SURVIVING THE PEACE The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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January 1, 2022
Bosnia crisis update: Possibilities for resolution—or not.

In the past month, some aspects of the current crisis* have become clarified. Players are jockeying into their advantageous positions. That doesn't mean it's (ever) possible to predict what's going to happen in the next few months, but it's a bit more possible to outline a couple of scenarios.
*A friend, after reading my last post, agreed that the entire Dayton era is a crisis. He suggested that the episodic events people describe as "crises," may be better termed "dramas."

One of the ways that the argument breaks down is between people who are convinced there will be a war, and everyone else. By "everyone else" (and I include myself), I mean people who think there might not be a war, because there are other possible outcomes. I would say no one who's serious can categorically say there won't be a war.

The people who are convinced there will be a war think so for various reasons. They are all abstract reasons, because you can't prove there will be a war, until it happens. But for many people, the fact that it has happened before is reason enough to be convinced. And I find there's a certain euphoria connected with holding to the worst case scenario. People who have militarist leanings, that is, people who are philosophically or temperamentally inclined to think of military action as a solution to a problem, tend to populate this group.

I suppose the scenario that the present crisis can come to a non-violent resolution is also abstract, because it hasn't happened yet. But there are a respectable number of signposts that point to a certain outcome that I feel is worth examining.

Much of this has been broached in my previous blog entry; the last several entries are good background, if you're new to this blog and just starting to examine what's going on in and around Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Now, President Dodik and his crew are still calling for the abolition of state-level jurisdiction over the Serb-controlled entity where policing, security, defense, and tax administration are concerned. That is, they want the RS to create its own army, judiciary, and indirect tax administration.

On December 10, the RS Parliament (NSRS) held a special session at which it announced that it would create these institutions, and that the state-level agencies would then no longer be welcome in the entity. Those include the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, the army, the national police (SIPA), and the security agency (OSA), along with the state-level tax authority. This declaration was passed as a non-binding measure, because the opposition parties (PDP, SDS, DNS...) abstained or walked out of the session, not wishing to throw their lot in with Dodik's SNSD. Dodik's bill received 48 votes out of the possible 83.

The bill calls for the drafting of laws creating the new institutions within six months. For the present bill to become law, it would have to pass in the House of Peoples, the RS Parliament's upper chamber. There, it would encounter resistance from Bosniak representatives, but that might not be insurmountable. Dodik will be able to find a way around resistance, if he wants to go that far.

By way of justification, Dodik and his colleagues insist that his proposed measures are in harmony with the Bosnian Constitution, even though this statement flies in the face of facts. There is no provision in Dayton for an entity's unilateral separation from state-level authorities, which is equivalent to secession.

Recall that the RS has already begun to separate from the state-level medical agency. Medical experts and economists point out that if the RS goes all the way with this measure, it could cause mid- and long-term shortages of medicines and equipment in the RS because of procedural disorganization and regulatory conflicts with the state. It is particularly problematic for such a rearrangement to take place in the midst of the pandemic, where hospitals and all other medical institutions are fatigued and facing supply shortages. Commentators also point out that EU conditions for Bosnia's accession call for simplification of medical acquisitions procedures, not the opposite. But the fact that the secessionists continue to dismantle a public health system that works is a good illustration of their priorities. [1]

The latest on this plan is that the Law on Medicines and Medical Equipment was entered into the RS official registry on December 29, making it go into force in six months. In response, Croat member of the Bosnian presidency Željko Komšić commented that "there will be a criminal complaint filed against the people responsible...if things continue like this, then the same thing will happen tomorrow with the BiH Armed Forces, and with the judiciary, and when that happens, then that will have to be answered with force."

Meanwhile, the Serb boycott of state-level institutions goes on. Dodik continues to attend the presidency meetings—so that he can vote against anything that might cost the RS. At the meeting on December 23, he voted against everything including completely uncontroversial measures, such as concluding agreements with ambassadors, and sending relief aid to people in his own entity.

Dodik's explanations of how the RS is going to enact its secessionist measures are not very sophisticated. He says that the RS will "defend itself and disqualify the Bosnian judiciary from its territory," and "the RS will defend itself in an organized manner and in a few months it will have laws regulating the judicial system." He added that the entity will prohibit the BiH Prosecution’s work, and will "disqualify the Court and the Prosecutor's Office of BiH.”

Speaking of the international officials trying to maintain order, Dodik said that the Peace Implementation Council meetings "don't mean anything; who authorized them to talk about anything?" Dodik demands that the laws prohibiting genocide denial be revoked, saying "it is not possible for anyone to accuse our people and the whole republic as genocidal."  If the laws are revoked, he says, that will be sufficient for Serb officials to return to the state-level institutions. (He has subsequently moved the goal post several times.)

I note here that, while Dodik and his fellow separatists complain about the entire Serb people being tarred as genocidaires, that is exactly what national and international judicial processes have not done. They have identified and prosecuted individuals. It is the Serb extremists who work to convince their constituency that the Serbs are being condemned as a people.

Not all is harmony among Serb politicians in the RS. SDS (the party of Radovan Karadžić), now led by Mirko Šarović, leads the opposition, together with the PDP and the DNS. I'm never quite able to push aside the impression that the main difference between the opposition and the SNSD-led governing coalition is that the former are simply jealous that those in power are able to steal so much more than they are. As to the long-held Serb nationalist articles of faith, such as genocide denial, Serb supremacy in the entity (including discrimination verging upon apartheid), militant nationalism, and historical distortion, you can't fit a Gillette razor between the ideologies of the government and the opposition. So much so, that commentator and sometimes wag Srđan Puhalo recently said that there is no opposition.

But in order to justify their status as opposition—and to pave the way to an eventual electoral victory—the SDS and the other parties have to pretend that they are the paragon of honesty and that they are leaders in the fight against entrenched corruption and other ills of the present RS government. Banja Luka Mayor Draško Stanivuković (PDP) has made a pretty good show of this on the rhetorical level, though it's doubtful that he has chipped away at the criminality of the Dodik family consortium whatsoever (and don't ask Draško's father how he made his first million).

In the present drama, opposition figures have made it very clear that they are, at least, uncomfortable with Dodik's maneuvers. They have no disagreement with the idea of transfer of government competencies "back to" the Serb-controlled entity. But they disagree with the creation of so much turbulence that it could cause serious disruption to the orderly conduct of business in the entity. Mr. Šarović expressed that he didn't believe that the RS "has the power for this kind of undertaking," and he said, "You have embarked on a dangerous path, and we can't follow you." Šarović commented that the RS is divided, and "has no, or very few friends, and that is not sufficient for what you are trying to accomplish"—referring to secession. [2]]

Šarović also stated his opinion that transfer of authorities is a good thing, but that it must be done "by agreement." And the PDP's Igor Crnadak accused Dodik of mounting a very early pre-election campaign (the next elections will be in the fall of 2022), with the "cannonade of great Serbianizing" just "a nationalist façade that distracts the voters from their crimes."

The supposition is common among opposition figures that Dodik's present drama is all about restoring his image in time for a victory in this year's election. They don't talk much about Dodik's proposed goals (enumerated above), which he has made very clear. And it seems that Dodik is aiming to achieve those goals, or some of them, well before next year's elections, which are 10 months away. There is more to the story than what the oppositionists seem prepared to take into account.

Crnadak actually recounted something that points to what may be Dodik's most important goal: removal of judiciary power that's hanging over his head. Supposing the state-level court and prosecution got its act together—and there are tentative signs of this happening—the judiciary could, by rights, put Dodik in jail. But not if he succeeds in removing their jurisdiction over the RS.

Crnadak said that, before the December 10 special session of the RS Parliament, a member of the governing coalition came to the SDS caucus and asked for help achieving a unanimous vote for the abolition of the High Court and Prosecutorial Council. Then, the SNSD would drop all the rest of its plans, as Crnadak recounts it. He explained, "The only thing that is important to them is to control the judiciary. All the rest would be let go...The greatest plundering has taken place during the present pandemic. We all know that the biggest profiteering has been committed by members of the families of Dodik's office." [3]

Staying out of jail is not the only reason Dodik wants to secede, or at least abolish state power over his entity. I've discussed the background to this earlier. He has his eye on land and other resources that the state controls: agricultural land and forests. (Over half of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina is state-owned property, with about 35% being forests, and pastures about 11%.  So far, the state also controls military property. Dodik wants control of all this property for the entity—so that he can sell it or use it as collateral, to service the massive debts he has gotten his entity into in the last 15 years. [4]

At 6.4 billion KM of public debt, the RS is in twice as much debt per capita as the Federation. Remember also that creditors on the hundreds of millions of bonds the RS has floated have the right to seize part of the RS's holdings if the entity defaults on any loan. So the very precarious state of the RS economy and liquidity is certainly on Dodik's mind.

Dodik thinks that if he removes the state-level Indirect Tax Authority's power over the RS, his entity will be able to control income that could go partway to solving its debt problem. But rather the opposite is true. Upon exit from the ITA, foreign loans to the RS could be withdrawn, because they are guaranteed by the ITA. If such loans disappear, that will directly affect pensioners, health workers, police, and other government employees. And commentators are doubtful that the RS has the wherewithal to establish its own ITA. Taxes collected by the ITA are the biggest source of income for the governments of both entities. They are used for financing schools and hospitals, and for building roads. The IMF has expressed concern about dismantling the ITA and has been making pointed inquiries to the government of the RS about this plan. Besides everything else, there's a mechanism built into the ITA that ensures payment of Bosnia's foreign debts. [5]

In short, removal of the state-level Indirect Tax Authority has the prospect of inducing a very high level of chaos in the Bosnian economy.

RS opposition leaders are also uncomfortable about the secessionists' activities in the economic realm. Mr. Crnadak calls for the governing coalition to "stop the madness and enable our firms to have normal business." He complains that in the present atmosphere, it is "increasingly tougher for someone to invest from outside. These are very damaging conflicts." He noted the threat of sanctions from Germany, Bosnia's biggest trade partner—a relationship that Dodik has treated in a very cavalier way. Hearing of the possibility of sanctions, Dodik responded that the RS could retaliate against Germany. High Representative then worried, sarcastically, that perhaps the RS would put a boycott on German mineral water. Meanwhile, Crnadak lamented that there are ever greater problems for companies from the RS in realizing business arrangements with European firms, and signing of prospective agreements is now being delayed. [6]

While the RS opposition clamors, Dodik persists, pushing for control of the state-level properties located in the RS. Besides those mentioned above, there is also the valuable airport at Trebinje that could be used as collateral, as well as a hydroelectric dam on the Drina River. The status of these properties could become a negotiating point in an attempt at resolution of the present drama, and very little good could come of compromising on this matter. In the context of "possible alternative scenarios to war," this will be something to watch out for. If—perhaps under international pressure—pro-Bosnian negotiators are forced to concede on state property, this will be a very costly and destabilizing alternative to war. This is quite possibly what international officials have in mind when they repeat the fatuous advice to "solve this through dialogue."

Part of the "dialogue" that international officials have been promoting, of course, is the series of negotiations for electoral reform that I have discussed in previous postings. US Special Envoy for Electoral Reform Matthew Palmer and Director of the European External Action Service (EEAS) Angelina Eichhorst were leading these negotiations until the first part of December, but the negotiations were going nowhere. It seems that the least resolute camp among the "pro-Bosnia" politicians, that is, Bakir Izetbegović's SDA, still could not bring itself to jump the fence and consent to the Croat separatists' plan for a soft partition of the Federation. Izetbegović stopped short of agreeing to the electoral reform plan promoted by the internationals that would effectively lock in place representation of the Bosnian Croats by their most nationalist and separatist representatives, that is, by the HDZ led by Dragan Čović.

Although the SDA has been in coalition with the HDZ since before the war, with a few exceptions, it is clear that the HDZ now sees its wartime separatist goals better served by collaborating with the Serb separatists. This is something that the international negotiators either do not see, or they do not care about. The negotiators have paid lip service to constitutional reform that would incorporate several pro-democracy findings that have been brought over the years by the European Court of Human Rights (Strasbourg), starting with the Sejdić and Finci decision of 2009. So they, Eichhorst and Palmer, are in the contorted position of trying to improve the democratic structure by incorporating the ECHR findings, on one hand, while simultaneously advocating for a strengthened ethno-national configuration on the other. That just can't be squared.

In any case, the negotiators, for now, have backed off. There was no progress in discussions between Izetbegović and Čović a week into December, and Eichhorst and Palmer went home.

What happens next is up in the air. But Čović and his Croat separatist accomplices have been demanding recourse, that is, what amounts to political hegemony in representation, for many years now. One manifestation of that demand is the HDZ refusal to form a new Parliament in the Federation ever since the 2018 national elections, leaving the entity's previous government in place to this day, and probably up to the 2022 elections. Now, Čović is threatening to boycott next year's elections if "reform" is not established. This could be an added obstruction to the functioning of Bosnia's state structure, on top of the Serb boycott of state-level institutions. Here the collusion between the Croat and Serb separatists starts to become visible in high contrast.

One can look at the region around Bosnia-Herzegovina in several directions and observe how various international factors are responding. Let's look at Hungary, which is the leadership, within the European Union, in obstructing Bosnia's progress. This should be no surprise, since Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is the most anti-democratic and all-around trumpoid leader of an EU member state. He is rather like Dodik, but with sovereignty—and money. Orban has just recently pledged 100 million euros in support to the Republika Srpska. This, after a recent visit to Bosnia—where Orban only met with Dodik. Along with his direct support of Dodik and his separatist agenda, Orban has pledged to oppose any move by the EU to levy sanctions against Dodik. This renders full EU sanctions impossible, since any such decision must be unanimous.

It gets worse, at least on the rhetorical level. In a press conference a few weeks into December, while Orban was discussing the present drama in Bosnia, he underscored his support for Dodik by saying, "The Balkans cannot be stabilised without the Serbs, without Bosnia, and Bosnia cannot be stabilised without the Bosnian Serbs. The key to the Balkans is the Serbian nation." Following this, discussing EU enlargement, he underlined his disdain for the Bosniak population of the country by saying, "The challenge with Bosnia is how to integrate a country with 2 million Muslims.” This blatantly racist comment, naturally, prompted great protest by Bosnian leaders and some other democratically-minded Europeans. [7]

Hungary's support for Dodik's separatist agenda has manifested itself as well in the behavior of European Union Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Oliver Varhelyi, and of the EU Ambassador to Bosnia Johann Sattler. It appears that these two figures arranged for the special December 10 RS Parliament session to take place, with the understanding that, while the NSRS would go ahead and pass its declaration of intent to create independent governing institutions, it would not actually enact them for six months. This formulation gave Sattler and Varhelyi (a Hungarian politician close to Orban) cover to present their action as a blocking maneuver against secession, by virtue of the 6-month delay. Varhelyi insisted robustly, after the fact, that he had warned Dodik not to allow the RS Parliament to draft the secessionist declaration. But it is pretty clear that, on the contrary, Sattler and Varhelyi smoothed the way for this event, if not outrightly supporting it. [8]

These moves on the part of Western officials all point to appeasement of the Dodik impulse toward separatism. The dynamics between Dodik and the West over the past 15-odd years have been described many times: Dodik pushes Bosnia into a new crisis; then he gets rewarded. This is happening now. Commentators have noted that Dodik has been surprised at how far he has been allowed to go with his plans. While secession, and/or war—as before—are "unthinkable," they are possible. Dodik will take as much as he can get. This is certain. It is the response of the EU and the US that are up in the air, and at present, the responses do not look promising.

There is a recent initiative that points at a resolution to the Serb boycott of state institutions. Since that boycott was prompted by former HR Inzko's decree against genocide denial last July, it has been suggested that the Bosnian state-level Parliament work out a resolution that would satisfy everyone—then HR Schmidt would annul the Inzko laws. This initiative, in fact, is being promoted by Varhelyi, with some rhetorical support from Schmidt. Though there is scant information about this, apparently Schmidt confirmed that he would support a Parliamentary move that was "explicitly even-handed over the denial of any genocide."

Schmidt's main focus is described as being "on the clear need to create the basis for a parliamentary legislative process through a broad social discussion involving social and religious stakeholders." But "broad social discussion" sounds like something that can't win the race against secession. And it doesn't make sense that any amount of social discussion—or even palavering inside the Parliament—will reconcile the secessionists to the idea of admitting that their political predecessors were genocidaires. It sounds like a non-starter, or a way to delay and confound those who would keep Bosnia intact. [9]

In a recent report, the Democratization Policy Council blasted the combination of Western officials' moves that lean toward appeasement. Commenting that "EU official’s actions directly aid the break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina," The DPC describes a package of Western officials' deals (especially from Varhelyi) that contains the following concessions: "a soft electoral partition a plus property devolution" that the DPC terms "a kleptocratic giveaway." The report warns that what it calls the "spoiler-focused 'diplomacy'" will magnify corruption and party capture...hasten emigration, allow organized crime and corruption to flourish, and demonstrate just how willing the EU is to throw money at right-wing extremists to camouflage protracted failure and fake 'success'."

That's a strong condemnation from the DPC, which further describes the "EU foreign policy machine [as being] steered by Orban," and chastises the EU as comfortable with "transactionalism with autocrats [as] business as usual." [10]

In fact, we've seen this before. The EU and the West in general was not any more careful before the breakup of Yugoslavia thirty years ago than it is now, and we saw what that carelessness permitted to happen.

During the last week in December, the Bosnian Office of the Prosecution raised its befuddled head and called in a half-dozen leaders of the Republika Srpska to question them on a case they have formed, which they call the "Attack on the Constitutional Order." The Prosecution formed this case after the December 10 RS Parliamentary session, investigating what appears to be a de facto move toward secession. Leaders of the opposition were called and questioned about the session, and they cooperated because, having abstained from participation in the Parliament's decisions on that day, they really had nothing to hide. The outcome will probably be different if members of Dodik's party, and coalition members, are called. To date, Dodik has responded with intensified racist statements against "Muslim Sarajevo." Look for a continuation of this drama in the months to come.

Meanwhile activists, primarily in Sarajevo, have continued to organize sporadic demonstrations in front of public institutions, calling for constitutional reform towards a civic democracy. And activists based in Brussels, representing the Bosnian diaspora, are calling for protest demonstrations in Europe and North America on January 10 against Dodik's secessionist moves. To date, there are plans for demonstrations in London and Brussels, among other European cities, and American activists have submitted a request for a permit to hold a demonstration in New York. All pro-Bosnian members of the diaspora, along with allies, are invited to participate. For background on the demonstrations, see here and keep an eye out for updates.

This blog entry is long enough at this point, if not too long. But I must quote the analyst Dr. Aleksandar Knežević, who on December 27 wrote a column titled, "They say come to an agreement" (Kažu dogovorite se). In recent months I've mentioned the silly, fatuous, useless, and meaningless phrases uttered time and again by international officials calling for Bosnians to sit down together and "work things out." Here's what Dr. Knežević has to say about that—just a couple of excerpts.

"Today, as Milorad Dodik is tearing apart Bosnia and Herzegovina, and when the other two members of the Presidency have no idea how to do their jobs, well-meaning Europe says that the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina need to make a deal. Of course, nothing is better than such an arrangement."
...
"Yes, an arrangement is needed. But that cannot be done among three sides, but among four. That includes, 1, those who are living below the poverty line, 2, those who wish to live decently, 3, those who have business sense and are willing to take a risk, and 4, those who are members of the political-criminal circle. The Bosnian Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Others don't need to negotiate directly, because in each ethnic group there are the four above-mentioned social categories. Because ethnicity is not a matter of ethnic politics; it is a matter of ethnic culture. Politics works on the social status of the citizens and their aspirations. In Bosnia-Herzegovina negotiations are needed, but the citizens who fall into these different social groupings are the ones who need to negotiate about social questions." [11]

In other words, international officials are playing the wrong game, with the wrong people, and they cannot help Bosnia get out of the present and long-term crisis in that way. It reminds me of a saying, allegedly from Albert Einstein, that goes, "You can't solve a problem from the same level of consciousness that caused it." That's where the international community is stuck—and I suspect, for that matter, that that is where they are content to be. They don't really want to solve the problem, because not only can they not imagine a real solution, but the present situation—wars and all—does not bother them that much, if at all. It makes for a good career.

________________________________________________________________________

Footnotes:
[1] "Brisel zaprijetio najvišim zvaničnicima RS-a: Obustavite sve aktivnosti vraćanja nadležnosti." Oslobodjenje, December 24, 2021
[2] See Der Standard otkriva Dodikovu strategiju: Potreban mu je novac kako bi hitno otplatio kamate, Oslobodjenje, December 6, 2021
[3] Crnadak razotkrio Dodika i najavio prelomni trenutak naredne sedmice: Kanonada velikog srbovanja..., Oslobodjenje, December 24, 2021
[4] Iza krize u BiH stoji formula K=M+D-O: Znate li šta ona znači?, Oslobodjenje, December 23, 2021
[5] See "IMF warns Bosnian Serb separatists against dismantling tax regime," Reuters  Dec. 8, 2021
[6] "Počelo je? / Strane kompanije odbijaju potpisati ugovore sa firmama iz RS-a: Ovo je rezultat Dodikovih nebuloza", Oslobodjenje, December 16, 2021
[7] Bosnia Daily, December 22, 2021: "Orban: How to integrate a country with two million Muslims?"
[8] Bosnia Daily, December 22, 2021: " Outrage among pro-BiH parties over allegations regarding Varhelyi's activities"
[9] EU working to amend genocide denial law that is blamed for Bosnia crisis, The Guardian, December 22, 2021
[10] Democratization Policy Council warns of Várhelyi’s complicity with Dodik, N1 News (Sarajevo), December 22, 2021
[11] Kažu dogovorite se, Dr. Aleksandar Knežević, Oslobodjenje, December 30, 2021

*

My November 12, 2021 presentation for UC Berkeley, titled "Bosnia-Herzegovina: How Long Does the 'Postwar Period' last?" is now on line here.

One last thing: I haven't made space to discuss Russia's role in supporting the secessionist drive, but here's an article that's worth reading on the subject: Russia Is Playing With Fire in the Balkans: How Putin’s Power Play Threatens Europe,
by Ivana Stradner, December 27, 2021

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