SURVIVING THE PEACE The Struggle for Postwar Recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina

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May 4, 2021
The elusive and provocative "non-paper" that proposes to re-draw borders; more
glorification of war criminals; the danger of a spurious "electoral reform;" Corona.

The non-paper
The biggest news from Bosnia-Herzegovina lately is this: the "non-news" of the infamous "non-paper" that almost no one has seen.

There's a trend lately of people and governmental institutions issuing unofficial position papers and policy proposals related to Bosnia and the surrounding ex-Yugoslav countries. The most notorious and provocative of these came to light in the first half of April after Slovenian President Borut Pahor met with the three members of Bosnia's state-level presidency. In that meeting, he asked if a peaceful dissolution of Bosnia were possible.

The three members responded as follows, and I paraphrase freely: Croat member Željko Komšić shook his fist and said, "Not a chance!!"  Bosniak member Šefik Džaferović said, "Um, I don't suppose so." Serb member Milorad Dodik said, "Sure, why not?"

These responses were reflected in news articles that came out in news bits over the next couple of days (around April 12). In subsequent reports Pahor was quoted as saying that he wants "the exact opposite" (of dissolution), and was only posing the question out of concern about rumors that had been circulating in European diplomatic circles.

It soon came to light that something called a "non-paper" had been delivered to the office of the President of the European Commission, Charles Michel. There is much that is vague about this. News and rumors connect Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Janša with the paper—possibly as the writer, but moreso as the person who sent the document to Michel. Janša denies involvement, saying he had not met with Michel since last year. Off the record, Bosnian and European commentators profess to be certain Janša sponsored the non-paper.

The reason the paper is so inflammatory is that it proposes a series of border changes: uniting most of Kosovo (and parts of Montenegro and Macedonia) with Albania; removing the Republika Srpska from Bosnia and uniting it with Serbia; removing a Croat-controlled part of Bosnia from that country and uniting it with Croatia; and leaving the rest of Bosnia as an independent Bosniak-controlled state.

All these solutions are intuitively attractive if you think, as the empire-builders of the 19th century did, that pieces of territory are like building components that you can casually rearrange to fit your simplistic vision of what constitutes a state. They're attractive if you don't mind the resulting war and accompanying genocide. That is, after all, what happened in the 1990s with the rearrangement of borders in former Yugoslavia.

Not only is Janša's direct participation in the non-paper hard to prove, but the document itself is elusive. That furthers the purpose of a non-paper: to get an idea into circulation without the writers taking the risk of exposing themselves too much. It's kind of a diplomatic way of saying, "I'm just sayin'." Which is a way of saying something without taking responsibility for it.

Naturally, the release of the ideas contained in the non-paper caused more than a stir, both in Bosnia and abroad. The Bosniak nationalist SDA rebuffed the ideas, saying, reasonably, that "people should be aware that such things must never happen, because the only result will be war and a chain reaction throughout the region." The US Embassy pointed out that the Dayton agreement and the Bosnian Constitution do not allow the secession of either entity from the country.

Pretty much every other embassy in Europe weighed in strongly against the non-proposals. Every pundit, commentator, and analyst filled the news and internet with comments opposing the ideas. Eric Gordy suggested the possibility of a conspiratorial background to the non-paper; perhaps Janša colluded with autocratic and racist Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to send out what people are calling a "trial balloon." Progressive Bosnian politician and activist Reuf Bajrović asserted that a "Putin-friendly group of EU members are working toward making the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina possible."

These assertions about the background of the non-paper, while it's hard to know if they are true, have logic on their side. It is clear that Russia wants a weak and divided Bosnia, which would thereby be so much the less likely to go the way of Montenegro (to date) and Macedonia, i.e., toward NATO and the West. A disintegrated Bosnia would be so much the better.

And one commentator suggested that there is an ideological ferment taking place among European right-wing nationalists as a result of the departure of Trump from office. Trump had put wind in the sails of the building-block movers and shakers of Europe, focusing simplistically and dangerously on Kosovo and Serbia, for example. Now, with Biden and his Secretary of State Anthony Blinken in office, there's a possibility of much greater understanding and nuance coming from Washington. So it seems plausible that the autocrats, petty manipulators, and third-rate despots (and Janša is all that) are combining to mount a pre-emptive assault against a stabilizing trend led by Washington and the cooler heads in the EU.

It happens that Slovenia is due to assume the presidency of the Council of the European Union in July of this year. It's conceivable that by then this non-paper will fade, and that the non-news will go away. That's what should happen with any lousy, outmoded political idea. In this vein, Germany’s Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said that the idea of re-drawing borders in the former Yugoslavia was “nothing but hot air” and does not deserve the air time it is getting.

But TK Vogel, of the Democratization Policy Council, pointed out, "...the question is, what's the secondary effect this is going to have? Independently of whether any of this will actually happen, I think the effect it has is to create an atmosphere in which people feel that everything is negotiable -- nothing is to be taken for granted. And that's a very dangerous game to play, I think, in the Balkans."

And the atmosphere has heated up in Bosnia and the region, with SDA leader Bakir Izetbegović saying that he would defend the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state even if it meant war. Dodik responded that he would not go to war even to preserve the Republika Srpska: "They said there would be war, but who is for war? Izetbegović's statements are the words of a loser."

Meanwhile, Serbia's Minister of Internal Affairs Aleksandar Vulin stated that it is "not clear why the borders of the Balkans are unchangeable and why the Serbian national question could not be finally resolved by having all Serbs in one state." He went on to call Serbs who had come out in opposition to the ideas of the non-paper as "accidental Serbs." "I respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as protected by Dayton," he said, "but the politicians there say that it's not a functional state." Vulin omitted the fact that that dysfunctionality and division have been most avidly and skillfully promoted by Dodik over the last 15 years.

Serbian President Vučić then visited Banja Luka and played the good cop to Dodik's and Vulin's bad cops, espousing peaceful cooperation, while donating Russian and Indian Covid vaccines.

Emboldened by the non-paper, Dodik announced the formation of a commission to study the possibility of a "peaceful dissolution" (mirni razlaz). He proposed to leaders of the Federation that officials of the two entities meet to discuss the issue. There's been no response so far from the Federation, and I wouldn't hold my breath.

Dodik stated that the negotiating team was his "answer to those who call for war." But while he postures as the peaceable leader of Bosnia's Serbs, he has been making sure to build up the armament of the RS police force to the point where it is equivalent to a serious military fighting force. It has bought a dozen armored combat vehicles, some helicopters, and 2,500 assault rifles, along with grenade launchers. All that is missing is the tanks and heavy artillery.

And Dodik says that the RS "will not make a war move, but it will defend itself." Well, the history of aggression under the guise of self-defense could fill an encyclopedia. All that's necessary is the accompanying rhetoric of victimization.

Banja Luka sociologist and wit Srđan Puhalo commented that the prospect of dissolution has now become "a little more real." He suggests that the non-paper comes at a time when it is convenient to distract people's attention from real problems in Bosnia: the raging Covid epidemic, unemployment, the exodus of young people, corruption, and much more.

It's also worth considering another issue lost in the distraction. Several commentators have noted that Croat nationalist leader Dragan Čović has largely kept out of the fray. He has pulled a number of levers lately to achieve his long-desired goal of "electoral reform," and people have pointed out that as the current fervor about the non-paper subsides, Čović will make the most of the opening to see through a new, de facto "third entity." More about that coming up next.

"Electoral Reform"

In mid-April I had an op-ed published in the "EU Observer": "Ethno-nationalism is not way forward for Bosnia-Herzegovina." See the article here. In the article, I describe how Čović, as leader of the Croat nationalist party HDZ, has long promoted the establishment of a third, Croat-controlled entity. Since resistance to an officially created entity has been strong, Croat nationalists have worked to devise a manner of territorial separation that would empower the HDZ as sole representative of the Croats.

This is in part a response to the third (non-consecutive) election of Komšić, a non-nationalist, as representative of the Croats in the state-level presidency (2018). His victories have been assisted significantly through votes cast by Bosniak citizens of the Federation.

The scheme to enshrine the HDZ as the official and only representative of the Croats involves giving greater weight to Croat votes in those cantons where the HDZ is strongest. This works to the detriment—that is, the disenfranchisement—of Croat voters in parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina other than the hard-core west Herzegovinan and western Bosnian HDZ strongholds. Not that the HDZ has ever really cared about Croats in those areas, anyway.

I won't go into this at length here, but it is important that, again, there's a danger of a simplistic "problem solving" attitude among EU leaders—with the US Administration on the same side, opting for an "electoral reform" that gives the ticket away to the HDZ. This could be the more real and present danger to the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, after the non-paper halabuka (brouhaha) subsides. A third entity, legal or de facto, will break the country apart (read my article).

Glorifying the criminals

This is an ongoing enterprise, but in recent months there's been a spate of incidents where local officials have seen fit to glorify "their" war criminals. The city of Foča is a prime example. There, a couple of years ago someone painted a large mural of the WWII nationalist commander Draža Mihailović. Mihailović's monarchist troops collaborated with the Nazis in committing atrocities against Croat Catholics and Bosniak Muslims, in Foča as well as in many other parts of Bosnia. When returned Bosniaks complained about the mural, local youth said that if it were removed, they would "repaint it the next day." And then-mayor Mašić said that the paint on that mural was going to fade before anyone would order it removed.

Then just last month (April), a large mural depicting convicted war criminal and genocidaire Ratko Mladić appeared in the same town. These murals are not far from the Partizan sports hall, where extreme nationalist Serb forces imprisoned young people, women, and the elderly, and set up a "rape hotel" during the 1990s war. Together with a recent unsolved shooting at the minaret of Foča's restored Aladža Mosque, these murals understandably unnerve Bosniak returnees. One returnee explained, “We are sort of used to hearing bursts of gunfire fired by drunk people when bullets are flying around our heads. However, the shooting at the Aladža Mosque, at the minaret, sounded all the alarms. It also saddens us. The reaction by the police and local institutions scares us even more...Then we get a mural of a convicted war criminal. All of us are victims of that war and that criminal. We all have family members who were killed,” he added. More than 2,000 non-Serbs were killed in and around Foča, and some 20,000 were expelled.

Now a park in Bijeljina has been named after Mihailović, and there was a monument erected to him in Bileća two years ago. Meanwhile, in Višegrad on April 12 there was a ceremony commemorating the "Day of Russian Volunteers." An estimated 500 to 600 Russian mercenaries came to participate in the 1990s war on the Serb side, and 38 were killed "helping their Serb brothers," as one of the celebrants commented.

The Women Victims of War organization sent a letter to the office of the Bosnian Prosecutor calling for the ceremony to be stopped, saying that it was “a glorification of war criminals who insult survivors, family members of the killed, displaced persons and returnees.” The Prosecutor's office has promised to investigate.

On top of the visual glorification of war criminals, others who have been convicted have been greeted as heroes and even appointed or elected to public office. For example, Blagoje Simić, sentenced to 15 years in prison for persecution of non-Serbs in Bosanski Šamac, was appointed director of the local health center in 2017. His partner Simo Zarić, convicted of crimes against humanity (including torture and beating of civilian prisoners) in the same town, was elected deputy mayor of Šamac in 2008. There are many other war criminals who have been elevated to public position, not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also in Croatia and Serbia.

And in January of this year, the RS Parliament gave several convicted war criminals who had held office in that institution awards of honor. Among them were Radovan Karadžić, Momčilo Krajišnik, and Biljana Plavšić. In response, High Representative Valentin Inzko demanded that the RS annul the awards within three months. Now that period has expired, and at the end of April the Office of the High Representative (OHR) announced that "When it deems it the most optimal moment...in the function of reconciliation, it will take the next urgent steps."

It's difficult to read any real gravity into this statement, and for that matter, it's likely that Inzko will be leaving some time this year, probably to be replaced by German politician Christian Schmidt. This, over the objections of the RS and the Russians. So there is no telling whether there will really be any repercussions for all of the RS's glorification of the war criminals who founded that entity.

Related to this, Inzko has also announced that if the Bosnian government does not pass a law prohibiting genocide denial by July 11 of this year—the 26th anniversary of the fall of Srebrenica—he will decree the law himself. He had already called for the passage of such a law in 2019. A bill prohibiting denial was recently defeated in the Bosnian Parliament's House of Peoples. With the OHR's "Bonn powers," Inzko has the power to bring the law into existence. He has not decreed any law since 11 years ago. Last November he stated, "Let’s be completely clear, I am ready." He may be ready, but we'll see if he's still High Representative this July.

Corona

The pandemic continues to ravage Bosnia, with some of the worst effects felt in Sarajevo. Introduction of the various vaccines has started to take place, four or five months behind the US. First came some donations from Serbia, and then other surrounding countries. Bosnia signed up last year with the international COVAX mechanism, a World Health Organization arrangement to allocate vaccines to less affluent countries. COVAX took so long to get rolling that Bosnia began seeking arrangements with various countries and manufacturers to acquire vaccines directly.

I spoke with a friend in Tuzla in late July, asking how the prospects looked there for getting a vaccine. She said, "I'm not even hoping for it."

As some vaccines did start trickling in, health workers were targeted for the first shots. The RS pulled out ahead of the Federation in acquiring vaccines, chiefly from Serbia. In mid-April Serbia announced that anyone who wished to could come to Belgrade for vaccines, and around 40,000 foreigners took advantage of this offer.

Meanwhile the epidemic was out of control. Over 20 doctors in the Federation died of the virus. By late March Bosnia's per capita death rate surpassed that of Italy, becoming the eighth highest in the world. A third wave of Covid infection was afoot. In early April a friend in Sarajevo told me of infected people lined up at the hospital, outside on the sidewalks, waiting for a chance to get in. Some people were fainting on the street from lack of breath.

A lockdown was declared in Sarajevo, with a curfew from 9:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m., and with kafanas and restaurants closed. Masks were required on the streets.

Some people protested the mask requirement, with pushback from medical workers. But more protested the hapless response to the plague from the government. A week into April a thousand people marched—most of them in a "car march"—demanding that the state-level Council of Ministers resign and that new ministers be appointed, within two weeks, with a clear plan to manage the crisis and to fight the pandemic. They blocked city traffic for a while, and then went home.

I commented to my friend in Sarajevo that apparently the Bosnian government was not capable of organizing an effective response to the pandemic. He answered, "They don't care."

By the end of April there were announcements of vaccine orders: 200,000 Pfizer vaccines by the beginning of May, plus tens of thousands from Serbia, and 50,000 Chinese vaccines as well. We'll see how much of this comes through. At the same time, the April surge seemed to be receding, and the outdoor mask requirement was lifted.

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