SURVIVING THE PEACE The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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January 31, 2022
Bosnia update: The "crisis" gets old, but electoral "negotiations" are hot.

January has seen a sharpening in the definition of forces trying to pull Bosnia-Herzegovina apart and those trying to keep the country together. I will examine these opposing trends through the behavior of international officials, domestic politicians, and a couple of salient public events. And as this blog entry comes out, international officials have been trying to conduct negotiations with Bosnian politicians over the "reform" of the country's electoral law.

Secession

The present "crisis," having begun late last July in response to former High Representative Inzko's anti-denialism decrees, is entering its seventh month. You'll recall that on December 10, the Parliament of the Republika Srpska (NSRS) announced a series of measures it would take to cement its independence from the state and to "recover" its powers that are, to date, in the hands of the state. These measures would be prepared in the form of new laws that would go into effect six months after the December 10 date.

We recall that Serb officials have (mostly) been boycotting state-level institutions such as the Presidency, the Council of Ministers, and the Parliament, except when it suited them to come and obstruct proceedings. In return for stopping this boycott, member of the Presidency Milorad Dodik has demanded not only that Inzko's decrees be annulled, but that Bosnian state and military property (forests, agricultural lands, and military holdings) be turned over to the RS.

Over the last few months, there has been a kind of evolution of Dodik's terminology where, most of the time, he has stopped calling for the complete separation of the RS from Bosnia. Earlier, he called for "peaceful separation" and, soon after that, "dissolution" of the state. More recently, he has called for an "independent RS within Bosnia," which pre-empts objections to the effect that there is no legal route to secession under the Bosnian constitution. It is still "creeping secession," but more a more tactically clever use of language.

There has been plenty of conjecture about the possibility of a war breaking out, especially if the RS forms its own army. Here I'll translate part of a statement by activist Kemal Pervanić:

There can always be a war. However, no one currently controls the capital needed for the preparation and conduct of a war. All of the banks (capital) are in foreign hands. They will defend (or are already defending) their interests. Sberbank, the only important non-Western bank, is already under American sanctions, which means that soon it will not be in the Balkans. The majority of "domestic" companies—small, middle-sized, and large—are controlled by foreign capital.

Dodik knows that he is unable to start a war, because he would simply lose it. In a new war there will be no siege of Sarajevo or Bihać. He has no control over strategic points such as Grabež, Vlašić, nor Vozuća/Ozren. He does not have backing in Croatia or Montenegro. Worse, those two countries are now NATO members. The border of the RS is not possible to defend, both because of the length of the border, also because of geography. Dodik knows that in a new war, the RS must, but cannot, defend itself.

Nor is there anyone to make war. Young people go to war, but for years they have simply been disappearing like smoke. ...People are not approving [a war], but they are afraid of speaking up publicly.

...Even if Dodik succeeds in splitting off the RS, the EU will never recognize it. And when you see that, unlike in 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina now has its own professional army, with cadre educated by world-recognized academies, and that there will not be an arms embargo, but a new NATO bombardment because they won't allow the Russians to open a military front in the heart of NATO, then you can conclude that all this that we're watching is just for show.

This is one person's take on why there will not be a new war. He's not including Serbia or Russia's presence in the equation—and I'm not sure about an automatic intervention by NATO—but let's hope he's right.

Meanwhile, the Bosniak organization Green Berets, which was founded before the last war as a Sarajevo-based paramilitary organization to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina's integrity, has recently started to sign up new members. The group denies that this is a belligerent move, stating that it will continue to defend Bosnia by non-violent means.

In any case, at present there is somewhat of a calm period compared to the fear of war that was prevalent for several months earlier on. This may be the calm before the storm, but on the other hand, it could be a fizzling out of President Dodik's attempt to secede. And that fizzling out may in fact segue into developments that work to the advantage of Dodik and his fellow secessionaire, Croat leader Dragan Čović.

January 14th may have been the turning point toward the winding down of the most blatant secessionist moves. On that day Dodik met in Belgrade with Serbian president Vučić, who told Dodik that he and other Bosnian Serb officials ought to resume participation in state-level institutions. Given Vučić's power as the leader of an actual state with a relatively strong economy and military, his advice carries a lot of weight with Dodik, who is often characterized as being one of Vučić's means to enforce an ongoing program of Serbian political, economic, and possibly territorial expansion.

Vučić stated that he was not asking the Bosnian Serbs to agree to anything imposed on them by the Bosnian state, nor by international officials, nor even to vote for anything in particular, but just to attend meetings and participate. His encouragement was backed up by a promise of ongoing significant economic support for the RS. This, after a promise of $100 million euros from Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orban.

Neither of these offers will be sufficient to pull the RS out of the debt it is in, incurred in part by bond sales I've mentioned in previous postings. Debts on bonds sold a few years ago on the London Stock Exchange are coming due this year. And economist Svetlana Cenić notes that meanwhile, the RS is planning to sell another 1.5 billion KM worth of bonds on the domestic market—and that the RS's installment of debt payment for this year is 1.2 billion KM. RS opposition figure Jelena Trivić points out that the RS's debt is around 55% of the entity's GDP, while the recommended maximum debt is 45%. And the RS's annual growth rate wallows around 3%, which Cenić describes as "nothing" for a developing country.(1)

This should illustrate one of the main reasons, as I've discussed before, for Dodik's wish to depart from the framework of the Bosnian state. Creating the RS's own indirect tax authority won't help, as that removes the protection afforded by the state-level ITA, which makes a priority of paying off foreign debt. It also illustrates why Dodik wants to get hold of state-owned properties.

Dodik, in response to media revelations about Vučić's suggestion, stated that options will be discussed at an upcoming RS Parliament session, but that "we are sticking with our principles with regard to the transfer of powers from the state to the entity level. We will respect the decision of the NSRS (his party controls the NSRS, ahem). But until the problem of Inzko's laws is resolved, our representatives will only go to meetings of the Bosnian institutions when we consider that it is in the interest of the RS" (my translation).

It's worthwhile to compare the economy of the Republika Srpska with that of the other Bosnian entity, the Federation. First of all, the 2013 census tells us that the Federation, with some 2.2 million inhabitants, is home to about a million more people than the RS, which is home to somewhat below 1.3 million people (we must assume, due to emigration, that both figures are considerably lower now than in 2013). And the Federation has far more urban population than the RS, with the relatively large cities of Sarajevo, Mostar, Tuzla, Zenica, and Cazin, while the RS only has Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and Doboj that can represent any significant economic power. In contrast to the RS, the Federation has recorded a 6% increase in its GDP in 2021, with indications that the growth trend will continue in 2022. (2)

Sanctions

In the midst of the ongoing drama, the US Treasury Department finally saw fit to levy new economic sanctions on Dodik, who was already the target of US sanctions installed just before the Trump inauguration in January 2017. The new sanctions not only increase the pressure on Dodik, but also target his legal advisor Milan Tegeltija, who at the end of 2020 resigned in disgrace from his position as head of the state-level High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council under suspicion of various acts of corruption (see my earlier blogs on this subject here, here, and here). The new sanctions also target Tegeltija's wife, as well as the Tuzla-based Bosniak politician Mirsad Kukić, also for corruption.

Another important target of the sanctions is the television station Alternativna TV, owned by the consortium Prointer. Prointer has shadowy ties with Dodik's son Igor—and Alternativna TV is commonly thought to be editorially controlled very closely by Milorad Dodik himself.

The new sanctions freeze US-controlled assets of those targeted, and prohibit those people's travel to the US. As such, they will not significantly affect Dodik and the others, who do not have much in the way of holdings in the US. But they are a sign that—maybe—the US administration is starting to take Dodik's behavior more seriously. There are many other corrupt officials to be targeted—you could say, just about literally, that there's a "lifetime supply." And the new US sanctions should be a signal to the EU, where the RS has significantly more business dealings. If Europe can ever focus its policies enough, and bring its behavior in line with its declarations about Dodik's secessionism, then it could have a powerful effect on the RS and its separatist trends.

It should be noted that the new US sanctions make a point not only of citing Dodik's separatism, but also his corruption. Some people I respect have criticized this combination as carrying a mixed message, or perhaps a distraction from the main cause of the current crisis—that being the dangerous secessionist moves. Ok maybe, but isn't corruption the motor behind the separatism? As the Treasury Department's statement explains, Dodik has undermined Bosnian state institutions and destabilized the state. It also notes that he has used his position "to accumulate personal wealth through graft, bribery, and other forms of corruption." (3)

Immediately after the new sanctions were imposed, Dodik stated that he was not worried by them. He joked that it was time for the RS to appoint special delegates to fight corruption in the  US and the UK. He also warned that "if the West introduces sanctions against the RS, you can consider that the date of an independent Republika Srpska."

Meanwhile, the Democratization Policy Council commented that the new sanctions provide an opportunity for Europe, via Germany's leadership, to get on the ball and "get the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans and BiH out of a dead-end and finally demand accountability from local leaders." Referring to the EU's rudderless behavior concerning the Bosnian crisis, the DPC statement continued, "these sanctions do provide an opportunity for a course correction for the US, EU member states, and UK away from a retrograde appeasement policy which has abetted Dodik."(4)

The obstacle to a unanimous EU decision to sanction Dodik's secessionist moves is the fact that under Viktor Orban, Hungary will oppose such a move. However, the EU does not in fact require a unanimous decision in order to impose sanctions as a body. The DPC has pointed out that it agreed in 2011 that it could apply sanctions by majority vote if that vote represents 65% of the EU's population.(5)

The DPC, along with the Helsinki Human Rights Committee, added that "nothing will come of this until the UK, Canada, the US, and the EU come out with the clear position that secession won't be tolerated....Next steps must be to end negotiations about electoral law as well as about state and military property, and for the US to have serious talks with its European partners about sending EUFOR or NATO troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina."

In this vein, several EU member countries including Germany and the Netherlands have indicated that they are seriously considering levying sanctions, but no move has been made so far. On the other hand, there is controversy within EU member Croatia, where President Zoran Milanović has commented that "any Croat politician who favors sanctions against the RS is a traitor." Milanović has otherwise gone off the rail with incendiary and even racist statements lately, but his support for Dodik's separatism should be seen as an extension of Croatia's nationalists' support for Bosnian Croat secession—which is of a piece with that of the RS.

Possible scenarios

In mid-January after Vučić asked Dodik to end his boycott of Bosnian institutions, Vildana Selimbegović, editor-in-chief of the Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje, asked if Dodik had lost the battle, or the war. She wrote, "I'm not sure if this is a turnaround by Vučić, or he is just waiting until the storm subsides." She added that not everything depends on Serbia, even though the country wields enormous influence over the RS.

Agreeing with the DPC statements, Selimbegović says that if the EU accepts the "twitter populism" of its own European Commissioner for Enlargement, the Orban accomplice Oliver Varhelyi, then there will continue to be escalation by the secessionaires. On the other hand, if the EU follows suit upon the US sanctions, then Dodik could be on his way out. Other pro-Bosnian public figures have recently asserted that Dodik is on his last legs, but I think they are being prematurely triumphalist.

Another possible development would be for Dodik and his fellow Serb officials to return to the state institutions, clearing away one distraction in order to ease the way for Čović to achieve his long-held dream, through "electoral reform," of cementing HDZ (the main Croat nationalist party) hegemony over the Croat voting body and the levers of power in the Federation. We will see.

The January 9th "celebration"

January 9th is the date when, in 1992, Bosnian Serbs declared their own state. The name of this para-state went through some evolution before it became the Republika Srpska but, via ethnic cleansing and genocide, it came out of the war as an "entity" enshrined in the Dayton agreement. Since then, the date has been celebrated by RS patriots as a glorious anniversary, and dreaded by the victims and survivors of expulsion and genocide as a day of evil memories.

In 2015 the Bosnian Constitutional Court banned celebration of the founding of the RS on this day because it falls on a Serbian Orthodox religious holiday, which makes it discriminatory against citizens of the RS who are not of that religion. However, the objection to the observance is more accurately an objection to the celebration of separatism achieved through genocide. And since the court decision, observance of the holiday has become progressively more flagrant and stridently nationalist.

The celebration took place once more this year against the fraught backdrop of Dodik's boycott and his secessionist promises. Several thousand people marched in a short parade through Banja Luka, accompanied by RS police helicopters flying overhead. It is worth noting who appeared on the stand with President Dodik on that day: Serbian war criminal Vinko Panderović, convicted at The Hague for crimes against humanity in connection with the genocide at Srebrenica; Russian Ambassador to Bosnia Igor Kalabuhov; Chinese Ambassador Ji Ping; and two right-wing French Members of the European Parliament, colleagues of National Party leader Marine Le Pen.(6) Members of the Russian motorcycle club the "Night Wolves," known as "Putin's favorite motorcycle club," participated in the march.

All in all, the scene lays out who is prepared to celebrate the results of genocide: Officials from Serbia; expatriated Bosnian war criminals; officials from the two world powers that support RS secession; right-wing representatives from the heart of western Europe; and a mass of fascist rabble. It's not a promising scene, especially for the Bosniaks and Croats who have returned to their prewar homes in the RS.

The extravaganza of concocted patriotism was not limited to Banja Luka. Along with widespread celebrations came a flurry of hateful incidents in a dozen-odd locations throughout the Serb-controlled entity. In Brčko members of the Association of St. George, which calls itself a "humanitarian organization," marched wearing black hoodies with the word "Russia" printed on them and chanting, "We will give blood for the RS as Milorad Dodik envisions it." Their leader, Srđan Letić, previously served two and a half years in prison for having sex with minors.

Similar incidents were also recorded between Orthodox Christmas and January 9th in Prijedor, Janja, Foča, Doboj, Bileća, Sokolac, Modriča, Višegrad, Čajniča, and Gacko, as well as in Priboj, in neighboring Serbia. A motorcyclist fired shots near a mosque in the return community of Janja near Bijeljina. In Prijedor men carrying torches and banners with pictures of Ratko Mladić lit off fireworks and chanted about the RS as their "djedovina," the land of their grandfathers. In Zvornik marchers carrying torches celebrated "30 years of freedom."

"Freedom" is an interesting euphemism when celebrated by putative sports fan groups such as the "Ultras" and the "Patriot Boys." In a newspaper article after the January 9th events, criminology Professor Mirza Buljubašić and Branko Todorović of the Helsinki Committee discussed the nature of these "fan groups." They explained that these are "not people who are delighted by sports," but who find meaning in belonging to an organization that, in many cases, is part of an "invisible network connecting politics and hooliganism via the ideology of nationalism."

Buljubašić added that it was important to note the illegal behavior of high-ranking members of the groups in activities such as drug dealing, illegal possession of firearms, and committing physical violence against people—and that this behavior is usually ignored by the local ethno-nationalist authorities as long as the "fan groups" don't endanger their power, and such behavior works to support the power of local and higher authorities. Such is certainly the case with the January 9th celebrations. Mr. Todorović adds that the fan groups in Bosnia are often a screen for organized criminal groups which, sometimes, have ties with similar organizations in Serbia. The article went further in noting that the fan groups "often exist to earn money from criminal activities: drugs, racketeering, extortion, terrorizing, and services offered to local politicians during election period." (7)

January 10 international counter-demonstrations

As if in answer to the January 9th "patriotic" rampage throughout the RS, on the next day there were pro-Bosnia demonstrations in 15-odd countries abroad, including in St. Louis, London, Paris, Brussels, Geneva, Sydney, Vienna, Oslo, Stockholm, Rome, Copenhagen, Toronto, Ottawa, and Boston, with accompanying protests in Tuzla and Sarajevo. The protests were organized by a coalition centered in Brussels, with leadership from Satko Mujagić.

The protests carried three main messages:

·       The present crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not an ethnic one; rather, it comes from the leadership of some political parties that are violating the BiH constitution.

·       Denial of genocide, and the glorification of war crimes, must be prohibited.

·       The international community and all pro-Bosnia allies must take action, including supporting the Bosnian Prosecution in an endeavor to process those people who are responsible for the crisis. 

In Sarajevo, demonstrators sought the resignation of all three entrenched ethno-nationalist leaders: Čović, Dodik, and Izetbegović. Banners read "Stop those who are endangering the peace."

A speaker for the Brussels-based coalition emphasized that "this gathering is a reflection of concern, as well as of patriotism, and its goal is not to promote any manner of political option, nor is it aimed against any ethnicity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The events that we are witnessing in recent months seriously endanger the peace, and because of this, it is our duty to speak up and say clearly that we do not want any more division and war."

In response to the January 10th protests, organizers of the event received a letter on behalf of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, which expressed congratulations on the success of the protests and read, in part,

"The EU deeply regrets the prolonged political crisis, which has held back progress on reforms, and condemns the blockage of the State institutions. The path currently taken by Republika Srpska (RS) may only lead to isolation. Initiatives aimed at withdrawing from State institutions are unacceptable and endanger the country’s EU accession path. The EU also firmly condemns the rhetoric and actions by RS leaders during the unconstitutional celebrations of 9 January, which have further heightened tensions. The RS leadership should put an end to a worrying trend of hatred and intolerance. There is no place in the European Union for minimisation and denial of war crimes and genocide, nor for the glorification of war criminals."

...All that, and more. One can only hope that the EU will pull itself together and act appropriately. Meanwhile, the January 10 organizers have announced another round of protests set for March 6, with the prediction that 35 cities will participate, and that the next events will be much bigger than the last protests.

Electoral Reform

For the last six months—and before that, since Dayton—the way representatives have been elected to any seat in government has been a problem. That especially pertains to the members of the state-level three-part presidency, the state-level upper house (Dom Naroda—House of the Peoples) and the entity level upper houses, also called House of the Peoples.

There's much that is not democratic about the electoral system, and for the last half year Croat nationalists, supported by Serb separatists, have been working overtime to make the system even less democratic. In the other direction, pro-Bosnia forces have been advocating democratization.

In response to a handful of lawsuits, several decisions by the Strasbourg-based European Court of Human Rights have found the Bosnian constitution in violation of European standards, because people who identify neither as Bosniaks, Serbs, or Croats—for example, Jews, Roma, and Bosnians, are not allowed to run for office in the above-mentioned institutions. The ECHR finding on the violation of the rights of Jews and Roma dates all the way back to 2009. The successive governments of Bosnia and its entities have ignored the findings, which should be incorporated into an amended constitution.

One thing that is right about the electoral system is that any citizen of the Federation can vote for either a Croat or Bosniak for member of the presidency, unlike in the Republika Srpska, where voters can only vote for the Serb candidate. This situation in the Federation leads to a lot of Bosniaks helping three times to elect a Croat, Željko Komšić, for president rather than the separatist Dragan Čović. It's not so much that the voters love Komšić as that they are happy to have an alternative to Čović.

So lately, Matthew Palmer and Angelina Eichhorst, US and EU special envoys respectively, have been trying to lead negotiations to alter the electoral system. The negotiations have primarily involved Čović and Bosniak leader Izetbegović. In essence Čović, backed by the entire structure of Croat nationalist parties, advocates a system of virtual electoral units that will ensure that his HDZ party will come out on top in all future elections. He calls this "legitimate representation," wherein "legitimacy" is defined as whatever the HDZ approves of.

One possible such electoral arrangement would see a greater number of Croat representatives elected from the cantons where the HDZ is stronger, disadvantaging those cantons where there are significant numbers of Croats who don't support the HDZ. Essentially it is a form of gerrymandering and, as many analysts point out, a step toward the "third entity" that leads toward dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This should make it clear why, in recent years, Čović and Dodik have grown so close—they share the goal of secession, that is, the achievement of the wartime plans of their predecessors.

One of the more outrageous aspects of the ongoing negotiations is the role of Palmer and Eichhorst. Why have these representatives of supposedly democratic institutions been so strongly supporting Čović's anti-democratic goals? It is a bit mysterious, but it is telling that both figures were involved in the disastrous, failed attempt by Trump, via his adventurous envoy Richard Grenell, to arrange a land swap between Serbia and Kosovo that could well have led to a war in more than one part of the Balkans.

This attitude, and the entire witless approach of the Western part of the international community to the present crisis, highlights the habit of outside interlopers (read: managers of the Empire) historically to make sloppy arrangements that are doomed to failure. That description applies to Dayton and, just for example, the various attempts at resolution of conflicts in Palestine over the last 70-odd years as well. You can see the ongoing mayhem there as illustration of my criticism.

In any event, the weekend of January 27-29 saw an intensive round of "negotiations" at Neum, Bosnia's city on the Adriatic coast. Most of the progressive-leaning Bosnian parties (SDP, DF, NS) abstained, and the prominent participants were the HDZ and Izetbegović's SDA. The very buildup to the meeting was intensive, with some of the Croat operators warning that there may be no national elections this October if their minimum demands were not met. One of them said, "If there is no agreement, we will have a special meeting afterwards. So in about 20 days, we will know whether there is anything to this country or not."

After a long Friday of technical discussions covering basic elements of secure, fair, and open voting procedures, on Saturday negotiators worked until 3:00 a.m., digging into the essence of the Croats' demands. There had been nervousness among democratically-inclined Bosnians about the possibility of Izetbegović giving in to those demands—a concern that was not historically unfounded. But in the end, Izetbegović did not cave, and so nothing much came of the negotiations. With all that time spent, it may even be that there were sincere efforts to cooperate.

Final statements from the negotiators on all sides expressed a half-hearted optimism. What we have to watch now is whether the Croats, backed by the Serbs, will decide to try to obstruct the October elections. International officials have already weighed in sternly against such an outcome.

In that vein, I finish this short blog entry with a quote from the author and analyst Faruk Šehić: 

That he [Dodik] makes the EU nervous is their problem. No one should expect any good from them. The very fact that, in the throes of the greatest crisis in BiH, when the danger of the disintegration of the state is threatened, they have organized negotiations with the goal of achieving a change in the electoral law, openly leaning to the side of the ultra-nationalists from HDZ, says everything about their view of this state. About their amateurism, blindness, incapability, or these people are simply on the side of all our enemies, who wish to break this country into its Croat and Serb parts. That wish has never ceased from 1993 up to today. And I doubt that it will ever cease. (8)

Footnotes:
1. "Patriotizam u 1,5 milijardi zaduženja / Cenić: Kolaps RS-a je neminovan ukoliko se "isključi" iz sistema indirektnog oporezivanja i formira neku svoju upravu" (Patriotism in 1.5 billion debt...) Oslobodjenje, January 17, 2022
2. "Novalić: Procjene ukazuju to da naša privreda nikada nije proizvela više roba i usluga nego prošle godine" (Novalić: Estimates indicate that our economy has never produced more goods and services than last year), Oslobodjenje, January 27, 2022,
3. "Treasury Sanctions Milorad Dodik and Associated Media Platform for Destabilizing and Corrupt Activity, " Treasury Department Press Release, January 5, 2022..
4. "DPC: Berlin must take the wheel in Bosnia after US sanctions," N1, Sarajevo, January 6, 2022.
5. "DPC: Berlin must take the wheel in Bosnia after US sanctions"
N1, January 6, 2022
6. "Banned Bosnian Serb Celebration Recalls Memories of Start of War"
Balkan Insight, January 10, 2022.
7. "Sprega politike, huliganizma i nacionalizma: Kako su desničarske navijačke grupe mobilizovane za proslavu 'Dana RS-a'?" (Combination of politics, hooliganism and nationalism: How were right-wing fan groups mobilized to celebrate 'RS Day'?), Oslobodjenje, January 28, 2022.
8. "Ponavljaju se događaji koji će nam odrediti sudbine u narednim mjesecima, godinama ili decenijama" (Events are repeated that will determine our destinies in the coming months, years or decades), Faruk Šehić, BH Dani, January 30, 2022.
 

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