Representative, has been anemic at best. Serb officials call the new High Represenative Schmidt "a tourist," and say that he doesn't exist as HR, nor does the OHR exist, nor can it exercise any power. And the international community (IC)—the West, that is—seems to prove that assertion correct. Domestic "pro-Bosnia" leaders and international commentators regularly call for various forms of intervention from the IC, but to date there have been nothing but meetings and empty declarations.

There is, however, one important area where Western officials might exercise an influence, for better or worse. That is the area of electoral reform, a neuralgic issue for many years. It's...complicated.

The Dayton system, enacted via Bosnia's constitution, which is Annex 4 of Dayton, contains the two entities and the Brčko District, with ten Cantons in the Federation; parliaments at the entity and state level; prime ministers and presidents at every level; the three-part state-level presidency of which Dodik is the Serb member; an ethnic-based House of Peoples for each entity and at the state level; and a House of Representatives at each of these three levels as well. What is discriminatory and anti-democratic about this setup is that only members of the three "constituent" ethnicities can be elected to the Presidency or the Houses of the Peoples. So if you are Jewish, Roma, "other," or simply wish to identify as Bosnian (rather than Croat, Bosniak, or Serb), you're not allowed to run for office for any of these positions.

This discriminatory condition built into the Dayton Constitution has been challenged at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) several times, and the Court has found in favor of all the above categories in different cases from 2009 on—but the Bosnians have not followed through with any change to the Constitution. Compounding the complication in the Federation is that, as should be normal in a democracy, anyone can vote for the Croat or Bosniak member of the state-level presidency, regardless of the voter's ethnicity. This has led to the victory of the anti-nationalist Croat Željko Komšić for Croat member of the presidency in three out of the last four elections, prompting the frustration and rage of the nationalist Croats who wish to control the Croat seat in that office. They object to the fact that some Bosniaks have voted for Komšić, securing his victory. They insist that only Croat voters should be able to elect their member of the presidency.

This conflict underscores the fact that the Dayton arrangement is ethnic-based, not citizen-based. Voters who are more progressive and democratically oriented would like to see the end of what amounts to an ethnocracy, where people are divided on the basis of their ancestors' religion, instead of being able to be united on the basis of the human needs that ordinary people have in common.

But the nationalist leaders—that is, the ethnocracy—fight back against this civic impulse because it threatens their hold on power. In the Federation this conflict has been illustrated in high contrast since the 2018 national elections because Croat politicians, in revolt due to the re-election of Komšić, have refused to seat their representatives in the Federation-level parliament. So that body has been operating for the last seven years without a new election (similar to what happened with the city government of Mostar for 12 years).

The Croat nationalist politicians, led by Dragan Čović, leader of the HDZ party, have been holding out for "electoral reform," which would clinch their hold over the Croat position in the state-level presidency. This is where it gets a bit complicated. They would prefer, instead of a Croat vote being counted in each of the ten Cantons in the Federation, that the Croat votes be counted exclusively from the areas where Croat strongholds exist. This would throw the elections permanently to the Croat nationalist leaders, primarily the HDZ, in those places. It would be a step away from democracy and a step toward a de facto third entity.

This is where the international community comes back into the story. Everyone—nationalist and non-nationalist domestic leaders and international officials alike—agrees that electoral reform needs to happen. Incorporating the ECHR decisions, i.e., removing the "ethnic prefix" from positions in the House of Peoples and the state-level presidency, is one thing. But making a tenuous democracy into even less of one in the Federation by creating a de facto third entity is another. And the American and European envoys who have arrived in a revolving door procession to promote electoral reform have shown signs of leaning toward making a deal with the HDZ that would set back Bosnia-Herzegovina's chances for democracy and, thereby, for stability.

With this dilemma in the background, ordinary citizens in much of the country are feeling nervous, wondering if suddenly some incident of violence is going to cause a war to break out. In Bosnia today, the only international military presence—which after the war numbered 60,000 strong—is EUFOR, the EU "Althea" force of 600. For over a decade Althea has been far below the operational level sufficient to quell any significant outbreak of hostility. This is both a reflection of the indifference of the EU to Bosnia on this practical level, and an invitation to those who would test the limits of international control to keep on testing them.

*

Backing up a bit, let's look into some things that are of concern to the Serb separatists who are trying to break up Bosnia-Herzegovina. There are several matters that have been determined either by the Dayton constitution or decided and implemented by Bosnia's state-level parliament and, in some cases, confirmed by the Constitutional Court. These have to do with military property, agricultural lands, and forests. In all three cases, these properties have been designated as state property—not without strong push-back from the Serb-controlled entity.

In the case of unfarmed agricultural lands, the Constitutional Court found in February of 2020 that such land, if it had been property of Yugoslavia before the breakup of the country, then it now belongs to the state. Similarly, there are numerous military facilities that belong to the state, as confirmed by the Constitutional Court. The RS has so far refused to register 23 militarily useful properties in that entity to the state, which is a condition for Bosnia's progress toward membership in NATO. And more recently, the Court also determined that forests throughout the country, not privately owned, are state property.

These are all resources that the separatist government in the RS wants to control. In light of this conflict, Dodik disputes the legitimacy of the Constitutional Court, which comprises six Bosnian judges and three international ones. Dodik calls it a "political court" which has violated the constitution and has become a "court of inquisition." He insists that the property in question is exclusively that of the entities and that the Constitutional Court has "desecrated" the Constitution.

*

How has the "other international community" (I'm making the best of a very vague category), that is, Russia and China, responded to the current "crisis?"

First of all, both countries joined with the leaders of the RS in rejecting the legitimacy of the new High Representative, on the pretext that Schmidt was not approved by the UN Security Council, as previous HRs had been, but only by the Peace Implementation Council. As I described in my blog entry of July 31, Russia and China submitted a proposal to the UN Security Council objecting to the ongoing existence of the OHR—especially its Bonn powers—but this was defeated, two to thirteen, in that body. And in response to the continued objections by Serb separatists that Schmidt's selection was "illegal," the HR and a number of other analysts have countered that his legitimacy stems exclusively from his selection by the PIC—and that Annex 10 of the Dayton Constitution requires Bosnian officials to defer to the High Representative as the final interpreter of the Dayton Agreement.

In other ways, however, both countries—prominently Russia—have continued to provide strong support and encouragement to the RS's secessionist moves. This goes back far earlier than the present crisis. Russia has provided significant amounts of military weaponry and training to RS police. Russian instructors have provided training to RS special police in the former army barracks at Zalužani; the RS has also received military-grade automatic rifles, APCs, and helicopters from Russia. The increase in acquisition of weaponry by the various RS police forces over the past couple of years has outstripped that of all other Bosnian police agencies.

For China's part, besides intervening in the UNSC, it has characteristically engaged in economic encroachment into Bosnia-Herzegovina as in many other parts of the world. For example, in Bosnia China is investing in the construction of coal-powered energy plants at Ugljevik and in Tuzla. This, while recently agreeing with the United States at the latest international environmental conference (COP 26) to collaborate on curtailing coal-based energy production. The construction of these plants promises environmental devastation locally and globally—and it also increases China's economic inroads in Bosnia. (Of course, everyone wants a piece of Bosnia, and in this, China is probably the West's greatest rival.)

There is always a question about Russia's role in Bosnia, and it's a bigger subject than I can really settle here. But Russia's involvement in the country has gone through phases from casual dabbling in disruption, to more intensive intervention. This, of course, parallels Russia's operations elsewhere in the Western Balkans, such as its 2016 coup attempt in Montenegro, and some involvement in Macedonia (ok, North Macedonia) as well.

The awkwardly partitioned Bosnia, with three parts competing and collaborating in self-destruction, answers to Russia's wishes quite well. Here, for example, Russia can support the Serb element's anti-NATO impulse, and the RS joins with Russia in opposing recognition of Kosovo statehood. RS leaders—along with those of Serbia—support Russia's annexation of the Crimea, so this is a three-way dynamic of support, important to each side. Russia's inroads into Bosnian politics are able to increase in proportion to the EU's now long-term passivity. And more broadly, the dynamic of support for extreme nationalist tendencies resonates with the same in nearby Hungary and Slovenia as well.

Ultimately, anything that happens in Bosnia-Herzegovina that stymies Western interests is good news to Putin. But there are other factors in play that are important to him. That is, in fact the Western Balkans are small potatoes to Russia, not so nearby, and somewhat of a plaything. What is probably far more important is Russia's relationship with Europe. Russia needs to sell gas to Europe, and Europe needs to buy that gas. This leads Germany, in particular, to agree (so far) to the establishment of the Nordstream 2 pipeline that skirts around Ukraine, providing gas to Germany. This project has been controversial all the way, and it establishes a conflict for Germany itself, as that country also wishes to comply with US sanctions against Russia. (Of course, the project is also very bad news for Ukraine, which loses transit fees; other countries in Europe also object to such an increase in ties with Russia on human rights grounds.)

In any case, economic and political relations between Russia and Europe are of larger impact for Russia than anything that happens in former Yugoslavia—but in the present case, it appears that Russia can eat its cake and have it too. That is, with the EU's passivity, Russia can meddle and destabilize in Bosnia to its heart's content, and still do business more or less peaceably with Europe.

Meanwhile, what about the US and EU's response? It has been mixed, and not convincing. Both have sent one envoy after another to back up HR Schmidt and to try to cool out what they keep calling the "biggest crisis since the war." (Btw, I put "crisis" in quotation marks not because there is not a crisis but, as I've mentioned before, because when people talk about this being a big crisis, it makes it seem like there wasn't already a crisis before the Inzko decree of last July. There was. There always was, and it's called Dayton. I'll come back to that.)

The American analyst Janusz Bugajski said that the US has to show force: the State Department has to show that the US and the EU "have all the needed proof about Dodik's corrupt activities. They should freeze Dodik's holdings or take them away, and start criminal proceedings against him. They should warn Serbian president Vučić not to intervene in Bosnia, and they should mount a regional effort against the destabilizing influence from Russia."

These are practical suggestions, none of which has been undertaken yet. And there has been all but a clamor for troops to be sent to the militarily strategic choke point at Brčko—but the Austrian EUFOR commander General Platzer has declared, "The situation is stable and I don't see the need for a troop buildup, which could be taken as a provocation." It should be noted that Platzer also commented that "a united army was not foreseen in the Dayton Constitution"—and his only objection to the creation of an RS army was that it would "create unnecessary bureaucracy."  In spite of Platzer's disinterest, EUFOR officials continue to declare, "We are one hundred per cent dedicated to Bosnia-Herzegovina."

And in mid-November the EU Ambassador to Bosnia Johann Sattler said that the parties to the conflict need to arrive at a compromise. Democratization Policy Council analyst Kurt Bassuener responded, "When you have a direct threat to Dayton and a threat to peace, then the answer should not be compromise."

In the vein of a possible military conflict, HR Schmidt recently said, “I do not actually see a danger of war; fortunately, there are too few military assets available.” Bassuener countered, "He's complacent, there's more than enough equipment for very bad things to happen."

Complacency does seem to be a reasonable accusation. Here are a few standard comments from international officials:

--US Ambassador Eric Nelson says, "Bosnia must go forward, the leaders must participate in the work of the government and achieve an agreement."
--General Secretary of NATO Jens Stoltenberg said, "We are worried because of the tension..."
--EU envoy Angelina Eichhorst said, “Our view is that now is not yet the time to talk about sanctions, the focus needs to be on resuming dialogue.”
--HR Schmidt said, "This [Dodik's secessionist campaign] is a serious attack on the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I will be completely clear... [the campaign] is absolutely mistaken" and he called for dialogue among the domestic politicians.

And so on and so on. Dialogue, dialogue, dialogue. Does Schmidt actually think that the politicians are not always in dialogue with each other? They are, and that is how they continue to keep their constituencies divided, and their bank accounts ever fuller. And for that matter, if the domestic leaders were of a mind to solve things via dialogue, the present crisis would never have started in the first place.

So regarding the attitude of Western officials, it is part complacency, and part stupidity, in my estimation. As many analysts have said, Dodik has been signaling his intentions for ten to fifteen years. People have ascribed his earlier crises to "electoral campaigning," which is only partly true. In the long run, Dodik's separatist campaign is about profiteering and his personal survival. He pushes the boundaries to see how much he can get away with. In the present episode he has gone further than he thought he would be allowed to—it is even said that he has been surprised at this. So the outcome of his present offensive against rule of law and honesty in Bosnia is up in the air. And the Western international officials are, at best, careless, while their Russian counterparts are making the most of the opportunity.

Underscoring the leverage of Russia and China concerning Bosnia, in the first week of November EUFOR's year-long mandate came up for renewal in the UN Security Council. Russia has the power to block and thereby discontinue the presence of the military force in Bosnia, and in the context of the present separatist campaign, this fact made Western officials very nervous. So they made a deal with Russia: the existence of the OHR would be downplayed. That is, the High Representative would not present his customary semi-annual report in person to the UNSC.

The body then voted to continue EUFOR, and at the same time symbolically dismissed the OHR. This did not technically reduce the powers of the OHR, but it was a clear compromise in favor of the separatists. The OHR submitted its report indirectly; in a way, the arrangement perhaps brought more attention to the report than it otherwise would have garnered. HR Schmidt's report was quite strong and condemning of the behavior of the Serb separatists, and this did not in fact go unnoticed.

Schmidt wrote, for example, "Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) faces the greatest existential threat of the postwar period. Persistent, grave challenges to the fundamentals of the General Framework Agreement for Peace [Dayton] by the Republika Srpska entity authorities, led by the biggest RS party, the Alliance for Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) headed by BiH Presidency member Milorad Dodik, endanger not only the peace and stability of the country and the region, but -- if unanswered by the international community -- could lead to the undoing of the Agreement itself." You can see the report here.

*

Meanwhile, after the initial promise of secession, Dodik and his separatist accomplices in the entity have modified their rhetoric in admirably Orwellian fashion. Perhaps this is in response to some advice Dodik has gotten from president Vučić of Serbia, or else he saw that he needed to moderate the tone of his approach. In any event, for the past month or so we have been hearing pronouncements like the following:

--RS President Željka Cvijanović said, "We are legalists; we aren't rebels or revolutionaries. We want to be consistent in respecting the Constitution, so that the powers that belong to the RS under the Constitution will be returned to us."
--Dodik said, "We respect the territorial integrity of Bosnia; no plan of ours endangers it. And we respect the international sovereignty of Bosnia, but we likewise call for respect for the sovereignty of RS." That is, Dodik's new line is that under the Constitution (which he apparently can rewrite on the fly), the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina has no power over the entities, and its sovereignty extends outward, not inward.
--When Dodik says that the RS will annul 140 laws supposedly "imposed" by past High Representatives, he explains, "We are saving the Bosnian Constitution." He adds that "the RS is dedicated to preserving peace, stability, and constitutional order, and we are...trying to prolong the life of this country...The RS is trying to make the country successful, trying to straighten out injustices."

All that, and a whole lot more. On the subject of recreating the RS army, Dodik proposed three "peaceable" options: The first, he said, would be reducing the current national army by half. “If you don’t want that then we will have no other choice but to adopt, in line with the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the formation of the army of the Republic of Srpska, or declare the Republic of Srpska a demilitarised republic,” he said. It all sounds rather dazzling—an approach that seems to be a strong part of Dodik's repertoire in generating and orchestrating a crisis.

Perpetuation of the Serb boycott of state institutions has taken an interesting turn, in that on occasion, Dodik will attend a meeting of the presidency only in order to vote against every item on the agenda. Serb Members of Parliament have done the same thing. At the end of November they attended the state-level House of Peoples, where Dušanka Majkić stated that the Serbs had "only two conditions for ending their boycott." Those were that the Inzko decree be revoked, and that the international judges on the Constitutional Court be removed.

At about the same time, also in the state-level House of Peoples, there was a vote on the question of whether to pursue the annulment of Inzko's law against genocide denial. All Serbs and all Croats present voted in favor of the move, but it did not pass because those present from the Federation, and in favor of the annulment, did not constitute at least a third of the members from that entity. In a re-vote, with more Croats present, the proposal could pass.

For clarification, the House of Peoples at the state level is composed of five representatives each from the Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs. It is arranged this way so that no law can be passed without approval from at least one third of the ten members—Croats and Bosniaks—from the Federation. In this recent case, only three Croats were available to vote for annulment, and one more vote would have been needed.

This brings us to the nature of the cooperation between the Croat nationalists and their fellow separatists on the Serb side. That alliance has been growing for several years, with Croat nationalist politicians, judges, and prosecutors more and more consistently falling in line with Serb nationalist, separatist campaigns. It is significant that, recently, Chief Prosecutor Gordana Tadić (a Bosnian Croat whom I've discussed before, in my most recent blog entry) was removed from her position for, among other things, failing ever to launch a prosecution against any corrupt operator close to Dodik. But as of yet, there's not evidence of prosecutorial focus on corruption among Dodik's accomplices—and as mentioned above, Dodik should be high on that list.

There is much evidence that Čović and Dodik are in very close collaboration on the campaign to dismantle Bosnia-Herzegovina—with the support of Croatia and Serbia. Not long ago, Čović visited President Vučić in Belgrade, and Dodik visited the president and prime minister of Croatia in Zagreb, on the same day. And Serbian President Vučić stated, "With regards to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia are ninety per cent in agreement" (one commentator countered that they are "120 per cent in agreement").

And driving home evidence of the Bosnian Croat-Serb alliance is the vote by Čović and his colleagues against Inzko's decree. The hypocrisy and manipulation thus displayed would be astonishing, if we didn't already know to expect just that kind of self-serving behavior from most Bosnian politicians. This all starts to be reminiscent of Tuđman's and Milošević's documented collaboration in dividing up Bosnia in the 1990s. The wartime goals have never been laid to rest.

So, will there be a war? US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Gabriel Escobar announces, after meeting a few weeks ago with each of the three members of the presidency, "There will be no war." President Dodik comes out of the meeting stating that it was "satisfactory," but—"We will still create our own army in the RS." Many commentators doubt that there will be a war, but just as many say, "You never can tell." And I agree; the different parties can back into a war just as easily as running headlong into it. It's harder to prevent a war if you keep preparing for it.

In recent weeks calls for sanctions against Dodik and other separatist Serb officials have increased on the part of several governments: the UK, Germany, Czechia, and Netherlands, among others. On the other hand, Hungary—a member of the EU—is opposed. I won't be surprised if sanctions are raised (they've already been in place against Dodik and some others since 2017)—but meanwhile, Dodik asserts that he will get support from Russia and China in response to such pressure. And this is probably not hot air; Dodik is visiting with Putin as I write.

An indication of what might happen to ramp down the tension, and get Dodik and his cronies to back off, is what the Western envoys are concentrating on right now. That is the ongoing attempt to achieve an agreement about electoral reform. A round of intensive daily meetings is being held with Čović and Izetbegović as presumptive leaders of the Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, respectively, in the Federation. Dutch diplomat Angelina Eichhorst and the US special envoy for this reform, Matthew Palmer, are hosting the meetings.

The very involvement of Eichhorst and Palmer is worrisome. Both have previously been involved in the attempt to arrange a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo, backed by former US President Turmp via his envoy Richard Grenell. It was a scheme worthy of the simplistic, self-serving, and reckless behavior of the former US president. Had it succeeded, it could have added fuel to the RS secessionist drive and contributed greatly to instability in the region. The fact that Eichhorst and Palmer participated, combined with ongoing indications that they now support the Bosnian Croat drive for an electoral rearrangement that throws future elections to the Croat separatists, portends very negative developments for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Negotiations about electoral reform are ongoing as I write this. Nationwide general elections will be held in 2022, and if electoral laws are to be changed, it has to happen within the next few months. The most recent news points to a stalemate. There is fierce contention between the civic and ethno-nationalist approach. Whether the Muslim nationalist SDA, led by Izetbegović, will compromise and come to an agreement with Čović's HDZ is up in the air. It is quite possible that no deal will be arranged—in which case, Croats may boycott next year's elections, leading to further instability. We will probably know the outcome this month.

If, on the other hand, Eichhorst and Palmer, with collaboration from Izetbegović, find a way to satisfy Čović, this would be half of a resolution to the present crisis that would calm fears, chill separatist activities, and postpone a breakdown—in the short term, but ensuring it in the mid- to long-term. The other half of such a resolution would be a gift to Dodik and the RS of control over some or all of the state properties I mentioned earlier.

Let me go just briefly into the ramifications of such a handover. The RS is in hock to international lenders and shows no serious sign of liquidity. Three years ago it sold 168 million euros' worth of bonds on the Vienna Stock Exchange, and the electric power system is angling to sell another 140 million euros at the same venue this month. And earlier this year the RS sold bonds amounting to 300 million euros at the London Stock Exchange. Now, the RS's per capita international debt, at 5,600 KM per person, is nearly twice that of the Federation, at 2,900 KM. It is, arguably, out of control.

So Dodik and the RS desperately need control of a significant amount of state property to use as collateral for international loans. The identity of the buyers of these bonds is unknown, and the details of collateral are hidden—but the Vienna loan allows creditors to seize assets from any company over 51 per cent owned by the RS. It is reasonable, according to analysts, to expect that if the budget of the RS is not able to service nearly two billion euros of debt in the next two years, such a seizure will take place. And if the RS is not able to control state-owned property on its territory—as it presently is not—then there will be an economic disaster upon the entity, probably spreading throughout the country.

So it is quite plausible that a major factor behind Dodik's presently orchestrated "crisis" is a strategy to win control of state-owned properties in the RS, to be used as collateral. Again, time will tell, and international officials should be careful not to play into Dodik's hands.

*

What is at the root of the ongoing crisis, with its episodic eruptions? It is clear to everyone that the Dayton system is a perpetually destabilizing factor. The military component of it was good, because it helped stop the war. Analysts have always viewed the civilian component as something that has to be changed. It enshrined the wartime achievements of the separatists, creating a semi-partitioned land partially governed by a semi-protectorate. The wartime leaders and their political heirs have been able to run the show, with free rein to engage in wanton corruption (this refers to all three ethno-nationalist leaderships). So why would they want to change this system?

Here's just one example of how this generates permanent instability: In late October, state-level Minister of Defense Sifet Podžić (a Muslim) was absent, and his deputy minister, Mirko Okolić (a Serb) approved the purchase by an RS-based company, Kosmos, of an imported anti-aircraft rocket launcher. When Podžić returned to work, he canceled the approval. Leaving aside the question of why an entity police force would need such military equipment, the incident illustrates the glaring dysfunctionality of a system where co-ministers are destined to fight with each other at all levels of government.

All officials—domestic leaders, internationals on all sides (from Russia to the US), and pro-Bosnia commentators—insist that we "have to preserve Dayton." But as Banja Luka-based sociologist and wag Srđan Puhalo said, "Yes, let's stick with Dayton—but, which Dayton?" It's a near-impossible dilemma, since there is no effective mechanism to change the Dayton constitution.

One voice less heard from is that of the ordinary people.* But in recent weeks there have been several demonstrations, mainly in Sarajevo: in front of the OHR office, that of the EU, the state-level Parliament, and the US Embassy. People held signs that read, among other slogans, "We want equal rights," and "We don't want [ethnic] corrals; you're digging [war] trenches."

Most recently, protestors appeared in front of the EU offices with signs saying, "Denial of genocide is not freedom of speech." Demonstrators called for President Biden to come to Bosnia, and for Matthew Palmer to go home.

The only way for positive change to take place in Bosnia-Herzegovina is for such citizens to keep organizing, and to organize better. That, and for the international community to support them—rather than working against democracy in Bosnia.

*For more from the grassroots, see this excellent challenge by Gorana Mlinarević & Nela Porobić Isaković: The Geopolitics of the Anticipated War; How the voices of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are made irrelevant, 19 November 2021.

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